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Claire Callender and Peter Scott
The expansion and growing importance of higher education in England over the 
past 50 years, especially since the 1980s, have prompted numerous developments 
aimed at reshaping and restructuring the sector and its funding. In turn, these events 
reflect higher education’s changing ideological, economic, and social functions. 
The reforms introduced in 2012/13 in England are arguably the most radical and 
have far-reaching consequences, both intended and unintended. At their heart lies 
the question of how to pay for the increasing demand for higher education. These 
reforms are the focus of this book. They were informed by the Independent Review 
of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance, chaired by Lord Browne, and 
the subsequent 2011 White Paper – Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System 
(BIS, 2011). – 
The book seeks to unpack what has driven and underpinned the 2012/13 
reforms while locating them in a broad historical, ideological, and policy context. 
It looks both back at the factors that have prompted and informed them as well as 
forward to what they mean for the higher education sector, how it is managed, its 
future, and the policymaking process. 
To help contextualize the book the first part of this chapter provides a 
descriptive account of the contents of the Browne Report and the 2011 White Paper. 
The second part summarizes the other chapters. 
Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance 2009
The Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance, chaired 
by Lord Browne, was launched on 9 November 2009 with full political party support. 
It arose from the Labour Government’s commitment, made during the Commons 
stages of the 2004 Higher Education Bill, to review the operation of variable tuition 
fees for full-time students after three years. Thus initially, the Review was not prompted 
by a need for reform, but by a desire to assess the 2004 Higher Education Act. The 
Browne Review was ‘tasked with making recommendations to government on the 
future of fees policy and financial support for full and part-time undergraduate and 
postgraduate students’ (BIS, 2009) and was to report after the General Election of 
May 2010.The highly contentious and vote-losing issue of resolving student finances 
was consequently wiped off the General Election agenda, and left to the incoming 
government: the Conservative–Liberal Democratic Coalition. Such a defusing 
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strategy had also been used by the Conservatives: when they launched the 1996 
National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education, chaired by Sir Ron (later 
Lord) Dearing, and in the publication of the Dearing Report after the 1997 election.
The Browne Review’s final report – Independent Review of Higher Education 
Funding and Student Finance (IRHEFSF) – was published on 12 October 2010. Its 
case for reform focused on three issues (IRHEFSF, 2010: 23). The first issue was the 
need to increase higher education participation because demand exceeded supply. 
In addition, low-income students and under-represented groups were not going to 
the most prestigious universities, so ‘fair access’ had not been achieved while access 
to part-time study was hampered by a lack of government financial support.. The 
second focus was on improving quality: students lacked the skills employers wanted 
to improve productivity and higher education institutions needed more money to 
upgrade their courses and also lacked incentives to enhance the ‘student experience’. 
The third issue concentrated on the desire to create a sustainable system of higher 
education funding and the balance of private and public contributions to the higher 
education sector. This had not changed since 2006. Tuition fees of £3,000, introduced 
by the 2004 Higher Education Act, had generated more income for universities, but 
the government was spending more on student financial support. Consequently, 
higher education remained overly reliant on public funding, and if subject to public 
expenditure cuts would be unable to attract additional funds. 
The economic context within which the Review’s recommendations operated 
was one of the global recession and unprecedented cuts in public expenditure (HM 
Treasury, 2010). This is paramount for understanding its recommendations – and the 
Coalition’s response to them. So, too, are the political context and the Coalition’s 
ideology.
The Report’s key recommendations were as follows:
The Student Finance Plan
1. Most of the money higher education institutions receive from the government for 
teaching undergraduate courses should be withdrawn, but government subsidies 
for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics courses should continue 
at a reduced level. This lost income would be replaced by higher tuition fees. 
2. The government-set cap of £3,290 on undergraduate tuition fees should 
be removed. 
3. Higher education institutions charging tuition fees over £6,000 should be subject 
to a levy. Higher education institutions would keep a diminishing proportion of 
any fees charged above £6,000, and the levy returned to government to help fund 
the national student financial support system, so avoiding the need to restrict or 
cut student numbers. 
Introduction
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4. All full-time students would continue to receive student loans to pay all their 
tuition fees, including those attending private higher education institutions, and 
for the first time, part-time students also should qualify for tuition fee loans. 
5. All full-time students would carry on receiving student loans for maintenance but 
these should no longer be means tested. Full-time low-income students also would 
still qualify for maintenance grants which would be increased to compensate for 
the proposed abolition of statutory bursaries.
6. The terms and conditions of student loans repayment should change. The point 
at which graduates start to repay their loans should increase from £15,000 to 
£21,000, and all outstanding debt should be forgiven after 30 years – previously 
25 years. Consequently, graduates would pay 9 per cent (unchanged) of their 
income above £21,000 until they had repaid all their student loan debt, with any 
outstanding debt written off after 30 years.
7. The interest paid on the loans for graduates earning above £21,000 should be 
equal to the government’s cost of borrowing (inflation plus 2.2 per cent), and 
this income threshold should no longer rise automatically in line with inflation. 
8. Potential students should be provided, primarily by higher education institutions, 
with more information and careers advice about courses and their outcomes, so 
they can make informed higher education choices.
9. Entitlement to student finance should be determined by a minimum higher 
education entry standard, based on UCAS tariff agreed annually.
The Higher Education Council
10. The four bodies regulating the higher education sector – the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England (HEFCE), Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), 
Office for Fair Access (OFFA), and the Office of the Independent Adjudicator 
(OIA) – should be combined in one: the Higher Education Council. It would 
take a more targeted approach to regulation, with greater autonomy for higher 
education institutions, and have five areas of responsibility: investment, quality, 
equity of access, competition, and dispute resolution.
Other provisions
11. Increase in student numbers of around 10 per cent over the next three years.
The Coalition Government’s response to the Browne Report
2010 government Spending Review
On 20 October 2010 the Chancellor, George Osborne, presented the government’s 
Spending Review. The 25 per cent reduction by 2014–15 of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills’ resource budget hit higher education the hardest of 
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all. Two thirds of the savings were to be delivered by reforming the funding of higher 
and further education (BIS, 2010), while the overall higher education resource 
budget, excluding research funding, was cut by 40 per cent – or £2.9 billion – and 
reduced to £4.2 billion by 2014–15 (BIS, 2010). Such measures were inextricably 
linked to the Browne Review’s recommendations and the withdrawal of government 
funding for most undergraduate courses.
The government’s formal response to the Browne Report came in two stages: 
in a statement by David Willetts, Minister for Universities and Science, in the House 
of Commons on 3 November 2010 (Hansard, 2010) and in their publication on 28 
June 2011 of the White Paper Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ (BIS, 
2011a) – which reiterated the announcement of November 2010. The government 
accepted some of Browne’s proposals while rejecting others. They also introduced 
some new mechanisms in the White Paper while supporting the ideological thrust 
of the Browne Report for a more marketized higher education sector with students as 
consumers at the heart of the system. 
Announcement by David Willetts in the House of Commons on 3 November 2010
All the changes Willetts pronounced on 3 November 2010 came into force for new 
higher education entrants in 2012/13. The government:
● endorsed Browne’s recommendation to withdraw most of higher education 
institutions’ teaching funds (see 1 above)
● rejected Browne’s suggestion that the tuition fees cap should be abolished (2). 
Instead, the existing cap of £3,290 per annum for full-time courses was increased 
to a maximum of £9,000, and for the first time, a cap of £6,750 was put on the 
fees for part-time undergraduate courses 
● abandoned the idea of a fees levy (3) – but higher education institutions 
charging more than £6,000 were to be subject to ‘a tougher regime’ to ensure 
they met their widening participation and fair access responsibilities
● approved the extension of tuition fee loans to part-time undergraduates (4), but 
continued to partially means-test maintenance loans for full-time students (5)
● allowed maintenance grants for low-income students to be increased (5) but 
limited eligibility to partial grants to students whose family annual income was 
between £25,000 to £42,000; 
● agreed with Browne’s earnings threshold for loan repayments and the extended 
period of debt forgiveness (6) 
● introduced higher interests rates on loans (7). Both graduates from part-time 
and full-time study will not start repaying their loans until earning £21,000 a year, 
when the interest on their loan will be limited to inflation. Graduates earning 
between £21,000 and £41,000 will be charged interest on a sliding scale up to a 
maximum of inflation plus 3 per cent when annual earnings exceed £41,000
● supported more information for students (8)
Introduction
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● announced a National Scholarship Programme, co-funded by the government 
and higher education institutions, as a sop to the Liberal Democrats in the 
Coalition. This support for low-income students, worth at least £3,000, was not 
an entitlement: higher education institutions determine who receives help and 
what they get. 
Significantly, both Browne and the government recognized the importance of a 
comprehensive student support system to safeguard higher education participation. 
Consequently, the overall structure and type of student financial support available to 
full-time students remain largely unchanged, mirroring the provision introduced in 
2006. However, students will graduate with much higher student loan debt which it 
will take graduates far longer to pay off. 
2011 White Paper: Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System
The 2011 White Paper (BIS, 2011) primarily repeated, albeit in more detail, the 
statement Willetts had made in November 2010 but also sought to deal with HEI’s 
responses to that announcement, especially the higher than expected fees higher 
education institutions planned to charge – all within an ideologically driven vision of 
a higher education sector whose purpose and role were to be defined by the market.
The White Paper mirrors the Browne Report’s case for reform: 
Our reforms tackle three challenges. First, putting higher education on 
a sustainable footing. We inherited the largest budget deficit in post-war 
history, requiring spending cuts across government. By shifting public 
spending away from teaching grants and towards repayable tuition loans, 
we have ensured that higher education receives the funding it needs even 
as substantial savings are made to public expenditure. Second, institutions 
must deliver a better student experience; improving teaching, assessment, 
feedback and preparation for the world of work. Third, they must take 
more responsibility for increasing social mobility. 
(BIS, 2011: 4)
The White Paper established mechanisms to reduce higher education institutions’ 
tuition fees (and the government’s student loan bill), and to create more competition 
between providers in an environment of constrained student numbers by ‘liberating 
student number controls’ (BIS, 2011: 48). It introduced ‘core and margin’ student 
places. Higher education institutions were allowed to recruit as many students as 
they liked scoring the equivalent of AAB or above at A-level, while 20,000 places 
were reserved for higher education providers whose average tuition fee, after fee 
waivers, was £7,500 or below. These places were removed from the national pot 
of government-allocated student places and a higher education institution’s’ core 
allocation, which led to a reduction in core allocations in 2012–13.Over time it was 
anticipated that the number of ‘core’ places would decline further, however, and the 
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number of competitive ‘margin’ places would increase. However, there was to be no 
increase in total student numbers.
The government also sought to create greater provider competition by 
simplifying the regulations for obtaining and renewing degree-awarding powers to 
make it easier for new providers to enter the sector and by reviewing the use of the 
title ‘university’. However, they rejected Browne’s idea of a single regulatory body but 
said that they would ‘put in place a new regulatory system that protects standards and 
quality, gives power to students to trigger quality reviews where there are grounds for 
concern, yet cuts back the burden of review for high performing institutions’ (BIS, 
2011: 6). The measure required new legislation – and as Peter Scott shows in chapter 
3, there was little political appetite for that.
Outline of the book
This book contributes to an understanding of these reforms and their initial impact 
on higher education institutions, students, and society as a whole. The volume has 
two sections. The first provides a history and a context to the 2011 White Paper while 
the second examines particular issues and themes arising from it. 
Chapter 2 by Michael Shattock describes the historical, economic, and fiscal 
background to the budgetary decisions about higher education taken in the 2010 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) and later incorporated into policy in the 
White Paper (BIS, 2011). Like most policy decisions taken in higher education, 
Shattock argues that their roots extend far back in time. They were heavily 
conditioned by government policymaking machinery first established in the 1960s 
and by policy assumptions about the relationship between higher education and 
public expenditure dating back to the Thatcherite approach to reducing the latter in 
1979–80. The CSR decision to cut higher education government funding by 40 per 
cent was not newly minted in 2010. It reached back to policy tools first considered in 
1961–2 but which, rejected by Robbins in 1963 and by the Tory Government in the 
mid-1980s, were reactivated by New Labour, as part of their ‘Third Way’ politics, under 
Tony Blair in 2003. While not wishing to exaggerate the continuities in government 
decision-making, the decisions outlined in the CSR perhaps reflected a final stage 
in the Treasury’s search for a fiscal mechanism which would reconcile the key policy 
drivers of higher education’s post-war history: the increasing demand for places and 
the question of how to pay for them.
The next chapter, by Peter Scott, explores in more depth the policymaking 
process. Scott argues that the Browne Review and the subsequent White Paper 
represent a ‘new model’ of policy formation, one which had its origins in the 1980s 
under Thatcher and which was reinforced by New Labour from 1997. In contrast 
to the twentieth century’s more rationalist models of policymaking, this new model 
has four characteristics: a heightened degree of ideological dogmatism, a distrust of 
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traditional forms of professional expertise, a more pressurized 24/7 politics where 
presentation counts for more than implementation, and a focus on policy delivery 
at the expense of policy formation. The ‘new model’ has had a significant impact on 
higher education. It has contributed, firstly, to the increasing pace of policymaking 
and the frequency of policy interventions; secondly, to the decline of ‘grand narrative’ 
inquiries and the substitution of short-term political agendas – which helps account 
for why the Browne Report seems somewhat lightweight in comparison to the reports 
produced by the Robbins and Dearing Committees; thirdly, to the subordination 
of higher education policy to wider policies concerning innovation, industry, and 
employment; and finally, to more detailed intrusions into higher education under the 
guise of better management and improved accountability. As a result, policymaking 
focuses more on ‘on (ideological) message’ policy interventions that are brisker in 
their process, briefer in their presentation, and which reflect a number of trends such 
as the shift from the welfare to the market state, the development of a knowledge-
based global economy, the rise of the audit society, and even the foreshortening of 
time itself. 
Compared with the Dearing and Robbins’ Reports, Scott argues that the Browne 
Report fits this new model of policy formation well. However, while the Dearing and 
Browne Reports were received very differently by the higher education community, in 
their policy narratives are considerable continuities and a shared political consensus: 
that some sort of cost-sharing was necessary to deliver additional income to the 
higher education sector to maintain high-quality provision; that investment in higher 
education was justified in offering economic returns to both individuals and the state; 
and that enhancing learning and teaching, improving the student experience, and 
empowering students were all desired aims. Scott suggests that the Browne Report and 
2011 White Paper may have bent, but certainly did not break, this strong political 
consensus.
Continuing to describe and critique the contents of the Browne Report and 
2011 White Paper, Scott’s conclusions are twofold. First, there was no inevitability 
to the policies implemented by the Coalition Government. Rather, they reflect the 
contingency of policy formation. Second, the most dramatic changes in higher 
education may not result directly from the 2009–11 reforms but from the unintended 
impacts of other discrete, and uncoordinated, policy changes which together 
produce a ‘perfect storm’ in English higher education. These policies include: the 
recruitment of international students, the future shape of research (and innovation) 
policies, reforms in English schools, and the long-term consequences of devolution. 
Both conclusions – the contingency of policy formation and the gathering of a 
‘perfect storm’ – reinforce the plasticity of policy. 
Central to both the Browne Review and the 2011 White Paper, as we have seen, 
was the desire for a more market orientated higher education system with greater 
provider competition and user choice. As Scott argues, ‘market’ discourse has now 
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been irreversibly lodged in mainstream policy thinking. In chapter 4 Gareth Williams 
shows how this has come about and provides an economic critique of the limits of 
higher education’s marketization. He chronicles the shift in the sector’s funding and 
suggests there are two basic ways in which higher education can be organized: as 
a publicly provided service free at the point of delivery with its profile determined 
by politicians and planners, or a service provided by the market which decides how 
much is provided and who reaps the benefits on the basis of choices by individual 
consumers. In practice, all higher education systems are a combination of the two but 
the balance between them changes over time. In the UK the public service model was 
dominant until the late 1980s. But the past 20 years have seen a move towards market-
based provision. In the UK, this change was prompted by pressures brought about 
by ‘massification’ and radical ideological changes in ideas about how public services 
are best provided. However, the 2011 White Paper marks a major step towards a fully 
marketized higher education system in England. While the system has the potential 
to bring some benefits, especially in reducing the cost of provision by weakening the 
monopolizing power of providers, the so-called commodification of higher education 
also has many potential weaknesses. 
Considering these weaknesses, Williams asks whether, from an economic 
perspective, there are, or should be, limits to higher education’s marketization. He 
suggests that the idea of profit making by universities is a bridge too far. He argues 
that there are two central weaknesses to markets as mechanisms for the strategic 
allocation of resources. First, their tendency to prioritize short-term decision-making 
and second, their lack of concern with how the outcome of the large number of 
individual decisions that make up a market, distributes costs and benefits. Such 
weaknesses can contribute in turn towards, for instance, greater inequalities in access 
to higher education, a more stratified and hierarchical system of higher education, 
greater risks of corruption, increased managerialism and regulation, and a more 
intense audit culture. Williams maintains that it is possible to overcome these 
weaknesses but at a cost. However, he concludes that all the risks associated with 
market behaviour are likely to become more apparent the nearer higher education 
comes to being a service provided on an entirely financially transactional basis.
The second part of the book examines issues and themes emerging from the 
2011 White Paper. Here, it is useful to distinguish between policy aims – what the 
policy is supposed to achieve – and policy goals – the outcomes of policies and whether 
their aims are being achieved (Spicker, 2006). As discussed, the White Paper had 
three main policy aims: creating a financially sustainable higher education system, 
improving the student experience, and increasing social mobility. As Scott discusses 
in chapter 3 and the concluding chapter, along with Watson in chapter 11, there is 
considerable doubt as to whether these changes will lead to a more financially stable 
higher education sector. In the short- to medium-term public expenditure on higher 
education will rise, as will public sector debt in the first half of the century. 
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What about the student experience (whatever this term really means1) – is this 
likely to improve? The main driver in the 2012/13 reforms for improving the ‘student 
experience’ is the development of a higher education market which will lead, in 
theory, to better quality provision, drive down prices, and put ‘students at the heart of 
the system’. However, as Ron Barnett concludes in chapter 5, the student experience is 
likely to get worse as a result of the 2011 reforms. Barnett explores the marketization 
of higher education in relation to students. He probes the tacit idea of the ‘student’ 
informing the White Paper which, in line with the notion of higher education’s 
marketization, assumes that the ‘student’, in advance of her studies and with the 
aid of documents and data, can know what she wants from higher education, make 
rational choices about what to study, and can capture her educational experience 
and engagement in her course of study. A genuinely higher education, however, and 
all that is significant about higher education, Barnett argues, cannot be transparent 
and explicit in the way the White Paper requires. Indeed this search for transparency 
produces a process devoid of spontaneity, unpredictability, difficulty, challenge, and 
wonder while undermining higher education’s transformatory potential. Barnett 
illustrates his argument by interrogating the assumptions underpinning the White 
Paper. For instance, he calls into question its demand for ‘well-informed students 
driving teaching excellence’ (BIS, 2011: 25) and for ‘a better student experience and 
better-qualified graduates’ (BIS, 2011: 33). By dissecting the ideas bolstering such 
demands, Barnett highlights the White Paper’s narrow and regressive visions of the 
student and of learning. Ultimately, the reforms are likely to change the pedagogical 
relationship between students and their institutions to one that mirrors a market 
relationship and is thus self-undermining. In doing so they will impair the student 
experience rather than improve it.
Another important dynamic of a higher education market is the number of 
student places. Contrary to the Browne Review’s recommendation, the Coalition 
reforms have reduced the overall number of places, making admissions a zero-sum 
game. If some universities expand others must contract. If the number of institutions 
increases with new entrants, the average size of each must fall. Without greater 
student numbers, demand will continue to outstrip supply, constraining competition 
on quality and limiting student choice. Thus for some would-be students there will be 
no ‘student experience’ to improve. However, as Gill Wyness discusses in chapter 6, 
the government attempted to overcome such issues and to put a downward pressure 
on tuition fees by introducing an awkward quasi-market. They abolished quotas for 
students with A-level (or equivalent) grades of AAB or better and reserved 20,000 
places for higher education institutions whose fees were less than £7,500 a year. 
Wyness explores some initial consequences of these changes and how they have had 
a strongly unequal impact on different types of higher education institutions and 
students. She suggests that under the government’s new system, the universities most 
likely to be negatively affected are those charging over £7,500 without many AAB+ 
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students. Russell Group universities, by contrast, were relatively protected, although 
some had unfilled places in 2012/13. Further education colleges were meant to be 
winners but they, too, failed to fill many of their newly allocated places. Wyness’ 
analysis helps explain enrolment patterns in 2012/13, which she recognizes may be 
atypical of future years. While there were very few changes in student enrolment 
by family background or in terms of the courses students applied for, there were 
differential decreases in application rates and volumes among students of different 
age groups. The number of 19-year-olds applying in 2012/13 decreased in particular, 
a reduction likely to affect Russell Group universities especially since they tend to 
recruit a greater proportion of younger students. Applications from older students 
were also down in 2012/13, which strongly affected further education colleges as 
well as mid- to low-tier universities. Whilst applications amongst such students may 
recover in future years, Wyness suggests that a permanent fall in mature students 
– and a fall in student numbers in general – could have serious consequences for 
certain institutions and be a major threat to the government’s reforms. Looking 
ahead, Wyness concludes that the somewhat awkward quasi-market will prevail. The 
government’s announcement to remove the cap on students with ABB as well as AAB 
is likely to have a similar affect to the reforms of 2012/13. Student deferrals, however, 
are likely to be less of an issue since Russell Group and other prestigious universities 
will be protected, while participation falls are more likely to affect medium and low 
tariff institutions and academically weaker students. 
In Chapter 7 by Anna Vignoles, we turn to the White Paper’s ambitious 
policy aim of increasing social mobility, which seeks both to increase the chances 
of someone from a lower socio-economic background going to university and to 
increase their chances relative to their more advantaged peers. Should this happen 
it implies a decline in the relative chance of students from middle and high socio-
economic groups gaining entrance into university. Vignoles reminds us of the 
importance of widening participation as a means for achieving social mobility. She 
shows that despite the fact that more people are participating in university, the socio-
economic gap in participation is substantial and she continues to explore some of 
the reasons for this. In suggesting that the new system of student financial support 
mostly protects poorer students from the potentially deterring effect of higher 
tuition fees, Vignoles largely rejects the argument that poor students are unable to 
access university because it is unaffordable. Instead she argues that poorer students 
are less likely to go to university because they have lower levels of prior educational 
attainment which in turn is associated with their family characteristics. Consequently, 
as the White Paper recognizes, the policy effort needs to focus on improving poorer 
children’s achievement in school and on providing better resourced careers advice 
for all children. However, some responsibility for widening participation rests with 
higher education institutions. The National Scholarship Programme, in its current 
form, is unlikely to be of much assistance in this regard. Using contextual data in 
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admissions might help at the margins, as might the Office for Fair Access’ (OFFA) 
enhanced role. More outreach would be beneficial too – especially to encourage 
those poorer students who are qualified to enter university but choose to pursue non-
degree options – as would assessing the overall effectiveness of outreach activities.
One of the policy goals of the White Paper was to open up access to higher 
education, particularly through part-time study. The government sought to achieve 
this goal by providing enhanced financial support for part-time undergraduate 
students, introducing, for the first time, loans for their tuition fees. Following this 
change, however, there has been a 40 per cent fall in part-time undergraduate 
entrants since 2010/11. Chapter 8 by Claire Callender focuses on part-time students 
and provides a critique of the reforms of part-time student finances. Far from 
remedying the longstanding injustice in support for adult learners, Callender argues 
that the new loans for part-time students are likely to re-enforce or perpetuate them. 
The loans’ very restrictive eligibility criteria mean that the majority of part-time 
undergraduates do not qualify for them, and yet are faced with far higher tuition fees 
which they have to pay upfront, and out of their own pocket.. Callender suggests that 
these policies were designed for the ‘typical student and graduate’: a young school 
leaver who studies full-time and who, on graduation, enters the labour market for 
the first time. They fail to acknowledge the distinctive characteristics of the part-time 
student population, who consequently miss out most on the loans or choose to shun 
them. In their present form, Callender contends, the loans are an inappropriate tool 
of student support for many part-timers. Both the lower financial private returns to 
part-time study and the wide ranging non-pecuniary benefits students reap from their 
studies together justify larger government subsidies to encourage demand for part-
time study. Callender proposes that the government, at a minimum, should rethink 
the eligibility criteria of loans so that more students qualify for them. She concludes 
that unless there is the political will both within the higher education sector and the 
government to tackle the challenges posed by part-time study, demand and supply is 
likely to continue to fall, contrary to the government’s intentions. 
Another way the government has sought to open up access to higher education 
and to increase student choice and provider competition is through encouraging 
new entrants – including private providers and further education colleges – into the 
sector. Such new entrants are integral to the government’s vision of a well-operating 
higher education market. In Chapter 9 Paul Temple discusses aspects of UK private 
higher education. He describes the difficulty of neatly classifying the UK system into 
the public or private sector, arguing that UK universities have always been private, 
non-profit institutions but with important links to the state. The post-war expansion 
of higher education was seen as the state’s responsibility, as was providing generous 
state support for students, which made UK higher education an international 
anomaly: a public–private partnership relying on public funds. Very few universities 
in the UK are completely private, namely, institutions which receive no direct 
Claire Callender and Peter Scott
12
public financial support. Encouraging greater private sector involvement in higher 
education – crucially, by making it easier to gain a university title and by removing the 
legal impediments to private companies buying existing universities – is something 
the White Paper sought to remedy. However, as Temple argues, the White Paper 
provides no clear rationale for the growth of private provision and its benefits, nor 
does it give well-honed arguments as to why private sector providers should compete 
on equal terms with the public sector. Temple thus concludes that increasing the 
number of private providers was an ideological goal, and a policy framework was put 
together to support such an objective. He ends by suggesting that the ecology of the 
UK higher education is changing, with expanding private for-profit and non-profit 
sectors gaining degree-awarding powers. Looking ahead he sees a more complex 
pattern of higher education developing, with intersecting fields of public and private 
provision and a wider range of overlapping institutional types. Ultimately this brings 
into question the extent to which we can still speak of a single higher education 
‘system’ or ‘sector’. 
Unlike previous higher education White Papers, the 2011 White Paper is very 
narrowly drawn, focusing exclusively on the undergraduate economy, especially 
student funding, while failing to locate higher education within a broader context 
or addressing other higher education concerns. Overlooked and forgotten topics 
include postgraduate education, research, innovation, and knowledge exchange. 
Chapter 10 by Geoff Whitty and Joel Mullan focuses on postgraduate education. The 
authors point that not all government funding has been withdrawn from postgraduate 
courses, unlike most undergraduate courses. For the time being existing levels of 
core funding for postgraduate teaching in higher cost subjects has been maintained. 
Longer-term solutions to the funding of postgraduate courses and students are 
required, however, because, as Whitty and Mullan show, postgraduate education 
matters for the long-term health of the higher education sector, the economy, the 
nation’s culture, the professions, and for social justice and access including social 
mobility. Despite their importance, however, the majority of home postgraduates on 
taught courses receive no financial help with their tuition fee costs, nor do those 
undertaking part-time postgraduate research. Whitty and Mullan, in response, 
present a range of possible approaches to funding postgraduate study – including 
loans, long-term private bonds, alumni borrowing, and tax incentives for employers – 
and highlight a range of recommendations from the Higher Education Commission. 
To ensure against iniquities in the higher education system that have so far been 
neglected in the funding debate, they conclude that measures urgently need to be 
put in place before the first cohort of undergraduates paying £9,000 in tuition fees 
graduate in 2016. 
It is clear that the reforms are creating considerable instability in the sector. 
In chapter 11 David Watson discusses how higher education institutions can weather 
the storm of national policy confusion, funding uncertainty, and diminished public 
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confidence arising from the White Paper. Watson looks at two key themes in recent 
literature on UK higher education management: the limits of institutional autonomy 
and the freedom of choice of strategic direction. He begins with a historical analysis 
of ‘mission choice’ by UK higher education institutions since the Conservative 
Government came to power in 1979, setting this in a context of changes in sectorial 
organization and funding including those contained within the 2011 White Paper. 
From there he derives a pattern of actual and potential constraints on whole-
institution actions related to policy, markets, inherited and accumulated resources (of 
all kinds), performance (including of leadership and governance), and reputation. 
He then develops the concept of an institution’s ‘zone of freedom of action’ based 
on the interplay of opportunities, constraints, and resources, a process which reviews 
a series of techniques and objectives for institutional self-study. He concludes with a 
prognosis of possible and likely institutional trajectories.
In the concluding chapter Claire Callender and Peter Scott explore firstly 
how best to interpret the 2011/12 reforms – in terms of continuity or rupture? 
Secondly, they examine the reform’s collateral effects, or unforeseen and unintended 
consequences, in relation to student demand, access and equity, part-time study, 
postgraduate education, and new providers. They suggest that so far the reforms have 
failed to produce the changes ministers desired but they may achieve their overall 
objective to change the culture of the English higher education system. The ‘market’ 
university may not have emerged but the ‘managerial’ university is likely to develop, 
changing both institutional priorities and organizational cultures.
Note
1 Given the diversity of the student population, it is highly questionable if we can really talk 
about a monolithic ‘student experience’.
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Chapter 2
Public Expenditure and Tuition 
Fees: the search for alternative 
ways to pay for higher education
Michael Shattock
Introduction
This chapter describes the historical, economic, and fiscal background to the 
budgetary decisions about higher education taken in the 2010 Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR) and later translated into policy in the White Paper: Higher 
Education: Students at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011). Like most policy decisions 
in higher education, their roots extend far back in time. While I do not claim that 
they were an inevitable culmination of economic and demographic pressures, I do 
argue that they were heavily conditioned by government policymaking machinery 
first established in the 1960s and by policy assumptions about the relationship 
between higher education and public expenditure which extended back to the 
Thatcherite approach to reducing the latter in 1979–80. The CSR decisions were not 
newly minted in 2010. They reached back to policy tools first considered in 1961–2 
but which, rejected by Robbins in 1963 and the Tory Government in the mid-1980s, 
were reactivated by Labour, as part of their Middle Way policies to higher education, 
under the Blair Government in 2003. 
While it might have been draconian, the decision in the CSR to cut 
government funding for higher education by 40 per cent only extended the decision 
– and essentially used the same machinery – made since the period when Sir Keith 
Joseph had been secretary of state in the mid-1980s to determine higher education 
on fiscal and economic grounds. This is not to say it is impossible to exaggerate 
the continuities in government decision-making – political decisions are inevitably 
influenced by circumstances (the economic downturn, the need to react to the 
Browne Review) and political relationships (the Coalition, the dominance of the 
Chancellor’s commitment to reduce public expenditure). But the CSR decisions also 
reflected perhaps a final stage in the Treasury’s search for a fiscal mechanism which 
would reconcile the key policy drivers of higher education’s post-war history: the 
increasing demand for places and the question of how to pay for them.
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The nationalization of higher education
The inter-war years were a period of sluggish economic growth, concerns about the 
labour market, and, until investment in rearmament began to take place, falling 
production. There was no government policy towards the universities which funded 
themselves approximately one third through tuition fee income, one third through 
endowment income, appeals to the local community and grants from local authorities, 
and one third from recurrent grants from the University Grants Committee (UGC). 
The UGC’s grant was calculated on a deficiency basis arising out of the shortfall in 
necessary funding from the first two funding sources. It was made on a quinquennial 
basis and the approval of institutions’ quinquennial plans provided the UGC with 
machinery to influence institutional development. This responsibility it exercised 
sparingly, however, being most concerned to assess bids on the level of financial 
rather than academic criteria. The UGC was a committee of the Treasury, staffed 
by civil servants seconded from the Treasury, and its quinquennial bid for funding 
represented not much more than a bundling up of the bids submitted by the 
universities themselves. Apart from isolated occasions such as the imposition of ‘the 
Geddes axe’ on departmental expenditure, the Treasury, confident in the efforts of 
its staff at the UGC to control unnecessary expenditure, was able to meet the UGC’s 
applications for support. During the war grant levels were maintained in spite of 
sharp falls in student numbers and the recruitment of many staff into war service.
However, universities emerged from the war into a new world. The Beveridge 
Report and the growth in the state’s power in the intervening years had predisposed 
government against the laissez faire approaches of the 1930s, which led to the 
Labour Party’s promise in its 1945 manifesto Let Us Face the Future that planning 
would supersede a reliance on price mechanisms. In the spring of 1944, following 
the recommendation made by Lord Hankey’s Inter Departmental Committee on 
Further Education and Training that the number of university places would need 
to be doubled from the figures for 1938–9, universities were immediately faced with 
the pressures of demobilization and the admission of ex-servicemen under the Class 
B priority scheme (Gosden, 1983). Moreover, various government departments 
launched inquiries aimed at meeting future professional manpower requirements 
– specifically, in higher technological education, scientific manpower, medical 
education, dentistry, agriculture, oriental, Slavonic, eastern European and African 
languages, and in social and economic research – which led to earmarked grants to 
the UGC to implement the various recommendations. Such demands came at a time 
when the universities were themselves struggling with the depredations of war, bomb 
damage, the occupations of their premises by the military or the Ministry of Works 
(the University of London and its colleges were moved out of London in 1939–40), 
and a lack of maintenance and refurbishment since the war had started. 
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It was clear that the pre-war funding mechanisms for universities had to 
change. There was little alternative but to turn to the state: pre-war endowment 
income had been decimated by the war, local authority contributions were limited 
by the new economic demands being imposed on them, and an increase in tuition 
fees was out of the question for demobilized armed forces. The universities, through 
their representative body, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), 
appealed to the Chancellor in two significant documents: a Memorandum dated 5 
January 1945 and a public document A Note on University Policy and Finance in the 
Decennium 1946–56, which set out the case for increased funding and recognized 
the implication that UGC funding would need to grow from around 30 per cent to 
around 75 per cent of university budgets (Shattock, 2012). The state was generous 
in its response, resulting effectively in a nationalization of the university system: by 
1949–50 the state contribution through the UGC had risen to 64 per cent from 34 
per cent in 1935–6 and the tuition fee contribution – mostly paid, in any case, by 
individual local authorities – had fallen from 32 per cent to 18 per cent. By 1979–80 
the contribution – including tuition fees, which were now paid by the state through 
local authorities – had risen to 80 per cent.
At the same time the government reformed the UGC, which gave it stronger 
terms of reference to plan the university system and reinforced its membership but 
left it firmly located under the Treasury. The universities may have effectively been 
nationalized, but the authority of the UGC, operating as Carswell, a former UGC 
secretary, described it ‘as a collective minister’ (Carswell, 1985) under the financial 
umbrella of the Treasury, gave the universities who dominated the UGC’s membership 
an independence from government which served as a guarantee against any direct 
intervention from external political interests. Of course, the UGC had still to secure 
from the Treasury sufficient resources to run the university system satisfactorily. 
Three factors were important. The first was the close relations between staff in the 
Treasury and staff seconded to the UGC. Edward Playfair, at the time in charge, 
within the Treasury, of the financing of universities, emphasized to a Parliamentary 
Select Committee on Estimates the special position of the UGC compared to the 
Ministry of Education: ‘The situation is not quite the same with the UGC who are in 
our minds part of the Treasury. Their job is to do our job … we regard them as being 
our agents and trustworthy agents’ (Select Committee on Estimates 1951–2, in Shinn, 
1986). Keith (later Lord) Murray, chairman of the UGC from 1953–63, buttressed 
this relationship by dining with the permanent secretary every month. The second 
factor was the Treasury’s obvious pride in the cultural significance of its responsibility 
for the universities (it was also responsible for funding museums and galleries). In 
1956 the financial secretary to the Treasury greeted a delegation from the CVCP with 
the words:
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From the Treasury point of view, of course, it is one of the redeeming 
features of the lives of Treasury ministers that we have this contact with the 
universities. I feel that very keenly myself. We have to be constantly dealing 
with figures and saying ‘No’ to colleagues in the government and yet here 
is something of a warm and young and constructive character into which 
we can throw ourselves.
(CVCP, 1956)
The third factor was the government’s political desire to avoid being accused of 
denying the opportunity of entering higher education to those qualified to benefit 
from it. Initially this was most obviously associated with the population’s sufferings 
during the War. Gardner argues that an informal social contract was forged in 
London during the Blitz: ‘People who “took it” should be entitled to “get it” – if “it” 
meant better housing, a fairer education system, more job opportunities’ (Gardner, 
2011). But the improvement of educational opportunity, as exemplified in the 1944 
Education Act, lay at the heart of progressive post-war thinking. Entry to higher 
education represented a key element in this programme – as the public response to 
the decision not to support the UGC’s forecast of need for additional places in 1962 
(see below) amply demonstrated – and was fuelled by comparison with the much 
higher proportions of students entering higher education in the United States.
The post-war expansion reached its peak at 85,000 students in 1949 and 
fell to 80,000 in 1953, after which demand began to rise again. The UGC was the 
first to identify the components of the likely growth: the ‘bulge’ arising from the 
return of demobilized servicemen and the ‘trend’ for increasing proportions of 
school children to stay on in the sixth form. Such was the pressure to meet demand 
that when existing universities proved reluctant to expand, the Treasury found the 
funding for the UGC to establish seven new universities. Forecast growth rates of 5 
per cent p.a. had to be raised to 7.5 per cent by the 1957–62 quinquennium and the 
target accepted by the Chancellor of 124,000 places by the mid-1960s had to be raised 
to 136,000. The UGC also forecasted the need for 170,000 places by the early 1970s. 
Already there were tensions in government about the growth of public expenditure. 
While the general national mood was optimistic and Macmillan had won the 1957 
General Election with the famous words ‘most of our people have never had it so 
good. Go round the country, go to the industrial towns, go to the farms and you 
will see a state of prosperity such as we have never had in my lifetime – nor indeed 
ever in this country’ (Hennessey, 2006), in December of that year his Chancellor, 
Thorneycroft, together with two Treasury ministers, Enoch Powell and Nigel Birch, 
resigned because they could not secure a £48 million reduction in public expenditure 
to reduce the 1958–9 estimates to the level of 1957–58. By contrast, the universities 
were given an 8.3 per cent increase in the 1957–62 quinquennium settlement, and 
when the CVCP complained about its inadequacy the UGC’s chairman responded 
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that the universities were being protected from cuts imposed on other departments 
and should consider themselves as being in ‘a privileged position’ (CVCP, 1957). 
However justified the CVCP comment may have been in the light of the 
prospective expansion, the fact was that the UGC’s relationship with the Treasury 
ensured the universities’ budget was ‘top sliced’ and not subjected to the same 
competitive pressures for funding as other areas of public spending. Murray might 
have had to have two separate meetings with the Chancellor himself to secure the 
quinquennial settlement, but it remained within the Treasury’s gift: the universities 
were indeed in a privileged position – they had an inside track.
The introduction of the Public Expenditure Survey (PES)
As the Thorneycroft resignation testifies, there were already concerns in the 1950s 
about the growth of public expenditure. Hennessey quotes a memo from Brooke, 
a senior Treasury official (later Sir Norman Brooke, secretary to the Cabinet) 
to Bridges, the head of the civil service, expressing his surprise that ‘the great 
increase in public expenditure and the substantial change in its pattern, which has 
come about in the last five years in consequence of their [government] policies in 
the field of social services’, had not been accompanied by a review of the longer 
term implications (Hennessey, 2006). In 1958, the Select Committee on Estimates 
prompted the Plowden Committee, whose Report, Control of Public Expenditure (HM 
Treasury, 1961), suggested a radical change in the way government estimates of future 
expenditure were arrived at. The essence of the Report was the recommendation that 
a formal process be introduced for assessing the public expenditure implications 
of policies five years ahead. Implementation brought a wholly new rigour into the 
establishment of priorities. First, it established a committee, the Public Expenditure 
Survey Committee (PESC), to control the process; second, it recommended the 
establishment of a Cabinet-level minister in the Treasury, the chief secretary, to take 
charge, under the Chancellor, of public expenditure; third, it laid down that the 
beginning of the process was a Cabinet decision which set a public expenditure target 
against which individual bids for new expenditure had to be judged; and finally, it 
established the mode of a departmental bidding process. Over the years the ceiling 
against which this bidding took place was normally fixed at between 40 per cent and 
42 per cent of national spending: in 2008–09 it had risen to 43.2 per cent (Crawford 
et al, 2009).
The prime architect of the PESC machinery was Sir Richard (Otto) Clarke, the 
civil servant responsible for public expenditure in the Treasury and for the universities’ 
budget. At its meeting in January 1962 Clarke addressed the UGC, congratulating it 
on the scope and thoroughness of its quinquennial report but warning that ‘the scale 
of university finance was now such that decisions could no longer be taken by Treasury 
ministers on their own but had become the responsibility of the government as a 
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whole’ (UGC, 1962). This was a coded message that the special relationship with the 
Treasury was at an end. Now the arbiter of public expenditure in a new competitive 
process, the Treasury could no longer itself be the budget holder and, by implication, 
the advocate in a bidding exercise. Almost overnight it had become the impartial 
inquisitor of higher education expenditure and the relentless proponent of devices 
to restrain departmental spending within a pre-decided public expenditure target.
The institution of the new PESC machinery cut across negotiations the UGC 
had been having with the Treasury since 1960 about the need to accept an expansion 
of student numbers to 170,000, and dealt with the recurrent and capital grant 
implications. The timing of capital grants was particularly important to ensure building 
starts to accommodate increased numbers in 1962 and 1963. By January 1961 the 
UGC had secured some improvement in capital grant for 1962–5 but no acceptance 
of student number targets beyond 150,000 at the end of the 1962–7 quinquennium. 
In his address Clarke warned that the government was facing enormous demands 
from the health services and the roads programme, that GDP would not rise above 
2.5 per cent annually, and that any increase in public expenditure above between 40 
and 45 per cent of national expenditure (the Cabinet fixed the PESC target at 42.5 
per cent) could only be paid for by politically unpopular tax increases. In March, the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Henry Brooke, reported to the House of Commons 
that ‘considerations of economic policy, which are, of course, right outside the scope 
of the [UGC’s] responsibility, have made it necessary to depart from the Committee’s 
recommendations’ (Berdahl, 1962). Although the actual settlement for recurrent 
resource up to 1967 was only a little less than the UGC’s bid, the crucial issue was 
that the 170,000 figure had been deferred until 1973–4, a year later than the end 
of the following quinquennium. The public response was immediate, prompting 
debates in both Houses of Parliament. In the Commons Gaitskell, the leader of the 
Labour Opposition, described the government’s action as ‘discreditable in substance, 
dishonourable in presentation and deplorable in its consequences’, while Lord 
Longford, the Opposition spokesman in the Lords, called for the removal of Treasury 
control over the universities (Berdahl, ibid). For a government already in political 
difficulty, what was most damaging was the fact that many of the speakers against the 
decision were from the Tory party. In response it quietly reversed its decision later 
in the year and transferred Henry Brooke in a reshuffle. More significant about the 
event, however, was the fact that the universities’ budget was no longer ring fenced, 
that it now had to fight its corner with other national needs, and that a new powerful 
piece of policymaking machinery – which could superimpose its decisions, unless 
overturned in Cabinet, on the aspirations of whatever authority, whether the UGC or, 
later, secretaries of state for education – had been introduced.
Public Expenditure and Tuition Fees: the search for
 alternative ways to pay for higher education
21
The Robbins Report and the future financing of higher education
The violence of the political reaction to the government’s failure to support the 
UGC’s forecast of demand was to have a long-term impact. In part it reflected a view 
that the government had appeared to foreclose an area of policy – namely the rate 
and pattern of higher education’s expansion which the Robbins Committee had been 
set up to recommend on only a year previously – and in part it was a genuine reaction 
against those who were qualified for university entry being denied the opportunity. 
The political scars from the episode were to determine the government’s reaction to 
the Robbins recommendations. In the meantime two other important developments 
had taken place. The first was a growth in higher education outside the universities, 
recognized in the 1956 Technical Education Act by the identification of colleges 
where such growth might be encouraged, and by the creation of a group of standard 
bearers for the local authority sector called Colleges of Advanced Technology, 
which were to be permitted to award a degree-equivalent Diploma in Technology. 
The second was the decision following the Anderson Report to finance tuition fees 
and student maintenance centrally, as an automatic right consequent on entry to 
higher education rather than being solely based on the judgement of local education 
authorities. Both decisions had clear long-term financial implications.
The Robbins Committee, though chaired by a leading economist, was much 
more concerned to present forecasts of the potential rate of expansion than to 
dwell in detail on how it was to be paid for. In this respect the waters had been 
particularly muddied by the decision to implement the Anderson Report in 1961. At 
the time the Anderson recommendations seemed like an entirely straightforward 
rationalization of provision, previously under the control of LEAs, and it was only in 
the 1980s that the Treasury compounded automatic student maintenance costs with 
the costs of student number expansion to create a single combined ‘pot of gold’ on 
which economies could be imposed. The Robbins Committee, forecasting a growth 
in student numbers from 216,000 in 1962–3 to 558,000 in 1980–1, had a unique 
opportunity to offer recommendations as to how this expansion (which implied more 
than a doubling of the public expenditure bill) could be financed – but chose not 
to do so. The chapter headed ‘The financial and economic aspects of our proposals’ 
comprised no more than 17 of the Report’s 296 pages (CHE, 1963) and relied on 
a generalized human capital argument – that ‘communities that had paid the most 
attention to higher studies have in general been the most obviously progressive in 
respect of wealth and income’ (ibid: para 626) – to justify the additional investment 
the expansion required.
The Robbins approach to the finance issue was the more surprising because it 
tacitly rejected the evidence presented by the Treasury. An examination of the various 
drafts of the Treasury evidence held in the National Archive (HM Treasury, 1961–2) 
show that while the Treasury was fully in support of a policy of expansion, and of the 
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economic and social gains to be derived from it, it was very concerned about how it 
was to be paid for. Reviewing a range of options as to how non-state moneys could 
be injected into the system, tuition fees, it noted, now amounted to only 12 per cent 
of total income: did not higher education bring private as well as public benefit? 
Was it not inequitable that the minority receiving its benefits should be supported 
by the majority who were not? Were loans to cover fees not justifiable? What was the 
justification for paying the fees of international students? Should consideration be 
given to two-year degrees? Such were to be the perennial questions in the next 30 
years. The Treasury offered two possible models within a target expansion to 500,000 
students by 1980–1: an Alpha model which envisaged an even split between university 
and non-university higher education students, in which universities would receive a 
10 per cent improvement in staffing, with two thirds of their students in residence; 
and a Beta model in which universities would be capped at 170,000 student places 
in 1973–4, the figure already approved, while the rest of the expansion took place in 
non-university sectors. It projected the total costs of these scenarios as representing 
1.90 per cent and 1.72 per cent of GNP respectively, as compared with the 1959–60 
percentage of 0.92 per cent. The Treasury pointed out that even Beta represented a 
doubling of the proportion of GNP and that this had to compete in Education alone 
with improving primary education and abolishing class sizes of over 40, improving 
secondary schools and extending the leaving age to 16, and extending part-time 
technical education – all against a projected increase of GNP of no more than 2.5 per 
cent. It concluded by saying that:
There is likely to be a large expansion of public expenditure in the next 
decade and it can reasonably forecast that governments will continue to 
limit the rate of growth of each service in order to keep the aggregate 
within tolerable limits. The development of all publicly financed services 
is therefore bound to depend upon the government’s choice of priorities 
between a large number of objectives, all desirable in themselves but not 
simultaneously practical. 
(CHE, 1963: para 58)
The Robbins Committee ignored the implied warning. Its 1980–1 forecast was 
for 558,000 students, not 500,000, of whom 346,000 would be in universities and 
212,000 in non-university higher education, the former a much higher proportion 
than even the Alpha model envisaged. It accepted the point about tuition fees but 
recommended that they be raised to 20 per cent but continue to be paid by the state. 
It also argued against loans, though conceded that they might have to be addressed in 
the future. Even more significantly it accepted the forecast of the National Economic 
Development Committee (NEDC), a body set up by Macmillan shortly before his 
resignation, whose Report, Growth of the UK Economy to 1966 (NEDC, 1963), had 
forecast a growth in GNP of 4 per cent rather than the Treasury’s 2.5 per cent. In 
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answer to the rhetorical question it posed to itself – ‘Is this extra proportionate call 
on the national income likely to cause undue strain on the resources of the future?’ 
(CHE, 1963: para 634) – it replied: ‘In the last resort, public money is spent on what 
people want; and if they want more higher education then, on the estimates we have 
made it should be possible to finance it without imposing intolerable strains on the 
budget or the economy’ (CHE, 1963: para 636).
The Report’s recommendations generated enormous popular momentum 
and it was here that the impact of the 1962 decision kicked in. The government, 
facing a General Election, could not afford to be seen denying opportunity to enter 
higher education and within 24 hours issued a statement accepting Robbins’ student 
number forecasts. It did so in such a way, however, as to lay down a policy imperative 
which lasted until 1980–1. The paper the chief secretary addressed to the Cabinet 
accepted the Robbins forecast numbers up to 1973–4, a ten-year programme, stating 
that it represented a growth in GNP from 0.80 per cent to 1.3 per cent within an 
assumed GNP growth rate of 4 per cent per annum. Not only was the Chief Secretary 
resiling from the Treasury’s previous evidence to Robbins on the economy, of which 
he was party to, but the GNP figures for 1963 and 1964 were both the product of 
Chancellor Maudling’s ‘dash for growth’ and no more than a blip on the 2.5 per 
cent p.a. average growth rate which actually went on to occur between 1964 and 
1980. The decision was taken on the basis, soon to be forgotten, that ‘this additional 
charge can be accepted if it is regarded as having priority both within the educational 
field and indeed over other proposals for public expenditure’ (Cabinet Office, 
1963). It represented a crucial commitment which was to last in effect until the 
public expenditure decisions of 1980 and 1981. Robbins could be said to have lost 
a once and for all opportunity to recommend a sustainable approach to financing 
an expansion everyone wanted to see. Instead the Tory cabinet connived under the 
pressure of political necessity by fudging the figures.
Higher education funding 1963–77: the breakdown of the 
Robbins system
Despite student numbers continuing to grow, the period from 1963 to 1997 reflects 
the gradual breakdown of the Robbins financial settlement and the failure both of 
successive governments and the PES process to reform it. In the first half of the 
period a number of factors combined to protect higher education. Although, 
formally, the government’s decision in 1963 only guaranteed the Robbins figures 
until 1973–4, Robbins’ forecasts for 1980–1 were, in practice, politically sacrosanct 
and it was only the failure of student demand that legitimized their revision 
downwards. The PES process, until its reassessment after the 1973–4 oil crisis and 
its inflationary consequences, was based on volume planning, so Robbins’ forecasts 
provided the essential backdrop to PES negotiations. The transfer of the UGC to 
Claire Callender and Peter Scott
24
the new Department of Education and Science (DES) facilitated this by locating 
the universities (though not local authority based higher education, which was still 
funded through the Department of the Environment) under a main line spending 
department. In 1972 the new Secretary of State, Margaret Thatcher, signed her 
Department up to the Programme Analysis Review (PAR) system which further 
entrenched student numbers in any bidding process. Nevertheless attempts were 
made around the edges to reduce the rise in the higher education bill: in 1966 a 
differential was introduced for the first time in the level of tuition fees charged 
for home and international students (Crosland being offered a choice in the PES 
round of additional payments by international students or introducing charging 
for school meals); Shirley Williams’ 13 points, which included a Treasury favourite, 
two-year degrees (repeated yet again in the 2011 White Paper), made suggestions 
for economies in 1969; capital grants for student residences were discontinued and 
institutions were encouraged to turn to loan finance; and the quinquennial funding 
system for universities collapsed under the strains of the oil crisis. 
The most significant change, however, was the end of volume planning as 
a basis for PES resource allocation and its replacement in April 1976 with ‘cash 
limits’, a move intended to curb inflation. The change meant the end of what the 
then permanent secretary of the Treasury called ‘funny money at constant prices’ 
(Pliatzky, 1975) or, in higher education terms, an inflation-proofed student unit of 
resource. In 1980–1 ‘cash limits’ were replaced by ‘cash planning’, which ensured all 
PES three-year expenditure decisions were based on firm cash targets which offered 
no flexibility if inflation outran estimates. ‘Cash planning’ represented a key element 
in the Thatcher Government’s approach to the control of public expenditure and 
was ‘at the heart of Britain’s present difficulties’, as the public expenditure White 
Paper of 1980–1 said. Public spending, it went on to say, had been increased ‘on 
assumptions about economic growth which have not been achieved. The inevitable 
result has been a growing burden of taxes and borrowing’ (HM Treasury, 1980). The 
arrival of the Thatcher Government coincided with the last year of the protection 
provided by the Robbins student number forecast. For the Thatcher Government the 
first priority was the reduction of public expenditure: higher education was simply 
part of a bigger picture. The first casualty of the 1980 cuts was the subsidy implied by 
the less-than-full-cost tuition fees charged to international students. This produced a 
saving of £100 million, thus realizing in full the issue raised in the Treasury evidence to 
Robbins. The next was a sweeping cut of 8.5 per cent across public expenditure, from 
which higher education was not exempted. One important structural consequence 
was the creation of the National Advisory Body for Public Sector Higher Education 
(NAB), ostensibly to manage the capping of the Advanced Further Education ‘pool’ 
from which local authority higher education was funded, but which in practice was a 
first step towards bringing it under direct DES control.
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The new situation with the two sectors, brought together under one department, 
offered the prospect of greater central planning and, with the continued expansion of 
demand, greater influence from the Treasury through PES. In practice there was little 
increase in central planning but a considerable increase in the impact of PES on the 
struggle to control the costs of expansion. Four broad approaches can be discerned. 
The first was to meet demand by permitting, and even encouraging, expansion in the 
local authority (public) sector – where unit costs were some 25 per cent lower – and 
restraining growth in the universities. In 1980–1 the breakdown of full-time student 
numbers between the two sectors was as follows: university 269,000 and public sector 
146,000. By 1986 the numbers were broadly equal and as demand expanded very 
rapidly in the late 1980s, the figures quoted for full-time equivalents in the 1991 
White Paper (DES, 1991) recorded 317,000 in the universities and 510,000 in the 
public sector. However, 1992 saw a further extension of the policy as the two sectors 
merged and the student unit costs across them were rationalized, which capitalized 
on the reduction of costs from the expansion of the polytechnics and concentrated 
research spending through the RAE mechanism. The success of this approach, from 
the Treasury’s point of view, was the Dearing Committee’s calculation that demand 
had been met but only by a 45 per cent reduction in unit costs between 1976 and 
1995 (NCIHE, 1997).
A second approach was to call for more efficiency in the management of 
higher education institutions. The universities were persuaded to join the Rayner-
driven Financial Management Initiative for the public services, which led to the Jarratt 
Committee Report (CVCP, 1985). The detailed studies by the Jarratt efficiency team 
threw up only marginal savings. A parallel study for the public sector was derailed by 
the decision to abandon the NAB compromise and transfer local authority control to 
the DES. Sir Keith Joseph called for universities to generate more non-state income, 
increase efficiency in financial management, rationalize small departments, and 
introduce staff appraisal, a process concluded by the chairman of the CVCP and the 
UGC signing up to an action plan. The implementation of such measures set the 
tone for the 1980s but, in themselves, made only marginal contributions to reducing 
costs – and much less than the imposed ‘efficiency gains’ required by successive PES 
spending reviews.
A third approach was to uncouple the linkage between student numbers and a 
fixed unit of resource. Right up to the 1980–1 cuts the Treasury seems to have broadly 
accepted that any growth in university student numbers had to be accompanied by 
resources at a standard rate. The across-the-board reduction in public expenditure 
imposed by the Thatcher Government in 1980 and 1981 took no cognizance of a 
desirable student unit of resource and it was the UGC that cut student numbers in 
an attempt to preserve it. Within Whitehall it was obvious that the idea of a fixed unit 
of resource had to be abandoned if student demand was to be met (Shattock, 2012). 
As Kenneth (now Lord) Baker claims in his autobiography (Baker, 1993), however, it 
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was his decision to give priority to the need to match student demand over the need 
to retain a given unit of resource. This may be a post hoc rationalization, as John Major, 
writing of his time as chief secretary of the Treasury, when he was in charge of the PES 
process, provides an unflattering account of Baker’s performance in PES negotiation 
over the costs of increased numbers (Major, 1999). There is no doubt that Baker was 
personally committed to an expansion of numbers and in a speech at Lancaster he 
argued that the then age participation rate of 18.5 per cent needed to be raised in the 
next 25 years to 33 per cent. Baker’s solution to the public expenditure dilemma was 
to encourage a form of marketization where institutions were encouraged to expand 
at marginal costs. While enthusiastically implemented by the new Polytechnics and 
Colleges Funding Council (PCFC), the suggestion was resisted by the universities, 
who formed a cartel to negate the introduction of competitive pricing for increased 
numbers. Baker’s difficulty, as he spelt it out to the CVCP, was how this growth was 
to be achieved within a planned limit in public spending of 40 per cent of GDP and 
when spending demands from other parts of the public sector had such high priority; 
spending on the NHS, for example, would need to increase by 1 per cent p.a. simply 
for demographic reasons. He said he could not imagine that the growth in higher 
education would justify a tax increase (Baker, 1986).
Baker’s difficulty was exacerbated by the failure of the one radical attempt, 
launched by his predecessor, Sir Keith Joseph, to introduce a new approach to 
funding higher education. Joseph was already facing the ‘pot of gold’ argument 
from the Treasury – namely that the higher education budget, institutional costs, and 
student support for maintenance and tuition fees needed to be addressed together 
as a total budget item – and had responded by restricting the rise in student support 
costs to annual increases lower than inflation. In 1984, wishing to invest another £20 
million into the science budget, he obtained approval from the Treasury for a scheme 
that would abolish the minimum level of maintenance grant and make tuition fees 
means tested, making it possible that wealthier parents might have to pay £520 p.a., 
the fee level at that time for undergraduate programmes. The Tory backbenches 
exploded: half the parliamentary party signed an early day motion opposing the 
proposals and at a meeting of the 1922 Committee a proposal that the whole idea 
should be withdrawn was greeted with cheers and desk banging (Denholm and 
Garnett, 2001). Their constituents, they believed, would not wear it. The incident 
was to foreclose any prospect of significant change in funding mechanisms while 
the Tories remained in power. In 1991 at a dinner in Downing Street, John Major 
made it clear to the CVCP that the government would actively oppose any campaign 
in support of ‘top up’ fees. The issue was not especially a Party one: when Jeff (now 
Lord) Rooker, the Labour higher education minister, publicly proposed a graduate 
tax, he was promptly sacked by the Leader of the Labour Party, John Smith. The 
only alternative source of saving was the student maintenance grant which, deprived 
of inflation proofing, was gradually reduced and would soon be replaced by a loan 
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scheme. The decline in the unit of resource only increased and in December 1995 
the CVCP, now representing both the pre- and the post-1992 universities, formally 
endorsed a proposal for universities to levy ‘top up’ fees of £300 p.a. on the 1997 
student entry. In March 1996, with the support of the Labour Party, the secretary of 
state announced the establishment of the Dearing Committee to defuse the issue 
before the General Election.
The accelerating march to 2010
The Dearing Committee’s prime task was to produce a solution to the problem of 
paying for a higher education system which was expanding faster than the growth 
of GDP and against a background of huge pressure for increased resources from 
other parts of the economy’s public sector. Its Report can be said to have broken the 
logjam on the introduction of private contributions to the costs of the system but with 
hindsight it offered only a palliative. It recommended tuition fees be introduced, 
calculated at about 25 per cent of the average costs of a non-medical first degree 
(about £1000), which would be paid directly by the student on an income contingent 
basis backed up by a loan scheme and the reintroduction of maintenance grants. 
An essential element was that the tuition fee payment was to constitute new and 
additional income to current government funding levels. However, the incoming 
Labour Government had already committed, with the next Comprehensive Spending 
Review due in 1998, to adhere to its predecessors’ spending plans for its first two years 
of office – which included a further efficiency gain cut in higher education. The 
effect, therefore, of accepting the Dearing recommendation with effect from 2000 
was simply to absorb the efficiency gain in the increased income. Blunkett, the new 
secretary of state, argued that he had secured a favourable settlement by achieving 
increased funding for an additional 97,000 student places for 1999–2000 and 2000–
01. However, this did nothing to alleviate the fall over the previous decade of 35 per 
cent in the unit of resource (Taggart, 2004). Although the next spending review 
produced some increase in the unit of resource, most of the additional money was 
earmarked for Blunkett’s own priorities – research, widening access, the disastrous E 
University, and foundation degrees – and the grant letter committed the system to a 
50 per cent age participation rate (DfES, 2000).
A change was to come, however, from outside the Department but from the 
prime minister’s office. Lobbied by Lord Jenkins as Chancellor of Oxford, and advised 
by Andrew (now Lord) Adonis, Blair was already sympathetic to higher education’s 
position – but from a different point of view. While Dearing was concerned over 
the funding of the system, Blair’s concerns related to the funding and international 
ranking of individual universities. The turning point was a meeting with key members 
of the Russell Group in late 2001. In Blair’s own words, prompted by the meeting: 
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I looked at the top fifty universities in the world [presumably as described 
in the Shanghai Jaio league table] and saw only a handful in the UK, and 
barely any in mainland Europe. America was winning this particular race 
with China and India coming up fast behind. The point about the US was 
telling. Their domination in the top fifty – and top one hundred for that 
matter – was not by chance or dint of size; it was plainly and inescapably 
due to their system of fees. They were more entrepreneurial; they went 
after their alumni and built up endowments; their bursary system allowed 
them to attract poorer students; and their financial flexibility meant they 
could attract the best academics. Simple as that. 
(Blair, 2010)
Two years were to elapse between the meeting with the Russell Group and the 
publication of the 2003 White Paper The Future of Higher Education (DfES, 2003), 
occupied by dispute between the prime minister and his Chancellor of the 
Exchequer over the way forward. It was a further three years before the White Paper’s 
recommendation of a variable tuition fee of up to £3000, underpinned by income-
contingent loans, could be implemented, and even then it was only with the backing 
of the narrowest majority in the House of Commons. In the end the fees could hardly 
be described as variable – only two universities decided not to charge the full £3000 – 
but the die had been cast, much more significantly than by Dearing, that the solution 
to the problem of paying for further expansion would be through an injection of 
private funding.
In 2006 higher education’s funding looked surprisingly like the income 
balance of the 1930s, with one third derived from fees, one third from the state 
recurrent grant, and one third from other sources including research grants and 
contracts. However, built into the legislation was a commitment to review the impact 
of the new funding structure by an independent commission in three years’ time. 
The commitment was intended to reassure MPs that the new structure did not act as a 
disincentive to widening participation, as indeed the application figures for 2006 and 
2007 proved, and as the legislation’s terms of reference made clear its primary task 
was to review the fees policy with the unspoken expectation that its recommendations 
would feed into the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review.
The denationalization of higher education in England
One might have expected the Review to have contented itself with endorsing the 
charging principles agreed by Parliament in 2004, and perhaps to have raised the 
tuition fee cap to, say, £5,000 or even £7,000 p.a. to attempt to recapture the concept 
of variability, and perhaps also to have extended the loan scheme to part-time 
courses, for which there was much public pressure. In fact, the Browne Review went 
much further than this: it proposed that the fee cap be removed altogether – leaving 
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universities to charge what they liked according to the cost of the degree subject – 
with a levy, to be paid back to the government, imposed on fees of £6,000 and above, 
rising to approximately 25 per cent when the tuition fee level reached £12,000. The 
Review went on to propose removing the cap on student numbers, first introduced 
on demand by the Treasury in 1994 as a way of controlling an open-ended budget, to 
allow student choice and institutional selection policies to determine the size of the 
system and institutions, subject only to the creation of an entry tariff based on A-level 
scores (IRHEFSF, 2010). 
Such proposals might have looked plausible to New Labour market enthusiasts 
in 2004 – when the economy was expanding – but in 2010, when the economic 
downturn was in full swing and Lehmans Bank had collapsed, they offered far too 
many hostages to fortune for the Treasury to stomach. Certainly they offered a long-
term theoretical solution to financing expansion by appearing to remove higher 
education’s dependence on public expenditure, but the upfront costs to the state 
in transferring to the new funding model and the uncertainties implicit in the 
implementation – in particular, the practical difficulties of designing an effective 
tariff – presented too many risks to a Comprehensive Spending Review charged with 
making fundamental and long-term reductions to public expenditure.
The decisions that emerged from the 2010 CSR and the subsequent White 
Paper of 2011 – particularly those relating to ‘the core and margin’ – bear the clear 
imprint of the Browne Review’s thinking: the teaching function of higher education 
had essentially been privatized. While the Treasury still had to bear the costs of the 
loan arrangements, the PES round was relieved of a substantial element of future 
public expenditure costs. If the government’s primary strategy was to eliminate a 
line of public expenditure fraught with political problems, it had succeeded. In a 
very real sense the decisions reached by the 2010 CSR represented the culmination 
of thinking which can be said to have begun in discussions inside the Treasury as it 
was preparing its evidence to Robbins some half a century earlier. Denationalization 
may be an overstatement because research continues to be state funded but there 
can be no doubt that 2010 marked a significant shift of higher education into the 
private sector.
For as long as it has had to compete for resources to teach expanding numbers 
of students against public expenditure priorities within a predetermined public 
sector ceiling, higher education was bound to be vulnerable. But it could also be 
said that the changes were only introduced after the horse had bolted; the time to 
have introduced student paid fees and loans would have been before expansion took 
off. If Robbins had grasped the nettle of thinking through the public expenditure 
implications of expansion, it might have mitigated the shock generated by the last 
decade’s drastic changes. It is rumoured that the Treasury later viewed the expansion 
beyond an age participation rate of 30 per cent as demanding the introduction 
of cost sharing, but any move at that point was frustrated by Tory backbenchers’ 
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reactions to Joseph’s 1985 proposals. What is not clear is whether the 2010 policy will 
be sustainable over a decade of continued austerity: imposing such heavy debts on the 
graduate output may have unanticipated effects on a range of economic and social 
policies. What is clear, however, is that it is hard, under any fiscal scenario, to envisage 
a return to Robbins’ publicly funded system. For the present we can compare the 
futures of Scotland and England, the former with no fees, the latter effectively with 
full-cost fees, to see how the modern state manages the funding of the transfer from 
elite to near universal higher education. We cannot assume that either approach will 
be stable over the next decade.
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Chapter 3 
The Coalition Government’s 
reform of higher education: 




When Lord Browne, chair of the Independent Committee on Student Fees and 
Funding, introduced its report in October 2010, he announced confidently that 
it set out a blueprint for ‘a new paradigm in [English] higher education’. The 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, elected six months earlier, 
published an immediate response, the core of which was to reject the Committee’s 
central recommendation that there should be no upper cap on tuition fees. But it took 
the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills a further nine months to publish a 
White Paper in July 2011 revealing the policies the government planned to adopt to 
implement the Committee’s other recommendations and produce a workable system 
for a new funding regime. The contrast between the urgency, extravagance even, of 
the Browne Report’s launch and the government’s initially knee-jerk and then faltering 
responses was striking. 
One reason for the contrast was the political flux that succeeded the General 
Election’s indecisive result in May 2010. The election’s outcome brought to an 
end 13 years of New Labour rule and led to the formation of the first peacetime 
Coalition government since the fall, almost 90 years earlier, of David Lloyd George’s 
administration in 1923. Two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, 
with incompatible policies on higher education, came together to form the new 
government. The Conservatives had been largely silent on higher education in 
the run-up to the election, although they had voted against the previous Labour 
Government’s decision to increase fees to £3,000 in 2005 in what was widely regarded 
as an opportunist, even cynical, manoeuvre. The Liberal Democrats, by contrast, had 
made a high-profile pledge in their manifesto not only to vote against any further 
tuition fee increases but, if it lay in their power, to abolish fees entirely. Since the 
Browne Report recommended that there should be no upper limit on fees, some 
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degree of ambivalence at Westminster and turbulence in Whitehall was an inevitable 
consequence of such political confusion.
However, perhaps a second – and more significant – reason accounts for the 
hiatus between the Browne Report and the White Paper’s respective publications, 
one that was a consequence of a ‘new model’ of policy formation. The ‘new model’ 
had its origins in the 1980s during Margaret Thatcher’s time as prime minister and 
was reinforced when New Labour came to power in 1997. To some degree it is an 
analogue of the more celebrated ‘New Public Management’. The ‘new model’ had – 
and continues to have – a number of characteristics. The first is a heightened degree 
of ideological dogmatism that reflects the decay of the so-called post-war settlement 
(and the political consensus that had sustained it), although some argue that a 
broadly social democratic settlement/consensus has simply been replaced by a neo-
liberal one. The second is a distrust of traditional forms of professional expertise 
grounded in fear of so-called ‘producer capture’. The third is the greater pressures 
of a 24/7 politics in which (short-term, if not instantaneous) presentation counts for 
far more than (medium and long-term) implementation (Maarten, 2009). 
However, the ‘new model’ also has a fourth characteristic: a focus on policy 
delivery at the expense, perhaps, of policy formation. The ideological ‘line’ having 
been pre-set, consideration of different policy options appears to be less urgent. To 
the extent that such options still need to be developed the primary role appears to 
have shifted to ‘on message’ think tanks broadly, if unofficially, aligned with political 
parties. Also the predetermined orchestration of the views of ‘stakeholders’ is now 
managed through contrived ‘consultations’ in which genuine expressions of opinion 
are sometimes shouted down by the aggressive lobbying of organized stakeholder 
groups. But increasingly policymaking appears to be dominated by issues of delivery 
– even if the delivery of the government’s reforms of higher education since the 
publication of the Browne Report has been anything but smooth. Greater use is now 
made of management consultants, more attuned perhaps to the private sector’s 
commercial culture, for policy development but, to an even greater extent, for policy 
delivery. In addition, policy delivery now tends to be defined in terms of (relatively) 
short-range timelines and immediate objectives rather than of longer-term structural 
change, which may help to partly explain the government’s difficulties over 
implementing the Browne Report and its own White Paper.
This chapter is divided into three main sections:
● A review of the policy processes underlying earlier episodes of major reforms of 
higher education – notably the Robbins Report of 1963 and the Dearing Report of 
1997 – and a (continuation of the) discussion of these overarching changes in 
policy formation at Westminster and in Whitehall
● An account of how policies were developed from 1997 onward (though already 
apparent from the second half of the 1980s as Margaret Thatcher's government 
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gained ideological traction) as part of a drive to ‘modernize’ higher education, 
of which the current reforms are the culmination
● An analysis of, and critical commentary on, continuing processes of policy 
formation designed to implement the new funding and regulatory regime that 
has emerged as a result of these reforms.
‘The past is another country’
The ‘new model’ of policymaking that has developed since the mid-1980s has little 
in common with the twentieth century’s more rationalist models (Lindblom and 
Woodhouse, 1992), even in modified forms (Parsons, 2002; Birkland, 2011). It has 
had a significant impact on higher education which has been felt in a number of 
ways: firstly, in the increasing pace of policymaking and the frequency of policy 
interventions; secondly, in the decline of ‘grand narrative’ inquiries and the 
substitution of short-term (and presentation-driven) political agendas; thirdly, in the 
subordination of higher education policy to wider policies concerning innovation, 
industry, and employment; and finally, in increasingly more detailed intrusions 
justified in terms of better management and improved accountability. I discuss each 
of these four dimensions in turn. 
At a conservative estimate there have been 11 major policy interventions in 
higher education since 1960 – major reports, White Papers, and significant pieces of 
legislation. These were, in chronological order:
● The Robbins Report of 1963 that so magisterially endorsed student expansion 
(CHE, 1963)
● The 1966 White Paper that established the polytechnics and formally articulated 
the binary system (DES, 1966)
● The 1972 White Paper A Framework for Expansion – although overridden to 
some degree by changes in public expenditure that heralded the collapse of 
universities’ guaranteed quinquennial funding (DES, 1972a)
● The 1987 White Paper and subsequent Education Reform Act that led to the 
incorporation of the polytechnics (i.e. their removal from the control of local 
education authorities) and the abolition of the University Grants Committee 
(DES, 1987)
● The 1991 White Paper that led to the abandonment of the binary system, the 
‘promotion’ of the polytechnics to university status, and the creation of a single 
higher education funding council in England (DES, 1991)
● The 1988 White Paper Top-Up Loans for Students and subsequent Education 
(Student Loans) Act which ended the grants system established by the Anderson 
Report the year before Robbins (DES, 1988)
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● The 1998 Dearing Report that aspired to be a second Robbins Report and in the 
process perhaps lost focus (NCIHE, 1997)
● The 1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act which, incidentally, laid the 
foundations of the current system of student support and established the 
Student Loans Company
● The 2003 White Paper The Future of Higher Education that opened the door to 
higher fees and the subsequent 2004 Higher Education Act (DfE, 2003)
● The 2010 Browne Report that recommended there should be no cap on the fees 
institutions should be allowed to charge (ICSFF, 2010)
● The 2011 White Paper Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System that is 
the subject of this chapter (and book) (BIS, 2011).
In addition there have been a larger number of other important policy interventions: 
Green Papers; ‘letters of guidance’ to funding agencies; Select Committee reports; 
enquiry reports – whether commissioned by government, such as the 1972 James 
Report on teacher education (DES, 1972b), or by other agencies, such as the 1985 
Jarratt Report on university efficiency commissioned by the then Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals (CVCP, 1985); and planning papers on student number. 
A significant number of reports have also been produced on Scottish and Welsh 
higher education, both preceding the establishment of devolved administrations 
and subsequently published by these administrations. Finally, intermediate agencies 
– beginning with the UGC and the National Advisory Body (for public sector higher 
education), continuing with the Universities Funding Council and Polytechnics and 
Colleges Funding Council, and most recently including the Higher Education Funding 
Council for England (HEFCE) (as well as the Scottish Funding Council and Higher 
Education Funding Council for Wales) – have made regular policy interventions, in 
the form of circular letters, consultation documents, and annual reports.
An observer might well conclude that higher education has been drowning 
in policy. Indeed, the velocity of policymaking has certainly been increasing: over a 
third of the major policy interventions – five out of 11 – have been in the past decade. 
But the major increase has been in other policy interventions, many of which have 
been necessary to implement the proposals made in the major policy interventions, 
notably White Papers. A second group has reflected the increasing number of single-
ticket initiatives – whether widening participation, enterprise and links between 
higher education and industry or sustainability and the ‘green’ agenda. A third group 
has spoken of the development of more elaborate regulatory cultures reflecting a 
wider phenomenon: the rise of the ‘audit society’ (Power, 1999) and the drive to 
create a ‘market’ in higher education (notably in terms of more detailed disclosure 
of information to students and other stakeholders). The final group, of course, have 
arisen from the system’s operational requirements such as the provision of student 
data, research assessment returns, financial forecasts, and the like. The result has 
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been an accretion of policy interventions that have required universities in turn to 
invest in sophisticated managements systems, establish planning units, and create 
more elaborate lobbying and influencing capacities.
The second effect of policymaking’s ‘new model’ has been a sharp reduction 
in ‘grand narrative’ inquiries. The age of Royal Commissions – and the ‘Blue Books’ 
of the nineteenth century, which were themselves formidable contributions to social 
science – is finally and firmly over. The only, partial, exceptions are judge-led inquiries 
on topics of the highest political sensitivity: Saville on ‘Bloody Sunday’ (Saville, 2010), 
Hutton on the ‘sexed-up’ intelligence dossier justifying the Iraq invasion (Hutton, 
2004), or Leveson on phone hacking (Leveson, 2012). However, it may be significant 
that action groups have copied some of the operating methods once employed by 
‘grand narrative’ inquiries, the most recent of which has been the re-examination of 
the evidence concerning the Hillsborough disaster (HIP, 2012).While government 
may have abandoned such inquiries – deeming them too ponderous, not sufficiently 
political, or, perhaps, too revealing even – civil society organizations appear anxious 
to adopt them.
It is important to resist nostalgia, however. The Robbins Committee, although 
it behaved like a Royal Commission, had in fact been established by the prime 
minister of the day, Harold Macmillan. The Dearing Report had been commissioned by 
the then secretary of state for education. The Browne Report was established by Peter 
Mandelson, who possessed the grand title of first secretary (and headed the recently 
created Department of Business, Innovation and Skills). So the differences between 
Robbins and Dearing on the one hand and Browne on the other did not arise from 
their formal status. They arose instead from the latter’s modes of operation and 
publication, which partly reflected choices made by Lord Browne and his colleagues 
and were partly the result of policymaking’s ‘new model’. 
The Browne Committee engaged with stakeholders and other interested 
parties in two ways: firstly, as Robbins and Dearing had done, by soliciting views 
and evidence on student fees and funding and secondly, by organizing hearings, 
or public sessions, at which a selection of these views were presented and during 
which the Committee could interrogate those who were speaking. These sessions 
were also ‘broadcast’, in the sense that they were put on the web. Two influences 
appear to have helped shape Browne’s mode of operation. First, the parallel with 
the inquisitorial hearings characteristic of judge-led inquiries appears to have been 
deliberate. Second, the establishment of the Browne Committee had, in one sense, 
been the next stage in the ‘debate’ about the future of higher education previously 
initiated by John Denham (see the next section of this chapter). It therefore naturally 
maintained a similar degree of participation.
But the Browne Committee, unlike its two predecessors, did not commission 
a significant body of new research. The contrast is stark – and with the Robbins 
Committee in particular. Under the leadership of its research director, Claus Moser, 
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it commissioned a volume of research that bears comparison with the evidence 
collected for the ‘Blue Books’ of the nineteenth century. The National Commission, 
chaired by Ron Dearing 35 years later, also generated a significant but more modest 
amount of research. Less of the research commissioned by Dearing was empirical 
(or quantitative) and more was synoptic (or qualitative) – surveys of opinion for 
example, were heavily relied upon. Browne’s, by contrast, was a research-lite report. 
It did not commission, or otherwise generate, any significant body of new research. 
Much of the ‘evidence’ it did collect came from interested stakeholders rather than 
disinterested researchers.
One reason for such an absence was the inquiry’s much shorter time scale. 
The Committee had been established only months before the General Election’s due 
date. Its report could not be delayed for several months after the formation of the 
new government if it was to have much impact, and its recommendations were closely 
related to impending, urgent, and necessary decisions about public expenditure. 
Another, more general, explanation was the reduced role of commissioned research 
in policymaking’s ‘new model’ and the fact that evidence-based policy (despite 
the headline rhetoric) had been abandoned – which inevitably led, therefore, to a 
reduction in capacity to undertake public policy research. 
Timescales are also more significant generally. It has been argued that we now 
live in the ‘extended present’, in which the past has been forgotten and the future 
tamed by sophisticated forecasting and risk management systems. As I’ve already said, 
the nature of policymaking has been transformed by the mass media’s more intense 
and immediate (even instantaneous) intrusion into politics. Policies have shrinking 
shelf lives, measured in days and weeks rather than months or years. Most recently 
print and (conventional) electronic media have come under pressure from so-called 
‘social networking’ sites that enable instantaneous and real-time comments to be 
posted and interventions made. Time has become ever more scarce. The impact on 
research practice has also been pronounced. As timescales have been foreshortened, 
research has been squeezed into even tighter time frames. 
Whatever the causes, the result is that the Browne Report stands or falls on its 
recommendations. In contrast, the Robbins and Dearing Reports have a significance 
that does not depend so much on how acceptable are their recommendations. In 
fact, as I discuss in the next section, although Robbins’ overall endorsement of 
student expansion had a powerful influence on higher education’s future, its detailed 
policy prescriptions were largely rejected. Instead the polytechnics were established 
and an explicitly binary division created. While Dearing’s recommendations were 
not dismissed so categorically, its proposals for the (re)introduction of fees were 
substantially changed. Yet both remain landmark reports, their authority resting 
on the dispassionate research evidence and detailed statistical analyses they either 
commissioned or mobilized. Higher education scholars researching the state of UK 
higher education in the early 1960s or at the end of the twentieth century will always 
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be in debt to Robbins and Dearing. Their successors are less likely to feel the same 
debt towards Browne. 
The third and fourth effects of policymaking’s ‘new model’ are the subordination 
of higher education policy (and other policies) to overall strategies for innovation 
and economic development and the strengthening and elaboration of accountability 
regimes. The former can be attributed to the emergence of the ‘knowledge society’, 
in its neo-liberal interpretation at any rate. The provision of ‘knowledge’ goods and 
services – in the shape of research products and a highly skilled workforce – is now 
regarded as crucial to wealth generation, and wealth generation is also regarded as 
closely related to economic liberalization, whether through the creation of a more 
flexible workforce or the removal of trade barriers. The latter can be attributed to 
two factors: first, the advance of the ‘audit society’ – in which rituals of verification 
and the management of risk have assumed more important roles – and second, the 
shift of emphasis from policy development to policy delivery. 
Both factors have had an ambiguous impact on higher education’s development. 
However, both can be observed in the policies recommended in the Browne Report. 
Here, the instrumentalist justification of higher education is sharply etched – as it 
always has been. However, this justification is now more often expressed indirectly 
– in terms of individual investment by graduates in terms of their employment 
prospects and earning potential (which thus provides the basis for the affordability, 
and appropriateness, of higher fees and large loans) – rather than directly in terms 
of state investment in research and development (which was more characteristic of 
the New Labour era). The accountability to stakeholders, and importance of delivery, 
are reflected in the new information regime proposed by Browne, designed to power 
informed student choice (and which builds on earlier consumer-oriented initiatives 
such as the National Student Survey).
In summary, the ‘new model’ of policymaking is characterized by a preference 
for more focused policy interventions that are ‘on (ideological) message’, brisker 
in their process, and briefer in their presentation – a stark contrast to the more 
capacious, more ideologically detached ‘grand narrative’ inquiries of the past. 
Browne fits this new model, unlike the Dearing and Robbins Reports. In turn, this ‘new 
model’ of policymaking reflects a number of trends such as the shift from the welfare 
to the market state, the development of a knowledge-based global economy, the rise 
of audit society, and even the foreshortening of time itself.
Modernizing higher education
The government’s reforms of higher education in England can be described in 
terms of two narratives: a macro narrative of the wider modernization of mass higher 
education systems and a micro narrative describing the English system’s particular 
evolution. 
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The first, therefore, is a broad based account of the modernization of higher 
education, embracing elements such as the growth of mass systems (Scott, 1995), 
the development of new modes of research (Gibbons et al., 1994), the evolution of 
more entrepreneurial models of the university (Clark, 2004), and the increasing 
impact of internationalization (and globalization) (King et al., 2011). This process 
of modernization is perhaps part of an even larger narrative: the erosion of the post-
war welfare state, with its strong sense of social purpose, and the corresponding rise 
of the market state with a more pronounced ‘market’ orientation, the emergence 
of new forms of society – variously labelled ‘risk’, ‘audit’, or ‘information’ – and the 
growth of new forms of individualized identities moulded by consumer culture and 
expressed through so-called ‘social media’. 
The second narrative is more particular. It focuses on the evolution of higher 
education policy in the United Kingdom –and, more specifically, England – from 
the (partial) implementation of the Dearing Report in the early years of New Labour, 
through the 2003 White Paper and substantial increase of tuition fees in 2006, to 
the publication of the Browne Report and the 2011 White Paper. However, this second 
narrative has a long backstory. The establishment of the polytechnics by Anthony 
Crosland, a Labour secretary of state for education, in the mid-1960s was perhaps the 
first occasion when politicians seriously dissented from the academic-led direction 
of higher education development, even if the primary motive was to promote a 
local authority-led sector. This level of dissatisfaction sharply increased during the 
Thatcher period when university budgets were savagely cut in 1981 and the UGC 
itself, that much celebrated ‘buffer’ between universities and the state, was abolished 
five years later.
The first narrative is sometimes overlooked because of policymakers’ reluctance 
to take the long view – which, to be fair, is difficult to do in a world where politics is given 
a 24/7 media coverage, if through the lens of an ideologically inspired determinism. 
In other words the massification of higher education has inexorably fuelled demands 
for modernization that have, inevitably, demanded some degree of marketization. 
But the first narrative cannot be reduced to an endorsement of a ‘single path’ of 
higher education development. The rapid expansion of higher education systems 
since 1960 has certainly raised issues of funding in more acute and urgent forms. But 
it has also stimulated greater intervention by the state for two broad reasons. First 
is the growing need to coordinate these expanding higher education systems (and, 
in particular, determine more formally issues of differentiation and stratification – 
or their opposites). Second is the need to align higher education’s ‘outputs’ with 
perceived national needs, whether skilled graduates and impactful research in the 
economic domain or access and equity in the wider social domain. It is the latter, 
increasing state intervention, rather than the former, funding dilemmas, that has 
dominated this first narrative, not only in the UK but in many other developed (and 
developing) countries also.
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Both higher education and the state have been transformed. In the former’s 
case elite systems with participation rates of less than 15 per cent of the eligible 
population have been transformed into mass systems enrolling 40 per cent or more 
of school leavers. Previously unrelated components of post-secondary education – 
traditional universities, higher professional and vocational education institutions, 
and specialist teacher or nurse training schools – have been aggregated into 
coordinated higher education systems, whether binary or unified in structure. The 
research mission of higher education has also intensified, both in terms of the drive 
for research excellence – so-called ‘world-class’ research – and of wider notions of 
knowledge generation and dissemination – the growing emphasis on so-called ‘Mode 
2’ knowledge. Both are now seen as key inputs into competitiveness in the global 
knowledge economy.
Equally transformative transitions can be observed if we consider the state. 
The post-war ‘welfare state’, animated by collectivist values and ambitious to provide 
a wide range of services to its citizens, has been gradually – though not entirely – 
superseded by a ‘market state’ characterised by more individualistic values and a 
commitment to ‘shrink’ the state through the direct provision and funding of services 
and via its new and intrusive roles as regulator, auditor, and champion of the claims 
made by its citizen–customers. At the same time the nation state’s influence has been 
compromised by the advance of globalization – in the form of a tightly integrated 
world economy in which financial markets and credit agencies play a more powerful 
role, of regional blocs such as the European Union, and of truly transcendent issues 
such as global warning and enduring conflicts. 
This chapter is not the place to further explore this first narrative. But it is 
important at least to register this deep background: the transformations of higher 
education and the state and, in particular, the synergies and dissonances between 
them. For example, the affordability of mass higher education would have been a 
less urgent issue had the ‘welfare state’ persisted: its urgency is derived to a large 
extent from the unwillingness, or impossibility, of maintaining high levels of personal 
taxation. Also, within a framework of civil society, higher education’s openness and 
autonomy would have been easier to sustain if the ‘market state’ had not taken on its 
more intrusive roles as regulator and auditor. Equally, if mass higher education had 
not evolved, its overall cost would have been lower – and perhaps below the political 
‘radar’ – and its trust relationships might have been more easily maintained (reducing 
the regulatory and audit pressures). The second, and more familiar, narrative – the 
more particular process of modernization undergone by UK (and English) higher 
education – therefore needs to be considered in this broader, general context. 
The back story – the efforts to modernize higher education between the 1960s 
and early 1990s – has already been briefly sketched; a fuller account is contained in 
Shattock’s study of the making of higher education policy between 1945 and 2011 
(Shattock, 2012). The natural starting point for a more detailed account of the process 
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of modernization that culminated in the Browne Report and the 2011 White Paper is 
the Dearing Report of 1997. Like the Independent Committee on Student Fees and 
Funding (Browne), the National Commission on the Future of Higher Education 
(Dearing) was established by one government and reported to another. In Dearing’s 
case, Conservative and Labour governments; in Browne’s, a Labour administration 
and a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition. Both, therefore, were planned as bi-
partisan initiatives. While Browne’s provoked greater political ‘fuss’ than Dearing’s, 
despite the – abject? – acquiescence of university leaders, this may have disguised the 
existence of a comparatively robust political consensus. Certainly the continuities of 
national policy through the Major, Blair, Brown, and now Cameron Governments are 
at least as striking as the ruptures. 
Indeed the main difference between how the Dearing and Browne Reports 
were received was the contrast in the higher education community’s response to 
them. The former they deemed broadly acceptable, while the latter was met with 
widespread antagonism. One possible explanation why the Dearing Report met with 
greater acceptability was the National Commission’s mode of operation – engaging 
stakeholders, consulting widely and commissioning extensive background research – 
which helped to bind in the political and academic communities. The Browne Report, 
by contrast, offered a more superficial – and perhaps token – engagement.
Four phases of policy can be identified following the publication of the 
Dearing Report:
● The first phase began with the new (New) Labour Government’s decisions 
about which of the National Commission’s recommendations to implement, 
and extended to the development of a strong widening participation and 
lifelong learning agenda under Labour’s first secretary of state for education, 
David Blunkett. Dearing’s proposal to introduce fees was accepted – but in a 
modified form that perhaps owed as much to Whitehall pressures, in particular 
from the Treasury, as to left-wing political anxieties. Many other of Dearing’s 
recommendations were also accepted, notably the establishment of the Higher 
Education Academy to give a stronger focus to learning and teaching in higher 
education. But closer to Blunkett’s heart were widening participation and 
lifelong learning. The former was incorporated within the HEFCE’s funding 
methodology in the form of earmarked allocations. The latter was the subject of 
a neglected report by Bob Fryer, former principal of the Northern College and 
a fellow member of the South Yorkshire Labour establishment (Fryer, 1997)
● The second phase coincided with the tenure of Blunkett’s successor, Charles 
Clarke. It began with a White Paper and culminated in the decision to substantially 
increase fees. The decision was one of the most hotly contested taken by the 
Blair Government; the increase was approved by the House of Commons in a 
wafer-thin majority (more Labour MPs voted against the introduction of higher 
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fees than the invasion of Iraq). To win the vote Clarke promised to establish a 
review of the effects of higher fees within three years, the genesis of the later 
Browne Committee. The increase to a ceiling of £3,000 (initially) was justified 
by the need to secure additional resources for higher education that could not 
have been achieved as easily by increasing direct grants to institutions through 
the HEFCE. By and large the promise of ‘additionality’ was kept. An equally 
significant decision was to replace the existing Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) with a Research Excellence Framework (REF) that would attempt to 
measure ‘impact’ as well as assess ‘quality’
● The third phase was characterized by two important initiatives. The first was to 
establish a separate Department for Universities, Innovation and Skills (DIUS) 
and strip the Department of Education, also renamed, of responsibility for 
higher education. Reversing the integration of all levels of education under 
a single department, dating back four decades to 1964, sent a clear signal of 
the importance attached to universities and research within an increasingly 
knowledge-based economy. But it also communicated their subordination to 
innovation and economic imperatives. The second initiative was the debate 
about higher education’s future launched by the new Secretary of State, John 
Denham. Although this debate never got off the ground fully, a number of 
working groups were established to offer advice on a range of topics. To a 
large degree, however, the Denham debate was an attempt to produce greater 
coherence – and perhaps also to differentiate between universities’ mission 
statements to favour an elite of research intensive universities – within the 
mass higher education system that had been developed – almost – in a fit of 
absentmindedness. The issue of fees, and any need to increase them further, 
appears to have been deliberately sidestepped
● The final phase began in the dying days of the Labour Government when 
Denham’s successor, Peter Mandelson, was made responsible for an even 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) – a reconfiguration 
that, whether deliberately or not, distanced higher education even further 
from its old home in a department of education and reinforced the links with 
improving economic performance. The new first secretary also established the 
Independent Committee on Student Fees and Funding under Lord Browne, 
in fulfilment of the promise made by Charles Clarke five years earlier. The 
Committee subsequently reported to the new Conservative–Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government. Its key recommendations – that there should be no cap 
on fees institutions could charge but an increasing proportion of fees of more 
than £9,000 should be paid into a fund to pay for scholarships – were swiftly 
rejected.
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This brief chronological account already reveals substantial continuities and perhaps 
a more limited number of discontinuities:
i. The first, and most high-profile, continuity is the growing conviction that some 
degree of cost-sharing between taxpayers and students/graduates is necessary to 
deliver the additional resources a high-quality higher education system needs (in 
the New Labour period) and/or to protect higher education from the worst of 
the cruel-but-necessary cuts in public expenditure required to reduce the deficit 
(since the Coalition Government came to power)
ii. A second continuity, almost as important, is the belief that investment in higher 
education is predominantly justified in terms of enhanced lifetime earnings (in 
the case of individuals) and improved economic performance (in the case of 
the state). The increasing focus on research excellence and impact is the best 
example of this belief – as is the consequent need to identify more clearly and 
protect elite universities. But other examples include the growing emphasis on 
employability
iii. A third, perhaps more ragged, continuity is a commitment to policies designed to 
enhance learning and teaching, improve the student experience, and empower 
students. A number of policies have been developed to these ends: National 
Teaching Fellows, the Higher Education Academy, Centres of Excellence in 
Teaching and Learning, the National Student Survey and now Key Information 
Sets (KIS). The continuity is more ‘ragged’ as it is unclear whether the increasing 
emphasis on the student as the ‘customer’, particularly pronounced under the 
Coalition Government and celebrated in the title of the 2011 White Paper, is a 
driving cause or justificatory effect of the shift towards cost-sharing.
In contrast, discontinuities have been less apparent. Perhaps the most significant has 
been the declining emphasis on widening participation – from its high point under 
Blunkett in the early years of the Blair Government, through the establishment of the 
Office of Fair Access and the rise and fall of lifelong learning partnerships, to the its 
current low under the Coalition Government in which the favouring of conventionally 
qualified entrants with high grades amounts to a blatant form of discrimination. Other 
discontinuities either regard second-order issues or are attributable to differences of 
emphasis and rates of change, rather than to any fundamental differences of opinion. 
It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that over the last decade and a half 
– and most probably much longer – there has been a strong political consensus that 
the Browne Report and 2011 White Paper may have bent but did not break.
Implementing the White Paper
The Browne Report was the victim of – or accomplice in? – mission creep. What began 
as a limited intervention – the promised review of what impact Charles Clarke’s 
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decision to triple fees to a maximum of £3,000 had had – ended up a wide-ranging 
report on English higher education, to the extent that, as I have already said, Lord 
Browne himself claimed it was proposing a ‘new paradigm’, despite the much 
narrower remit of his Committee. Browne’s claim may have been difficult to sustain 
in light of important gaps, the most important of which was postgraduate education. 
Nor did the Report address key issues such as the future structure of the system, the 
potential impact of higher fees for the governance and management of institutions, 
the implications for learning and teaching or quality and standards, and the impact 
of research capacity (linked, of course, to its silence on postgraduates).
The pattern of mission creep established by the Browne Committee’s open 
interpretation of its terms of reference was continued with the White Paper. While 
perhaps not a deliberate attempt to emulate the grand reforms of the past, broadening 
the reform agenda came about following the need to deal with the implications of 
higher fees (for example, the rebalancing of the HEFCE’s funding, the requirement 
to revise the existing regulatory regime, and, in particular, the necessity to limit 
overall expenditure and therefore to cap total student numbers). In the period since 
the White Paper, as other agendas have been incorporated, the pattern of mission 
creep has extended further. A good example is the decision to allow a ‘free market’ 
for candidates with better entry qualifications (initially those with AAB grades at 
A-level or their equivalent and later those with ABB), a move that clearly mirrors the 
government’s school reforms. 
In this section I consider the evolution of policy in two phases: the 
recommendations made by the Browne Committee – and the government’s 
immediate response – and the proposals made in the White Paper ten months later, 
together with subsequent developments as new agendas have been added and new 
constraints have become apparent. However, a common thread running through 
both phases has been the need to respond to levels of uncertainty and turbulence 
that almost certainly exceeded the intentions of evolving policy – Donald Rumsfeld’s 
(actually J.K. Galbraith’s description of the Great Depression of the 1930s) ‘knowns, 
known unknowns and unknown unknowns’.
Browne and the government’s immediate response
The Browne Committee reported in October 2011. Its recommendations provoked 
a storm of controversy – largely perhaps because the Liberal Democrats, the junior 
partners in the new Coalition Government, had gone into the General Election six 
months earlier with a manifesto promising not only to not increase tuition fees but 
to abolish them entirely. The Browne Report recommended that there should be no 
overall cap on the level of fees universities could charge. While only one strand in 
the Report, and by no means the most important, the Liberal Democrats’ broken 
election promise focused public attention on the likely level of tuition fees in the 
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future. The result, inevitably, was a public debate on Browne that generated more 
heat than light.
It is important to go back to what the Browne Report actually said, which is in 
danger of almost being forgotten. Browne’s recommendations were grounded in an 
analysis of the weaknesses of the current system of fees and funding. The report listed 
six such weaknesses:
i. There was an insufficient number of places to meet student demand (it is important 
to remember that the Browne formula was intended to fund expansion)
ii. The existing system, because of its dependence on (direct) public funding, was 
vulnerable to future reductions in public expenditure (again, it is important to 
recognize that the Browne Committee’s hands were tied by the new government’s 
non-negotiable decision to cut public expenditure – fast) 
iii. There had been limited progress on access, a surprising (but not unfair) 
conclusion in light of the previous New Labour Government’s high-profile 
commitment to widening participation
iv. The existing system provided inadequate support for part-time students
v. It was not sufficiently responsive to the changing skills required by the economy, 
a conclusion that could have been – and was – reached by almost every post-
war government (and one that, for example, had been used to justify the 
establishment of the polytechnics by Anthony Crosland in 1966)
vi. There had been only limited improvements in the student experience – perhaps 
the shakiest of the Report’s conclusions given the absence of a consensus on 
what constitutes the student experience (although a key one for Browne in that 
it helped to justify the Report’s reliance on student choice as the primary means 
for improving quality).
Having made a diagnosis of what was wrong Browne then established a number of 
key principles that must apply in any new system. Again, there were six: first, that 
more investment was needed in higher education; second, that there should be 
greater student choice; third, that everyone with the potential should be able to 
benefit (a restatement of the venerable Robbins principle); fourth, that no student 
should be expected to make any financial contribution to the cost of their higher 
education before they were in work; fifth, that any payments they did make should 
be affordable; and finally, that part-time students should be treated in the same way 
as full-time students. 
In order to dissipate some of the heat generated by the immediate reaction 
to it and judge its recommendations fairly, it is important to recognize the Browne 
Report’s conceptual furniture. Perhaps too much attention has been concentrated 
on Browne’s commitment to student choice as the driver of any funding system – 
and the corresponding belief that this was also the mechanism most likely to drive 
improvements in quality. This commitment and belief have been widely criticized 
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as displaying either an unquestioning acceptance of neo-liberal ideology or a view 
that higher education’s value must be assessed in largely instrumental terms (higher 
earnings for individuals and enhanced competitiveness in the global economy) – or 
both. Two points perhaps need to be made in Browne’s defence: firstly, these were 
commonplace views held by wide sections of the political establishment, including 
the previous Labour Government, and secondly, Browne offered a broader analysis 
of the existing system’s weaknesses regarding funding and also set out a number of 
key principles, none of which were especially controversial.
The Browne Report’s detailed recommendations can be divided into three groups: 
student support/graduate contributions, institutional funding, and regulation of the 
proposed new system:
● Regarding the first group, Browne recommended that no students should 
be required to make any financial contribution to the cost of their higher 
education until they were in work – and earning at least £21,000, a threshold 
the Committee recommended should be periodically reviewed (in other words, 
increased). Interest rates should be low – the rate of inflation plus 2.2 per cent 
was the Report’s suggested figure – and any outstanding payments should be 
written off after 30 years. Finally, all students should be entitled to receive a non-
means tested loan of £3,750 to help with their living expenses, while students 
from poorer homes would receive an additional grant of £3,250
● Regarding the second group, Browne recommended that institutions should be 
free to set their own fees. If they decided to charge more than £6,000, however, 
they should be expected to pay an increasing proportion of the additional 
tuition fee income back to the government to fund the Committee’s proposals 
on student support. Institutions charging £9,000 would thus receive only 85 per 
cent of the proceeds, while those charging £12,000 would receive only 73 per 
cent. Such an ingenious proposal for a ‘fees taper’ had a number of advantages: 
the freedom of institutions to set their own fees was respected, there would be a 
disincentive to charge very high fees, and the pot of money for student support 
would be topped up – and would thus save expense on the part of the Treasury
● Regarding the third group, Browne recommended that a Higher Education 
Council should be established, combining the responsibilities of the HEFCE, 
the Quality Assurance Agency, the Office for Fair Access, and the Office for 
Independent Adjudication. The Committee concluded that the advantages 
of having a simpler and less cluttered regulatory environment outweighed 
the difficulties of combining in a single organization potentially conflicting 
responsibilities for investment (i.e. directly funding institutions), guaranteeing 
quality, monitoring access, and dealing with student complaints. 
The Committee believed their recommendations would create scope for higher 
education to expand – although it recognized that there might need to be some cap 
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on overall student numbers and recommended that the government should be given 
the power to annually set a minimum A-level points tariff to determine eligibility; that 
they would encourage institutions to compete, though Browne envisaged that such 
competition would be primarily expressed through students’ access to transparent 
and reliable information on institutional performance – including, crucially, 
employment rates – rather than through a crude ‘price war’ by setting variable fees; 
and that they would allow necessarily more tightly rationed public investment in 
higher education to be more clearly targeted – and therefore, perhaps, more easy to 
defend against future cuts.
So what went wrong? 
The White Paper
The White Paper was published nine months later in the summer of 2011. Its timing 
was itself significant: the government had originally promised it would be published 
‘before Christmas’ (2010) and its publication was delayed on three subsequent 
occasions. A number of reasons appear to account for such postponements. The 
first, and most significant, was that the original timescale was almost certainly too 
optimistic. The Browne Committee itself had substantially widened its remit beyond 
the promised review of the student fees and funding system introduced by the 
previous Labour Government. Understandably perhaps, in light of the incoming 
government’s far tougher approach to reducing the deficit (which required much 
deeper, and faster, cuts in public expenditure), Lord Browne and his colleagues 
came to the conclusion that a more systematic review was required. Of course, the 
stretched remit still excluded key areas of policy, most notably, perhaps, with regard 
to postgraduate education. In the same way the government was obliged to write a 
more comprehensive White Paper, partly to provide a more detailed justification of 
the decision to charge higher fees but partly also to knit together other strands of 
policy – notably, the emphasis on students as empowered customers, which then gave 
the White Paper its title. 
A second reason for the delay in publishing the White Paper can be attributed 
to the difficulties all governments face in taking office. Broad-brush ideological 
and policy preferences must be translated into workable policies; it takes all new 
governments time to penetrate the Whitehall machine. In the past these difficulties 
have sometimes been seen as the Civil Service’s predilection for a status quo it has 
itself constructed, combined perhaps with a resistance to novelty and innovation. 
Such suspicions were famously articulated by Richard Crossman in his diaries when he 
joined Harold Wilson’s Cabinet in 1964 (Crossman, 1975–7). However, less dramatic 
– paranoid? – explanations are possible. For example, the effective exclusion of 
the HEFCE from the Browne Committee’s development of its recommendations – 
which, as a result, could not be rigorously tested for their practicability – is largely 
explained by the focus of the Committee’s original remit on areas, notably student 
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fees, for which the HEFCE was not responsible. It was only when the remit widened 
through a process of ‘mission creep’ that the failure to involve sufficiently early in 
the policy process the agency with hands-on experience of managing the system 
became a significant liability. However, its decision to keep the National Union of 
Students, which was denied even an advance copy of the final report, is more difficult 
to explain.
The White Paper’s proposals were grouped around three themes. The first, 
commanding the other two, was the need to secure a sustainable system of funding 
for higher education which began, of course, with an assumption that had to be taken 
as a ‘given’: that there was no alternative to the new government’s deficit reduction 
strategy. However, from that non-negotiable starting point, the White Paper was 
frank about the options available to ministers: to reduce student numbers, to cut 
funding per student (the so-called unit-of-resource), or to adopt a harsher, and less 
progressive, repayment system for student loans. 
The second theme was the need to improve the student experience. Again, 
it was framed by a ‘given’: that the student experience was unsatisfactory in ways 
that remained unspecified. In fact most of the proposals grouped under this 
theme, accounting for the majority of the proposals made in the White Paper, were 
designed not so much to improve the student experience but to promote a more 
dynamic system:
i) The most significant was to ‘move away from tight number controls that constrain 
individual higher education institutions’ (BIS, 2011). To achieve this a pool of so-
called ‘contestable’ places would be created, consisting of approximately 65,000 
students with entry qualifications equivalent to A-level grades of AAB, and 20,000 
places for which institutions charging fees of less than £7,500 on average would 
be able to bid
ii) A second important proposal was to promote a greater diversity of institutions by 
making it easier for smaller institutions with more restricted course portfolios to 
acquire ‘university’ titles, by allowing more private providers to enter the market, 
and by encouraging further education colleges to offer more higher education 
programmes. Also floated was the idea that degree awarding might be uncoupled 
from teaching by encouraging universities to award degrees for programmes 
taught in other institutions – which, of course, already happened on a significant 
scale through franchising arrangements
iii) The third important proposal was to require all institutions to publish much 
more detailed information in the form of ‘key information sets’ on a course-
by-course basis about a wide range of indicators including average entry grades 
for newly recruited students and employment rates among graduates. Much of 
this data, of course, was already available from bodies like the Higher Education 
Statistics Agency (HESA) and others and used to construct newspaper league 
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tables but new measures were proposed to make it more transparent and more 
comprehensive. Institutions would also be required to publish summary reports 
of their own internal student evaluation surveys.
The third theme around which the White Paper’s proposals was grouped was the need 
to increase social mobility. These proposals reflected in particular the views of the 
junior members in the Coalition Government, the Liberal Democrats. First, the White 
Paper ‘endorsed’ the Robbins principle that higher education should be available to 
all those willing and able to benefit from it. Second, the government’s decisions about 
the repayment of student loans, which had previously been announced, were further 
commended and reinforced. Third, full grants for living expenses would be available 
to students from families with income of less than £25,000 p.a.. Finally, a National 
Scholarships Programme was established, though it would not be reach its target of 
£150 million until 2014. This programme would supplement the scholarships and 
bursaries awarded by individual institutions as a condition of their agreements with 
the Office for Fair Access if they had decided to charge fees of more than £6,000 (in 
practice, virtually all institutions). 
The White Paper was less clear about the detailed mechanisms required to 
implement such proposals. The Browne Committee’s recommendation that a 
single Higher Education Council should be established by merging the HEFCE, the 
Quality Assurance Agency, the Office for Fair Access, and the Office for Independent 
Adjudication had already been rejected by the government, partly on the grounds that 
it would create serious conflicts of interest. Such conflicts were not entirely avoided 
by the proposals in the White Paper, however. It announced that the HEFCE would be 
given an ‘explicit remit’ as the overall regulator of the sector to ‘protect the interests 
of students’ and to ‘promote competitiveness’. To that end it announced that there 
would be legislation to allow the HEFCE to attach conditions of grant. At the same 
time the HEFCE would continue to be responsible for distributing the remaining 
(direct) grant for teaching, specifically to support specialist institutions, widening 
participation, knowledge exchange, and those subjects that would continue to cost 
more than the maximum £9,000 tuition fee (science, engineering, and medicine). In 
addition, although not mentioned in the White Paper, the HEFCE would continue to 
distribute QR (quality research) funding. 
The White Paper appeared to be ‘work in progress’. It is best seen as a snap 
shot of where the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills had got to in its 
efforts to implement the government’s new funding system, while coping with its 
collateral consequences, in the summer of 2011. But policy continued to evolve and a 
number of issues remained intractable: the development of a lighter-touch, risk-based 
quality regime and the ‘level playing field’ for existing higher education institutions, 
further education colleges, and new private providers, on both of which progress 
has been slow. There was little evidence that colleges had a significantly increased 
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appetite to offer higher education programmes: seven private providers were granted 
the power to award degrees – for taught courses not research degrees – and ten 
smaller institutions were allowed to use ‘university’ titles, which hardly amounted 
to the substantial extension in the system’s institutional base promised, implicitly, 
by the White Paper. Meanwhile, the HEFCE’s primary efforts have been focused on 
managing the transition to the new high-fee regime and reducing the teaching grant 
without destabilizing institutional finances. The development of a stable system for 
the allocation of teaching funding to science, technology, engineering, and medicine 
(STEM) and strategic and vulnerable subjects remains a longer-term objective, 
although consultation has begun.
However, the most important changes following the White Paper have been 
the effective abandonment of the idea of ‘contestable’ places for which institutions 
can bid and the effective reduction in student numbers. Both reflect significant 
deviations from the policies set out in the White Paper:
i) The number of ‘contestable’ places has been reduced from 20,000 to 10,000 and 
in future will be distributed formulaically instead of as a result of an active bidding 
process (HEFCE, 2012). To some degree this change has recognized reality: many 
of the places awarded remained unfilled, especially in further education colleges. 
But it may also reflect an ideological shift. It has been decided that students with 
qualifications equivalent to A-level grades of ABB are now to be removed from 
institutions’ student number controls (which were reduced pro rata). The focus 
has shifted from encouraging lower-cost provision to privileging highly qualified 
students, whose choice, therefore, is now being enhanced at the expense of their 
less qualified peers
ii) There are also signs that the overall size of the English higher education system 
is likely to shrink as a result of the Coalition Government’s new funding system – 
which is significant because the White Paper justified the government’s decision 
to increase fees as an alternative to reducing student numbers. Yet this appears 
to have been its effect. The number of applications to higher education for entry 
in 2012, the year in which the higher fees came into effect, fell by 7 per cent 
(UCAS, 2012); actual acceptances fell by a greater percentage. The reduction was 
not altogether unexpected: a similar, although smaller, decline had taken place 
when the previous Labour Government had increased fees to £3,000. In the early 
stages of the UCAS cycle for 2013 entry there were further precipitate falls in 
applications, although they had recovered by the January Census date and ended 
up slightly ahead of the total at the equivalent time 12 months before (UCAS, 
2013). But unless there is a dramatic rebound in demand, overall student numbers 
will decline as the large intakes from 2010 and 2011 work their way through 
the system. In addition, the number of young adults in the overall population 
will continue to decline for more than a decade (Thompson and Bekhradnia, 
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2012b). The prospect in the coming years, therefore, is of a significant shortage 
of graduates.
Like all White Papers, the 2011 Higher Education White Paper was composed of 
an unstable combination of ideological preferences and pragmatic prescriptions. It 
is not my purpose to argue with the former, although the extent to which the new 
funding regime has been able to – or can ever – promote student choice is open 
to doubt. This is only partly because of the weaknesses in the construction of that 
regime – for example, the failure to recognize that individual institutions suffer few, 
if any, market disadvantages from charging higher fees, even if the system as a whole 
experiences a decline in demand. Combined with the substantial failure to widen the 
system’s institutional base, that could be said to constitute ‘market failure’. Some will 
conclude that the remedy is to redouble efforts to create a higher education market; 
others that the nature of higher education – notably its role as a positional and long-
term good – mean that such efforts are destined to fail. 
Of greater significance is the paradox at the heart of the government’s higher 
education policy. By its own admission the total of publicly provided resources flowing 
into higher education would increase by more than 10 per cent by the middle of the 
decade, which is difficult to reconcile with its overriding determination to cut the 
deficit by reducing public expenditure – except in the narrowest accounting terms 
(Thompson and Bekhradnia, 2012a). Such an outcome is the direct result of the 
government’s own, commendable, decision to introduce a less onerous repayment 
system, making it unlikely that a substantial minority of graduates will be able to 
pay back their student loans in full. In practice, higher education’s contribution to 
reducing the deficit can probably only be achieved by reducing student numbers. 
Such a measure would undermine all the efforts to promote social mobility by 
providing sufficiently generous terms to ensure that students from poorer homes are 
not discouraged and disadvantaged.
Finally, even if this central paradox is overlooked, there remain detailed 
issues of implementation that were not resolved by the White Paper and continue 
to be unresolved. For example, the government decided against introducing further 
legislation despite its promise in the White Paper to do so. Their choice has had three 
consequences. First, the HEFCE (and other agencies responsible for the delivery 
of the new funding system) have been denied the legal tools they need. Not only is 
it unclear how the HEFCE will be able to discharge its designated role as, if not a 
formal regulator then a de facto overseer of the system, it will lack the means even 
to enforce the detailed funding decision it – with the encouragement of ministers – 
has taken. Secondly, no effective mechanisms have been proposed to coordinate the 
actions (and effects) of decisions taken by a range of separate agencies – notably the 
HEFCE and the Student Loans Company. The threads of coordination will be held by 
ministers who will always be subject to short-term political pressures and brief tenures 
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of office. Finally, the degree of uncertainty within the system has been substantially 
increased. The risks of dysfunctional behaviour, with ill anticipated collateral effects, 
have also increased. As a result the system could be reshaped in perverse but difficult 
to reverse ways over the next decade.
Conclusion
The reform of higher education (and student) funding by the Coalition Government 
that came to power in 2010 has already been characterized as a watershed moment 
in the development of English higher education. First, it is said to represent a 
fundamental ideological shift: competition is now entrenched as the major dynamic 
for improvement and more active (and informed) student choice is the instrument 
of securing it. While such a view of higher education is hardly novel – and to some 
extent informed policy choices made by the previous Labour Governments under 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in their efforts to ‘modernize’ higher education – 
‘market’ discourse has now been irreversibly lodged in mainstream policy thinking. 
A tipping point has been reached. 
Secondly, the process of implementing this reform is now causing far-reaching 
changes in institutional behaviour as colleges and universities seek to modify not 
only their management systems but also their strategies and even their organizational 
cultures to cope with the new funding environment. The fact that this process has 
been incremental, unpredictable, and even chaotic has intensified the sense of 
transition: from a policy landscape that, in its essentials, had prevailed certainly for 
more than two decades since the abolition of the binary system and the creation of 
the HEFCE – and, some would argue, since the 1960s, when the first steps towards the 
creation of a mass higher education system were taken in the United Kingdom – to 
an unfamiliar, and still unknowable, policy landscape.
Of course, a contrary position can be taken: that core institutional values 
and behaviours are likely to survive the imposition of the new fees-led funding 
system without fundamental modification. Universities have proved themselves to 
be remarkably resilient institutions in the past and are likely to remain so – rightly, 
many will add, because they are key institutions within the space of a ‘civil society’ 
that mediates between the state and the market and, as such, should not be subject 
to ceaseless ‘reforms’. Also the process of policy implementation will inevitably 
require a series of, perhaps increasing, accommodations with existing practice. As 
such accommodations accumulate, it could well erode some of the radical potential 
of the original headline reforms – as is already evident in the (inevitable) survival of 
student number controls. Indeed the legal failure to specify the HEFCE’s regulatory 
responsibilities under the new funding regime might, in effect, increase its informal 
influence over institutions.
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However, these are matters that cannot yet be determined. All that is possible at 
present is a provisional assessment, one that might emphasize two broad conclusions:
The contingency of policy formation 
The first is that contingency always plays an important role in policy formation. 
All policy, of course, is formed by a mixture of structural determinism, the longue 
durée in the phrase made famous by the French historian Fernand Braudel, and 
political contingency, his histoire evénémentielle. But the mix has varied. In this case the 
(perceived) need to reduce the deficit as an urgent and overriding priority, and the 
determination to do so by reducing public expenditure rather than increasing taxes, 
lent an urgency to the deliberations of the Browne Committee and the development 
of the White Paper. If this need had been seen as less urgent, or a different balance 
between cuts and taxes had been preferred, the package of reforms might have 
taken a different shape. Although the long-term drift of higher education policy, 
common ground between all major political parties and many developed countries, 
had been towards increasing reliance on ‘user payments’ to fund institutions, the 
detailed proposals made by Browne and modified by the White Paper were not an 
inevitable outcome. 
Another contingency was that the government formed in 2010 was a coalition 
between Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, who had pledged in their election 
manifesto to abolish student fees entirely and were consequently deeply embarrassed 
by the volte face forced upon them. Two elements in the package of reforms can safely 
be attributed to the Liberal Democrat influence: the more generous repayment 
schedule and the emphasis on social mobility. While the latter can be dismissed as 
window-dressing, the former has had important consequences – not least the sharp 
reduction in price sensitivity among students and the consequent failure on the part 
of institutions to produce the kind of variable tuition fee structures a genuine market 
requires.
An illuminating comparison can be drawn with the debates historians have 
about the causes of the First World War. In the 1960s a group of radical German 
historians came to argue that Germany in 1914 embraced war as a means of ensuring, 
and enhancing, its dominance in Europe (and beyond) and quickly devised ambitious 
war aims. According to their analysis the (in)famous ‘war guilt’ clause in the Versailles 
treaty was amply justified (Fischer, 1967; 2007). More recently gentler and more 
nuanced analyses have tended to prevail. While the dangers of militarism were real, 
it was not inevitable that a local conflict in the Balkans would rapidly explode into a 
world war. Like previous – and actually more threatening – Balkan conflicts, it could 
have been contained given slightly changed circumstances (Clark, 2012). There 
was perhaps no similar inevitability about the shape taken by the reform of higher 
education funding in England between 2009 and 2011. It, too, was shaped by events, 
sometimes transitory, and contingencies that imposed their own constraints.
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A ‘perfect storm’
If indeed the 2009–11 reforms come to be seen as a revolution in English higher 
education, the second conclusion is that this may be due not solely (or even mainly) 
to their direct consequences but rather to the unintended impacts of other policy 
changes. The combined effect of discrete, and uncoordinated, policy strands could 
be to produce what might be termed a ‘perfect storm’ in English higher education. 
Certainly their unstable combination is a major ingredient in the turbulence and 
uncertainty currently affecting England’s universities and colleges, which might have 
been able to adjust more comfortably to the proposals made in the White Paper.
Four developments may be particularly significant: the recruitment of 
international students, the future shape of research (and innovation) policies, 
reforms in English schools, and the long-term consequences of devolution. First, 
given the importance of internationalization strategies in the future development of 
higher education, the chilling effect of the new visa regime imposed by the Coalition 
Government – the direct result of the Conservatives’ pledge to reduce immigration 
– could well have a greater impact on both the future shape of the English higher 
education system and the fortunes of individual institutions than the shift towards 
a high-fee funding regime. At the very least new rules on visas will compound the 
consequences of this new funding regime. Secondly, the abolition of regional 
development agencies in England has also had a significant effect on patterns of 
funding for applied research and development. Decisions yet to be taken on the 
distribution of QR funding following the outcomes of the 2013 Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) could also have far-reaching consequences. The current – and 
perhaps complacent – assumption that the REF will be a re-run of previous Research 
Assessment Exercises (RAEs) ignores its different origins and architecture.
Thirdly, the effective abandonment of comprehensive secondary education 
– and its replacement by a variety of school types such as academies and free 
schools – and the continuing uncertainty about the future of the General Certificate 
of Secondary Education (GCSE), first abandoned and then reprieved, as the 
foundational qualification in schools, are likely to have important consequences for 
demand for higher education. The establishment of a comprehensive secondary 
school system – and, in particular, the introduction of the GCSE – were key stimuli for 
the development of the current mass higher education system. Finally, the fracturing 
of higher education in the United Kingdom into three (or four) ‘national’ systems 
has been accelerated by the decisions of the Scottish and Welsh governments not 
to follow the English lead by charging high fees but to persist with funding regimes 
more dependent on public expenditure. Such decisions have produced centrifugal 
forces that may be difficult to contain and a number of ‘interface’ difficulties that 
may prove intractable. 
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Both conclusions – the contingency of policy formation and the gathering of 
a ‘perfect storm’ – tend to reinforce the plasticity of policy. Painstaking analysis of 
the stately progress of committee reports, White Papers, and (although absent in 
this particular phase of higher education reform – so far) legislation may convey a 
misleading impression of order and regularity. In fact, policy formation remains a 
chaotic business. Indeed a historical survey of the development of higher education 
policy may even suggest that, as policy interventions have become more intrusive 
(in the sense that the political will to meddle has become less constrained and 
ideological considerations have become more pronounced), they have also become 
more chaotic, as the growing difficulties regarding their implementation and the 
greater impact of unintended consequences and collateral policies reflects. 
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A bridge too far: An economic 




Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are 
usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the 
air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.
(Keynes, 1936)
The evolution of policy on the financing of higher education, and the changing 
public sentiment about the payment and financing of tuition fees and living costs 
by students in particular, provides a good example of how research findings and 
scholarly interpretations can eventually find their way into policy and practice. As 
with much in modern economics, recent ideas about higher education’s financing 
were conceived in the mind of Adam Smith. In the little read Appendix 1 to Book 5 of 
the Wealth of Nations (Smith, 2010) Smith comments on the effects of different ways of 
financing and regulating universities in England, France, and Scotland. Speaking of 
the first he says that guaranteed income from property ownership and endowments, 
as at Oxford, led to sloth and corruption; of the second, that state finance and 
regulation were a bureaucratic nightmare; and of the third, that a system of finance 
based on fee-paying students produced universities that were responsive to the needs 
of their clients, up to date, and efficient. 
The Robbins Report – Lionel Robbins was a distinguished economist – considered 
it was desirable for academic freedom that universities receive their income from 
several different sources, including fees from students, but made the proviso that it 
was appropriate for the state to continue to meet most of the costs until the practice 
of attending university was more deeply entrenched in British culture. 
(This para is a quotation)On balance I do not recommend immediate recourse 
to a system of financing students by loans. At a time when many parents are only just 
beginning to acquire the habit of contemplating higher education for those of their 
children, especially girls, who are capable of benefiting from it, I think it probable 
that it would have undesirable disincentivising effects. But if, as time goes on, the 
habit is more firmly established, the arguments of justice in distribution and of the 
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advantage of increasing individual responsibility may come to weigh more heavily 
and lead to some experiments in this direction (CHE, 1963: para 647).
However, the Committee recommended that student fees, even if subsidized, 
should not cover more than about a quarter of the costs of courses. In a very prescient 
remark they said: 
… if fees were at a high level … it is highly probable that the level of 
fees rather than broad questions of educational policy would become the 
focus of public discussion; and if this were so the problem of preserving 
academic freedom would present itself in a new form. 
(CHE, 1963: para 653) 
It was after the publication of the Robbins Report in 1963 and the establishment of 
the Unit for Economic and Statistical Studies in Higher Education, set up by the 
LSE to continue the groundbreaking statistical analyses inaugurated by Claus Moser 
and Richard Layard for the Report, that the economics of education – and higher 
education particularly – became part of mainstream economics in the United 
Kingdom. At the heart of its analysis were the theory and the measurement of ‘human 
capital’. Mark Blaug wrote a decade later: 
The birth of human capital theory was announced by Theodore Schultz in 
1960 (in his presidential address to the American Economics Association). 
The birth itself may be said to have taken place two years later when 
the Journal of Political Economy published its October 1962 supplement 
volume on ‘Investment in Human Beings’. This volume included … the 
preliminary chapters of Gary Becker’s 1964 monograph ‘Human Capital’ 
which has, ever since, served as the locus classicus on the subject. 
(Blaug, 1970: 12)
Human capital theory was attractive to economists for several reasons. It appeared to 
offer a solution to one of the puzzles presented by economic growth theory. For over 
a hundred years economic expansion in the West had been more rapid than could 
be explained simply by the accumulation of physical capital (Denison, 1962; 1968). 
Increases in knowledge had clearly made an important contribution. It was in the 
public’s interest for governments to maximize the investment in knowledge creation 
and dissemination in order to accelerate growth.
But human capital theory also presented a dilemma to those concerned with 
the financing of higher education. While hundreds of studies all over the world have 
yielded ample empirical evidence that higher education is a good investment for 
individuals – graduates on average earned considerably more than non-graduates, 
even when allowances were made for differences in inherent ability (Psacharopoulos, 
1973; 1985) – were there benefits to society over and above such higher incomes? 
The answer is not so clear-cut. Medical doctors clearly bring considerable benefits to 
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other people. But doctors are also very well paid. Moreover, as some economists and 
sociologists have claimed (Arrow, 1973; Taubman and Wales, 1973; Wiles 1974), it 
may be that graduates earn more because their degrees are assumed to signal higher 
ability; they replace non-graduates in jobs that could be done just as well without a 
degree. If all the benefits of higher education go to the graduates who have received 
it, there are no sound ethical reasons why taxpayers in general should pay for it. 
Furthermore, if the individual beneficiaries pay for it, the operation of the market 
means it is likely, in practice, to lead to an efficient use of resources since, as Adam 
Smith pointed out, people who pay seek to ensure that they get value for their money. 
On the other hand, however, if there are benefits to others, over and above those 
received by the direct beneficiaries, a case can be made for some subsidy from public 
funds. The existence and extent of such external benefits has been the subject of 
more than half a century’s debate amongst economists. 
There are also issues of equity. If students have to meet the full cost of 
higher education, only those from relatively affluent families will be able to do so 
and they will obtain the financial benefits in later life. It was in 1968 that Howard 
Glennerster of the LSE Unit published A Graduate Tax (Glennerster, 1968). Exploring 
the implications of such preoccupations, Glennerster concluded that the fairest and 
most efficient way of paying for higher education was through a surcharge on the 
income tax paid by graduates.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the issue of people contributing to 
the costs of their own higher education can be seen as part of a much wider debate 
about the distribution of personal incomes throughout an individual’s lifetime. We 
all begin our lives in a state of dependency where others must provide resources for 
our upkeep. This is followed by a period in which most of us are able to meet our own 
needs and usually generate a surplus. Finally, in the sixth and seventh of Shakespeare’s 
seven ages most of us again become dependent on the surplus generated by other 
people. It is now generally accepted that individuals must save some of their personal 
surplus during their good years to finance pensions later on. The argument for 
personal loans to finance at least the higher stages of an individual’s education can 
usefully be seen as mirroring the debate about personal pensions. There are also 
issues about equity between individuals – some people are more able, or are born 
with other socio-economic advantages – but at least as important is the need to help 
people enjoy a satisfactory standard of living throughout their life cycle.
Such questions preoccupied economists for several decades but the message 
heard by most politicians, until mass higher education became a reality in the 
1990s, was that more higher education was a wise way of spending public money 
and would bring ongoing long-term economic benefits and lead to a more equitable 
society. However, by 1980 there was a growing consensus in many countries that the 
collective provision of a very wide range of public services was failing and the virtues 
of the competitive market – on grounds of both efficiency and equity – became the 
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dominant ideology. The ideological change was sharpest in the socialist economies 
of eastern Europe, but moves in this direction have taken place in most countries in 
the past quarter century. 
A historical overview
Higher education is susceptible to economic analysis in that it requires resources. As 
in all resource-using activities, there are two basic ways in which it can be organized: 
as a collectively provided service: free at the point of delivery with its profile 
determined by political and managerial processes, or as a facility provided by Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand in which thousands of individual decisions in markets decide 
how much is provided and who reaps the benefits. In practice, all higher education 
systems are a combination of the two extremes but the balance between them has 
changed over time. 
Since the emergence of universities in the Middle Ages the dominant mode 
of higher education provision has been collective, firstly by religious organizations 
and subsequently by nation states. The basic reason was straightforward: both wanted 
to form the thinking of well-educated people and both wanted to train suitable 
people to run their organizations. Both controlled substantial resources and both 
wanted to recruit into their service the most able young people, whatever their social 
background. Such control of the thinking of each new generation and the upward 
mobility of the brightest individuals makes an important contribution to social 
stability: in societies where change was slow it worked rather well on the whole. 
In the United Kingdom, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century 
saw leaders of industry join the church and the government as sponsors of higher 
education in the great industrial cities for similar reasons. They wanted upcoming 
generations to embrace their commercial ideology and their share of the most able 
young people. Similar developments occurred in the United States, but in most other 
European countries church and government remained dominant, possibly because 
governments played a more leading role in the development of industry. However, 
the public service model prevailed everywhere until the late 1980s. Even in the United 
States, where there were many private universities, the ideal of public service was a 
major driving force for university boards of trustees. Higher education was a public 
service to which everyone was entitled if they could demonstrate that they had the 
intellectual capacity to undertake it. 
The model fell apart in the 1990s, partly as a result of pressures brought about 
by massive expansion but also because of radical ideological changes in ideas about 
how public services are best provided. In higher education, as in many other publicly 
provided services, the Achilles heel was self-indulgence, not necessarily explicit bribery 
and corruption but because the management of universities was largely for the benefit 
of its providers. The most blatant example of this in many of the United Kingdom’s 
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universities was the decision to grant secure lifetime tenure to individuals shortly 
after they obtained a first degree. Tenure is certainly justifiable in terms of giving 
academic staff freedom from political interference after they have demonstrated that 
they have useful knowledge and intellectual skills to offer others, but as a standard 
form of employment of very highly specialized people it introduced rigidities which 
eventually came near to breaking the system. The clearest example came in 1981–3 
when it proved impossible to reduce expenditure in some universities, in accordance 
with public policy decisions, because of legal commitments to excessive numbers 
of staff with lifetime tenure. Less dramatic were several cases where staff had to be 
retained despite having very few students to teach and little research output. The 
Soviet Union exhibited similar rigidities in an extreme form in its entire economic 
system – and that system did collapse. 
The political reaction to the inefficiencies and inequities brought about by 
‘producer capture’ was extreme, amounting – in many ways – to an anti-collectivist 
revolution, though for the most part a peaceful one. The past 20 years have seen 
a marked shift towards market hegemony, most dramatically in former communist 
countries. But in the past quarter century, market-based provision of public services 
has become increasingly global. In the former communist countries of eastern 
Europe, universities began almost immediately to admit full fee-paying students to 
supplement the regular students subsidized from state funds – and private higher 
education institutions burgeoned. In UK higher education the change was clearly 
marked by the 1988 Education Reform Act, which decreed that universities and 
colleges were no longer to be state-subsidized service providers but treated rather 
as economic organizations selling education and research services to the state and 
others who were willing to purchase them. Over the following quarter century there 
has been, in many countries, a further steady shift from quasi-market provision – in 
which the state is a pseudo-purchaser – to something approaching a real market in 
which larger shares of income for higher education institutions now comes from 
private purchasers. There are few countries now in which most students do not 
meet some of the costs of their higher education. OECD figures for 2010 show that 
only seven out of 37 OECD countries did not charge first-degree students some fees 
(OECD, 2011). In England all universities now receive less than half of their income 
directly from central government. The rest is paid by customers of various kinds. 
However, even in England, a country which has moved a long way in this 
direction, it is important not to overstate the free market analogy. Higher education 
institutions have remained charitable organizations. As such they trade an inability 
to take profits out of the educational enterprise and various commitments to provide 
services on a public service basis for favourable tax treatment. They are subject to 
a good deal of government regulation and the government remains committed to 
repaying the debts of graduates on low incomes or working in countries out of reach 
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of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, which may end up being a very large sum 
(HEPI, 2012).
However, the 2011 White Paper (BIS, 2011) marks a major shift towards a 
fully marketized higher education system in England. Similar developments are also 
occurring in several other countries in the form of an expansion of higher education 
provision by commercial profit-seeking enterprises (Kinser and Levey, 2006). While 
the shift has the potential to bring some benefits – especially in reducing costs to 
students by weakening the monopolizing power of providers – what has been 
described as the commodification of higher education (Lyotard, 1984; Naidoo, 2003) 
also brings dangers that are likely to be accentuated when profit seeking appears to 
be the primary driver.
Recent research into alternative providers of higher education has identified 
698 institutions that offer privately funded Higher Education in the United Kingdom 
(HMRC, 2012: 14). HESA (2011) shows that over 56,000 students, of whom 45,000 
were on business and related courses and 14,000 on postgraduate courses, enrolled 
on higher education courses in private institutions in 2010. At 2.2 per cent, this is a 
small proportion of the total number of students in that year, although it has been 
growing rapidly. Only the College of Law, part of a private commercial enterprise, 
has so far been authorized to use the title ‘university’ and award its own degrees, but 
more are in the pipeline. At present the others award qualifications that are validated 
in some way by conventional universities, which clearly indicates the absence of a 
sharp boundary between non-profit-seeking and profit-seeking higher education. 
The purpose of the HMRC (2012) publication cited above is to canvas opinion on 
whether for-profit private providers should have similar tax advantages as traditional 
not-for-profit higher education institutions. It seems likely that their number will 
increase, particularly in the areas of business studies and law, which are cheap subjects 
to teach and potentially very profitable. 
Such developments are occurring at a time when signs outside higher 
education suggest that the era of market hegemony may be evolving into something 
which recognizes the important role collective regulation has to play. Obviously 
the ideological landscape changed following the financial crash of 2008 and the 
subsequent worldwide depression. It was no longer possible to believe that a light-
touch regulation of global financial transactions would result in sustainable long-
term economic growth. The crash also revealed a huge amount of large-scale fraud 
and corruption. At a theoretical level the longstanding economic debate between 
the Keynesians and the Hayekians is gradually turning in favour of the former. 
Governments must intervene to return economies to health. But it is not just the 
economic crisis that is increasing doubts about market solutions to all social issues. 
For several years there has been evidence that societies with wide disparities in income 
score less highly on various measures of well-being than those with less overall wealth 
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but more concern about the welfare of whole communities (For a useful literature 
review see Easterlin et al., 2010).
Limits of marketization in higher education
As I’ve already indicated, throughout its history higher education has been 
predominantly provided collectively, partly through an inherent belief that young 
people should not be born to blush unseen, whatever their social backgrounds, and 
partly to co-opt able individuals into the existing social structure rather than risk 
their unmet aspirations turning into some sort of rebellion. Nearly half a century ago 
this longstanding foundation of provision was explicitly hardened into the assertion 
by the Robbins Committee that: 
… it is a proper function of higher education, as of education in schools, to 
provide in partnership with the family that background of culture and social habit 
upon which a healthy society depends. This function, important at all times, is 
perhaps especially important in an age that has set for itself the ideal of equality of 
opportunity. It is not merely by providing places for students from all classes that this 
ideal will be achieved, but also by providing, in the atmosphere of the institutions in 
which the students live and work, influences that in some measure compensate for 
any inequalities of home background. These influences are not limited to the student 
population. Universities and colleges have an important role to play in the general 
cultural life of the communities in which they are situated. 
(CHE, 1963: para 28)
Robbins clearly had a firm belief that universities and colleges have a role in honing 
and transmitting social and cultural values as well as skills and knowledge, a belief at 
odds with the recent idea that the student as customer knows what is best for them 
and that the pursuit by each of their own interests is in the best interest of society as a 
whole. This is at the heart of most controversies about the aims of higher education. 
Is it an activity in which the customer knows best or is the student a neophyte who 
comes to university to be guided by those who are more knowledgeable or wiser? 
As always in the social sciences the answer is not straightforward. The question for 
political economists is how the economic losses and benefits compare as the system 
becomes increasingly marketized.
An argument in favour of a market approach is that higher education has 
become a very differentiated set of activities in which the best way forward to achieve 
one aim is not inevitably compatible with another. For example, it is not hard to 
recognize tensions between those who believe the top priority is for the most able 
young people in a range of intellectual endeavours to have the opportunity to stretch 
their talents in an environment conducive to the highest levels of scholarship, and 
those for whom the top priority is ensuring some equivalent provision for people 
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whose abilities are more modest. In 2012 – the year of the London Olympics – it is 
hard not to see an analogy with sport. Are public funds better spent in enabling a 
few individuals to win gold medals or is it preferable to concentrate on promoting 
sporting endeavours amongst the non-elite mass of the population? Obviously the 
two are not entirely incompatible, but neither are they completely harmonious. In a 
market there is, in principle, a niche for everything, whereas in politically determined 
systems it is very difficult to make such choices since favouring one activity appears 
to be at the disadvantage of others and democratic governments that take unpopular 
decisions do not get elected. (For an academic analysis of these issues see Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1958.)
But the ethical benefits of the invisible hand are based on not-always-met 
assumptions. In higher education the market is far from perfect, the implications 
of which have been recently well analysed by Roger Brown (Brown and Carasso, 
2013). There are considerable costs of entry in most STEM (science, technology, 
engineering, medicine) courses, for example, and the commercial returns from 
creating the facilities necessary for research and teaching in such areas are extremely 
uncertain. Private commercial universities are unlikely to teach or do research in 
such subjects. Within multi-faculty universities there are many opportunities for 
sharing facilities and cross subsidization instead of profit taking. There are many 
services which can be jointly provided within institutions – an expensive computer 
system needed to meet the needs of engineers can provide services at marginal cost 
for historians, for example. Furthermore, many of the economic returns to higher 
education and for research, both for individuals and for society, are long term. 
Expenditure on higher education is a long-term investment and competitive markets 
are not usually enthusiastic about investments that bring uncertain returns only in 
the distant future. 
The main restraint on a fully marketized provision of higher education is 
equity. It is not difficult to find private funding, from both employers and students’ 
families, for low cost but well-rewarded areas such as law and accountancy. Many 
employers are also willing to finance students who have the potential to be high 
flyers in their future careers. In England several legal and accountancy firms have 
been reported in the media as providing scholarships and bursaries and subsidizing 
courses for the most promising individuals in these areas. The transformation of 
the private College of Law into an academically autonomous university and the 
concentration of commercial providers in various aspects of business studies have 
already been mentioned. In liberal arts subjects it was apparently not too difficult for 
the New College of the Humanities to obtain private backing provided it restricted 
entry to students who had performed particularly well in secondary education and 
might have just missed a place at Oxford or Cambridge. Even for staunch advocates 
of markets it is hard to see what the trickle-down effect of teaching safe subjects to 
safe students would be without government interference.
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Markets involve competition on the basis of price and perceived quality, which 
invariably means that differentiation becomes stratification. It was over a century 
ago that Thorstein Veblen invented the phrase ‘conspicuous consumption’ to 
indicate the purchase of goods or services not to satisfy needs or wants in the most 
economical way but rather to identify oneself to others as having superior wealth and 
social standing (Veblen, 1994). Bourdieu (1986) used the term ‘symbolic capital’ to 
designate a similar idea. It is not difficult to see how institutional diversity within mass 
higher education lends itself to conspicuous consumption. In an article a few years 
ago I suggested that the concept of mass higher education has become somewhat 
misleading. The more marketized a higher education system, the more it consists 
not of a network of complementary institutions but rather of a series of concentric 
circles, with the most sought after traditional elite formation at the centre surrounded 
by a belt of high-level professional formation – which in turn is surrounded by a 
loose collection of more or less open access activities with rather blurred boundaries 
(Williams and Filippakou, 2010). 
This view is exacerbated by the complementary function of research. There 
is a close, though not identical, link between the formation of an elite, and leading-
edge, internationally recognized research universities – probably because the ablest 
students prefer to be taught by the most distinguished scholars (see Wiles, 1974). 
The professional formation belt of institutions is associated with applied research 
that often depends on original discoveries made elsewhere. The diffuse penumbra, 
meanwhile, is more often concerned with consultancy-type activities that apply 
research to practical problems in wider society. These are all absolutely necessary 
functions in a modern higher education system but it is unclear whether market 
solutions will organize them in an optimal way, especially if they result in the banding 
of institutions I have suggested.
All markets are subject to some measure of regulation, though this may range 
from individual integrity and self-discipline, through collective self-regulation, to 
statutory regulation by governments. Historically, British universities have always 
been legally autonomous institutions and their Royal Charters enabled them to do 
anything not expressly forbidden by them or the law of the land. However, as the 
previous quotation by Robbins suggested, they also submitted to an implied code 
of conduct in which it was considered inappropriate for a university or its members 
to move outside a limited range of traditional activities. While very honourable, this 
formed a fundamentally conservative attitude which made it difficult for new subjects 
to become established or for new ideas about teaching and learning to be accepted. 
The University Grants Committee system, which channelled public funds into 
universities until 1989, underwrote this conservatism in being composed of senior 
academics and by making unhypothecated grants to universities. Compared with the 
enormous contributions made by members of British and American universities in 
winning the Second World War, meanwhile, the constraints of German universities 
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in the period leading to and during it demonstrated the value of relatively affluent 
academic freedom underpinned by ethically driven individual self-regulation. 
However, such a system could not survive massive expansion and the huge 
increases in public funding it implied. It depended in large part on the existence 
of ample resources, on all the universities involved having similar interests, and on 
an implied compact between the universities and the governments which provided 
resources. Expansion meant diversification and increasing concern by governments 
to ensure that resources were used efficiently and in accordance with their priorities. 
The period from the 1960s to the 1990s saw increasing government monitoring and 
regulation of university activities (for detailed accounts see Shattock, 2012 and Brown 
and Carasso, 2013) and the creation of a powerful sector of higher education under 
more direct public control. The end of a system based ultimately on mutual trust 
came with the 1988 Education Reform Act. In the 1990s growing tensions between 
financially autonomous higher education institutions mounted and vastly increased 
monitoring and regulation by central government. 
A bridge too far?
The final sections of this chapter consider whether, from an economic perspective, 
there are – or should be – limits to the marketization of higher education, and I 
suggest specifically that the idea of profit-making by universities is a step too far. 
The two central weaknesses of markets as mechanisms for the strategic 
allocation of resources are their tendency to prioritize short-term decision-making 
and their lack of concern with how the outcome of the large number of individual 
decisions that make up a market distributes costs and benefits. The result are periods 
of unsustainable optimism and others of irredeemable pessimism – booms and 
busts – that we might liken to Keynes’ ‘animal spirits’ exhibiting symptoms of bi-
polar disorder. Second-order problems are venality – as the boundaries of legality 
and commercial acceptability are tested to the limit – and of extreme complexity, as 
authorities try to regulate and correct market failures.
The outcomes of both research and teaching can be appreciated only in the 
long term. For students, higher education is a set of experiences, most of which bring 
returns – such as higher average earnings for graduates and the wider benefits of 
improved citizenship, healthier lifestyles, and a lower propensity to commit crimes 
(Schuller et al., 2004) – over a long period of time. It is important that universities 
match students’ abilities and interests to courses which are most appropriate for 
them. However, when universities are totally dependent on the number of students 
they recruit, pressures mount to cut corners and recruit as many students as possible, 
without too much concern for whether students and courses are matched as well as 
possible. Such fevered recruitment has been apparent in the past two decades in the 
scramble for students from outside the United Kingdom (Forland, 2006).
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In markets where repeat purchases are normal, consumers learn from 
experience and can avoid suppliers who fail to deliver satisfactory goods and services. 
Such avoidance is rarely possible in higher education: when making their choices 
of course and university or college, students rely largely on the experiences of their 
predecessors and the claims made by institutions seeking their custom. Much course 
advertising stresses the short-term benefits of a university: the immediate learning 
experiences, the social life, the speed of tutorial feedback on assignments, and the 
student societies, for example. In England the now compulsory Key Information Sets 
(KIS), which all universities are required to provide, concentrate mainly on short-
term measures. While there is emphasis on the first employment experiences of 
recent graduates, no mention is made of longer-term prospects. In reality, many of 
the students from the most well-informed families choose to attend old, established, 
research intensive universities with well-established records of alumni in leading 
positions in society. Their doing so strongly contributes to the stratification of 
universities, one characteristic feature of a marketized system. Longevity is one of the 
main indicators of distinction.
‘Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: 
but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath’ (Matthew, 
xiii: volume 12). It is not completely clear whether Jesus Christ was endorsing such 
an outcome, or merely describing one of the features of the Roman Empire. But 
two millennia later we can recognize it as an attribute of current global economic 
arrangements, one widely accepted as an inevitable and acceptable consequence of 
rapid economic growth through market competition. 
Market competition also exalts inequities in individual sectors of the economy. 
In any industry some products and some enterprises succeed while others fail, as 
much the case in higher education as it is in more obviously commercial sectors. In 
the United Kingdom, so far university failures have been cushioned by mergers and 
takeovers and occasionally by support from public funds. But inequality in some service 
activities risks having particularly damaging and long-term consequences. Health and 
policing come to mind but the long-term effects of educational inequalities are also 
especially detrimental. Despite efforts to promote lifelong learning opportunities, 
it is inevitable both for psychological and economic reasons that the bulk of most 
individuals’ education will be obtained early in life and will be a largely once for all 
experience. Ill-judged decisions taken in an environment of fierce competition for 
the custom of often immature minds affect people’s life chances throughout their 
course. The inequitable consequences of inequalities in education, including higher 
education, are long lasting impediments to a harmonious society.
In any economic or social organization there is always a risk of corruption, 
as some people in positions of influence use their power for their own advantage 
rather than for that of the organization or society to which they owe allegiance. The 
principal–agent problem is intrinsic to any large-scale, complex organization or 
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system. In a competitive market system those in positions of authority are particularly 
susceptible to temptation, especially if they promote entrepreneurial behaviour 
where success is measured largely in terms of effective innovations, which often 
means bending the rules, sometimes to breaking point. Traditional higher education 
systems have been tempted into adopting rules and procedures that operate more to 
advance the careers of academics providing the education and research than those 
of the students they were supposed to be serving. However, the adoption of market 
values and financial incentives greatly increases the temptation. Several cases have 
come to light showing student numbers being misreported or that advertising to 
attract overseas students is misleading, as have cases highlighting research plagiarism, 
allegations of manipulating students’ grades, and, in a few instances, public funding 
being misappropriated and job applicants providing misleadingly embellished 
curricula vitae. 
None of the problems outlined is insurmountable. They are all, in one way or 
another, examples of the principal–agent problem that is well known in economics. 
The more decision-making is devolved and organizations are encouraged to compete 
with one another, the harder it is to ensure that agents act in the common interest 
rather than for their own individual advantage. Some libertarians claim that this is a 
public benefit, even if it does lead to wide inequalities. But regulation and audit are 
common features of markets and even where states do not regulate, trade associations 
often set rules and standards for their members. 
Short-termism can, in principle, at least be ameliorated by providing university 
funds on a long-term basis. For the UK’s University Grants Committee, this was an 
underlying rationale of its quinquennial grant system from 1919 to the late 1970s, 
when it became one of the casualties of expansion and diversification. An alternative 
in a market-oriented system is endowments, which give universities some long-term 
control over their own resources. Well-endowed universities remain susceptible 
to certain of the vagaries of financial markets – as was shown in the United States 
in 2008–10 – but they are relieved to a large extent of the necessity to respond to 
every whim of consumer opinion. The danger, as Adam Smith observed, is excessive 
conservatism and an extreme toleration of self-interest. However, annual budgeting, 
which much of the quasi-contractual funding of new public management involves, 
exacerbates short-termism rather than alleviating it. 
Inequities can be ameliorated through new public management techniques. 
For higher education, this involves making public funds available on a contractual 
basis so universities are not subject to direct control by the government. However, it 
does involve detailed monitoring of how the funds are used. British higher education 
institutions have, since 1989, received almost all their funding on contractual terms, 
either through public funding of clearly defined teaching and research activities or 
through private contracts to perform specific tasks. In English universities currently, 
targets are set for enrolments of categories of students deemed to be under-
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represented and there are threats to withdraw funds if these targets are not met. 
Alternatively, extra funding can be made available for students who are deemed by 
public authorities to merit such positive discrimination. 
Inevitable questions that might be raised in response are: Who is entitled to 
positive discrimination? Are those who are able to take advantage of it really capable of 
benefitting from challenging courses? And does it result in unfairness towards those 
not considered to be entitled to the special treatment? Such matters have played out 
in the courts of the United States and on the whole were found to be unconstitutional. 
However, in 2003, a Supreme Court decision regarding affirmative action in higher 
education permitted educational institutions to consider race as a factor – a small 
plus factor – when admitting students, but ruled that strict point systems, like the 
one previously used by the University of Michigan Law School, are unconstitutional 
(Perry, 2007). Some states such as California have passed constitutional amendments 
banning affirmative action within their respective states (Myers, 2007). 
Payment of fees by students subsidized by loans or grants is how the UK higher 
education systems are attempting to safeguard equity while shifting towards a fully 
marketized system. However, this begs the question – and creates the problem – of 
how to define both eligibility for grants or subsidized loans and the criteria for the 
latter’s repayment out of subsequent and higher graduate incomes. HEPI (2012) has 
shown that likely repayments may leave substantial public sector deficits in relation 
to original estimates because of slight differences in prospective graduate earnings. It 
may also prove difficult to ensure that loans are repaid by European Union students 
who are legally required to receive the same subsidy as UK students but whose 
subsequent earnings cannot be checked by the British revenue authorities. 
Improper management or dishonesty can be dealt with by intensive monitoring 
and audit accompanied by appropriate penalties for infringements. Certain British 
universities have been fined considerable sums for over-recruiting on student target 
numbers and occasionally for submitting misleading statistical returns about numbers 
of students and course completions. 
It is my contention in this chapter that all the risks associated with market 
behaviour are likely to become more apparent the nearer higher education comes 
to being a service provided on an entirely financially transactional basis. As the 
examples in the previous paragraphs show, most of the weaknesses of marketized 
higher education can be overcome, but the ‘steering from a distance’ – that is, 
getting agents to act in ways the principals believe they should – involves extremely 
considerable transaction costs. As well as the costs of the regulatory procedures, these 
also include the advertising and marketing costs necessary for universities to compete 
with each other for students’ custom. Such costs increase as institutions are given 
more financial autonomy: the widespread introduction of a profit-seeking motivation 
may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
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Conclusion 
In the 1980s there was some justification for imposing a certain amount of market 
discipline on higher education institutions. There are reasons to believe that, at 
that time, producer capture of the system meant that some students at least were 
not receiving the learning experiences they had a right to expect. For individual 
members of staff, as well as their departments, success in research was usually more 
rewarding than success in teaching. The government’s response was the Act of 
1988 which made it clear that universities received public funds for the teaching 
and research services they provided. However, this was necessarily accompanied by a 
substantial increase in the statistical reports universities were required to make and 
more external scrutiny of their teaching and research. It also led to massive increases 
in the majority’s marketing activities.
Such changes have hugely increased institutions’ transaction costs – that is, 
the proportion of their total income spent on management and administration 
rather than directly on teaching and research. I have shown in earlier works that 
there initially was evidence that both teaching and research improved in a more 
competitive environment (Williams, 2004). The question facing those who make 
higher education policy in 2013 and beyond is whether these trends have gone too 
far. A major shift towards higher education provision by profit-making organizations, 
for which the financial bottom line is the key performance indicator, is likely to lead 
to even greater transaction costs than those currently facing a system presently largely 
marketized but which is nonetheless charitable at root. 
Of course it may be that the whole ethos of higher education provision will 
change and Robbins’ aspirations will become simply outdated. In an article 30 
years ago (Williams and Gordon, 1981) I showed that parents of most secondary 
school students wanted their daughters and sons to go on to higher education 
because it would likely lead to subsequently higher incomes, and that only teachers 
and academics thought personal development and cultural improvement were the 
main reasons for going to university. It may be that the commodification of higher 
education is acceptable to the majority of the population. That is an ethical and 
political issue, not an economic one. 
Adam Smith’s scribbling on the subject of financing higher education over 
two centuries ago has certainly found its way into the hearts and minds of men in 
authority, but I doubt whether the author of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, who 
accepted that social morality was largely a matter of convention but believed in the 
last analysis that wrong was recognizable by any reasonable person, ever imagined 
universities being driven mainly by the search for financial profit. 
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Chapter 5 




My argument in this chapter takes the following form. Within the White Paper 
Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System lies a tacit idea of ‘student’. A 
student (both before and following admission), according to the White Paper, is 
clear about her wants in relation to her higher education, makes rational choices 
about her course of study, is able to capture cogently her experience (in ‘student 
satisfaction’ surveys), is ‘engaged’ with her programme of study, is concerned about 
the number of class contact hours, and is developing her skills for the workplace. In 
turn, a course can be explicitly captured in a ‘key information set’, and its providers 
will work with employers in identifying the necessary skills to be taught. Among the 
assumptions in this set of ideas is the belief that a course can be explicitly set out 
in documents and data such that a student can form in advance a detailed sense of 
the experience awaiting her. Subsequently, when enrolled, a student can come to a 
total understanding of her course. All the features of a course, it seems, can be made 
transparent. All can be set out.
However, a genuinely higher education cannot be completely and explicitly 
described in advance of it happening or even when a student is enrolled on it – 
and this for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, a genuinely higher education is an 
unfolding process. It is a set of flows, unpredictable to a significant extent. Secondly, 
a genuinely higher education calls upon the student to give of herself. It is an 
encounter with strangeness that invites the student to venture forward in her own 
way. In the process, the student will acquire certain dispositions and qualities. The 
educational processes that a student experiences are significant in their own right, 
therefore, but that experience is partly a matter of the student’s own efforts. A course 
is not separate from the student enrolled on it: the course and the student inhabit 
overlapping spaces. Thirdly, a sense of mystery inheres in the process of a genuinely 
higher education, in the sense that it is resistant to being made fully explicit. It lies in 
the minutiae of the spontaneous gesture and inflexion, in the spaces being opened, 
in the opportunities for nomadic venturing, and in the imaginative perceptions of 
the moment. Calling for explicitness in and of a course offering is like calling for 
explicitness in the meaning of a poem.
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In its search for transparency, therefore, the White Paper is a pernicious 
ideology at work (Barnett, 2003). Its latent function is to produce a process devoid 
of spontaneity and unpredictability and likely to produce a student who might 
be ‘satisfied’ but whose experiences fall short of higher education’s transforming 
potential. It heralds an anodyne process, with an absence of difficulty, challenge, and 
wonder. The White Paper would work to draw in horizons of thought and human 
unfolding, limiting the students’ potential development. 
While my argument here draws its impulse from the recent UK White Paper, it 
can and should be read as an argument about the marketization of higher education. 
As such it can apply to any system that has or is acquiring such a character. 
Driving teaching excellence
Chapter 2 of the White Paper is entitled ‘Well-informed students driving teaching 
excellence’. Both phrases – ‘well-informed students’ and ‘driving teaching excellence’ 
– are problematic. The idea of a well-informed student begs a number of questions: 
about what is it that a student is supposed to be informed? Should the student be 
well-informed, for instance, about the total number of hours her tutors and lecturers 
are working each week or the range of demands on their time and how this might 
limit their accessibility or ability to offer the student the support she needs? Can a 
student ever be well-informed about crucial aspects of her experience, such as the 
micro dimensions of her likely pedagogical situation? To what extent, for example, 
might a department of French realise that its pedagogical signature – as we may term 
it – is markedly different from that of the Italian department in the same building of 
the same university?
The phrase ‘a well-informed student’ further, and more significantly, begs 
questions as to the concept of student that lies within it, for it may tacitly work to 
pose a sense of the student separate from her pedagogical situation instead of being 
immersed in it. The very notion of students being well-informed about the situation 
in which they find themselves could reasonably imply students who are passive 
spectators of the situation about which they are trying to be informed. The student 
here is not part of the pedagogical situation and so has a limited responsibility towards 
the character of the pedagogical situation. Her course experience is conveyed all too 
easily here as a set of activities, processes, and materials presented to her, about which 
she has a right to be well-informed.
‘Driving teaching excellence’ also begs questions. ‘Teaching excellence’ is the 
object here, not ‘learning excellence’. Here, again, the student’s presence in the 
pedagogical situation is diminished. At stake is the quality of teaching the student 
receives, not her learning as such and nor, in turn, her part in (driving towards) 
her own learning excellence. Again, the student is set apart from her pedagogical 
situation, posited as an individual who deserves an experience that is excellent in 
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its own right. That teaching excellence might have some relationship to learning 
excellence, and that learning excellence is in part dependent on the student, is 
hardly on the cards here in this policy framework. 
The idea, too, implicit in this formulation, that excellence might be a general 
attribute of students’ (plural) experiences across a system, is problematic since the 
concept of ‘excellence’ is necessarily a relational concept: if all entities or instances in 
a set are judged to be ‘excellent’, then the concept of excellence is largely shorn of its 
meaning. Further, the use of such a generalized application of ‘excellence’ can only 
serve to impose undue demands on an already stressed system since every instance is 
expected to be ‘excellent’. 
Perhaps, though, the most problematic term in the title of the chapter is that 
of ‘driving’, with its implication that well-informed students will and should be able 
to drive teaching excellence. ‘Driving’, of course, is a metaphor. It conjures, variously, 
a sense of a machine being driven (parallel to a student driving a car), or a sense 
of control in an otherwise disorderly situation (a cattle-owner driving his herd to a 
market), or a sense of a transmission of energy (as in one part of an engine driving 
another part). In each interpretation, the metaphor implies that the student is in a 
position of power, not just directly able to realise a pedagogical situation of increasing 
quality but legitimately able to do so. The implied powers of the tutors are, accordingly, 
diminished. Such a reading points to a de-professionalization of tutors: the power in 
the pedagogical situation is to be assumed by the students. It is they who are to drive 
towards teaching excellence.
Explicitness
The idea that students-as-customers can ‘drive’ excellence is linked in the White 
Paper, as intimated, to the idea of students being well-informed – and the latter 
idea is linked to the idea of explicitness. If students are to become well-informed 
through the provision of large quantities of data about their course experience and 
the opportunities it makes available, assumptions are being made here about the 
possibilities and power of explicitness: by making the relevant data explicit, students 
will be better informed which will thus make higher education ‘more responsive’ 
as a market (BIS, 2011: para 2.8). Explicitness (in data provision) becomes a pivot, 
therefore, on which the policy framework turns. Indeed, the theme of explicitness is 
pervasive in the White Paper.
The White Paper looks to each university to make available on its website 
certain kinds of information and ‘on an easily comparable basis’ (BIS, 2011: para 
2.10). ‘These items, together with information about course charges, are [to be] 
called the Key Information Set (KIS) and will be available on a course by course 
basis’ (ibid). That ‘information set’ contains 20 different kinds of information – listed 
in full in an appendix to this chapter – and is to be set out under the following four 
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headings: course information (a key section here is that of ‘student satisfaction’, itself 
opening to eight sub-sections), costs, employment, and the students’ union. 
This apparent panoply of information institutions are being asked to provide 
turns out to be far from exhaustive. The White Paper goes on to express the hope that 
institutions will want to go on expanding the information they provide to students, 
mentioning, for instance, that ‘it would be good practice for institutions to provide 
the sort of material that local councils offer to their residents, demonstrating what 
their council tax is being invested in’ (BIS, 2011: para 2.12). The Paper also points 
to the government’s intention to develop ‘a national source of clear and comparable 
information’, which it intends over time to build up from various national data sources 
‘so that prospective students can make more useful comparisons between subjects at 
different institutions’ (BIS, 2011: para 2.15). It further exhorts a range of national 
agencies in higher education to develop their own websites so that, institution by 
institution and course by course, ‘students can compare likely earnings’ (BIS, 2011: 
para 2.18). 
In itself, there can hardly be much objection to the idea that students should be 
able to have prior access to information on courses, in advance of deciding at which 
institution they might aspire to study. As a key part of a developing policy framework, 
however, two questions are prompted by such an idea: Is there a limit to the range 
and amount of information it is proper to seek from institutions and to provide to 
students and what might be the latent effects of providing such information?
On the first matter it can reasonably be judged that, of the range and amount 
of information being sought, there shall be no end. After all, no limit exists to the 
degree to which a student might become better informed about potential courses. 
It is difficult to see, therefore, why any limit might be imposed once the government 
starts asking institutions to generate such information. Certainly, no considerations 
are offered that might lead to a dispassionate reckoning of the value of providing 
such information – such as the possible overload of information on would-be students 
or the challenges they might have in making sense of information from disparate 
institutions, or the opportunity costs to institutions, for example. 
On the second matter, potential latent effects could be very serious. The most 
serious might encourage the student to come to see herself precisely as a customer, 
purchasing a product. It could, in other words, orient the student towards adopting 
a passive stance, tacitly holding a sense that in return for the payment of her fee her 
student experience will be determined for her in a way that displaces any sense she 
might have of being significantly responsible for shaping that experience. 
This pedagogical effect could go even further. As the sense of higher 
education as a market grows, and institutions come evermore to compete with each 
other for students, institutions may well be encouraged in their marketing ploys to 
emphasize the more enjoyable aspects of university life (especially on a particular 
campus) and also to devote more resources to student support services. Here, there 
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opens – unwittingly – a path to, as it has been termed, the infantilization of students 
(Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009): a possible tendency to treat students as children, 
declining to treat them as adults with responsibilities towards themselves, and a 
subsequent disinclination to be explicit about the challenging nature of a genuinely 
higher education.
A pernicious transparency
One further possible latent effect of giving emphasis – ‘driving’, as it might be termed 
– to the provision of information lies again in the matter of explicitness. Within the 
drive towards the provision of public information could lie a presupposition that 
any valuable feature of the student experience can be made explicit. Such a view 
reflects the assumptive world (Sabri, 2010) within policy framing that holds that 
all can be made transparent. Ultimately, the would-be student need leave nothing 
to chance: her course can be fully described in advance of her enrolment and the 
subject contents of the course in question, its mode of delivery, its curricula hours, its 
forms of assessment, and its likely labour market prospects can all be set out. 
In such a mindset and in its policy framing lies a pernicious transparency. 
It is not merely the point that a department, however self-aware and self-critical, is 
unlikely to fully understand the character of the student experience it opens – there 
is bound to be a degree of pedagogical blindness in any department towards its own 
courses. It is not even the point that students differ – that one may take a casual 
remark on an essay in her stride, while another might be traumatized by the same 
single phrase. And, if so, what is transparency to mean under such circumstances? It 
is not even the point that crucial matters of the student experience are observed and 
felt in the micro pedagogical processes at work and are only caught with the most 
sensitive of reflective instruments. It is the more penetrating point that much that is 
valuable in higher education is always beyond a full description. Much never can be 
made explicit.
There are two reasons here. Firstly, no matter how much lecturers, universities, 
and other agencies, such as professional bodies, attempt to set programmes of 
study within tight boundaries, still there will be elements of unpredictability in the 
pedagogical situation. Students might pose unexpected questions and surprising 
evidence or ideas might be uncovered – either by lecturer or by students – in the 
relevant research literature. More significantly, the pedagogical situation within a 
genuinely higher education is an open space – a space of reason indeed (Bakhurst, 
2011) – in which the pedagogical dialogue is relatively unconstrained (except by 
rules of fair reasoning and critical dialogue). Consequently, the pedagogical situation 
is a situation of openness, always liable to yield an insight, idea, or utterance of some 
originality. It is a situation of some spontaneity and potential creativity. 
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Secondly, there are, in higher education, elements of mystery, as it may be 
reasonably termed (Cooper, 2002). That a higher education experience can transform 
a person’s life, that a person can be inspired during the course of her studies as a 
result of her encounters with her field of study, lecturers, and others, that her studies 
can lead her to be genuinely creative and even original, that pedagogical experiences 
can be at once sources of delight, provocation, intrigue, anxiety, and exhilaration: 
we have no serious understanding as to how the transformatory potential of higher 
education effects its magic – even after 50 years of cross-national research into higher 
education on student learning, not to mention two thousand years of reflection since 
the Greeks on the ‘epistemic virtues’ (Brady and Pritchard, 2003) a liberal education 
might wrought. 
There is, in other words, a gap between our descriptions of higher education 
and what actually happens on a daily basis. In part the situation is an indication of 
the impoverishment of concepts and methods used in the ‘scholarship of teaching 
and learning’. But it is also, surely, an indication too of the intractability of higher 
education’s pedagogical processes, of there always being a ‘beyond’ that is not 
susceptible to conventional research techniques. There is a necessary elusiveness 
about higher education that evades explanation and even description. We can never 
give a full account of what is happening in such transformatory pedagogical situations.
Accordingly then, genuine encounters and transactions in higher education 
contain an element of mystery. Talk of the complexity of interactions between 
lecturer, student (singular), students (plural), and the discipline or professional field, 
with its own corpus of knowledge, understandings, and ways of going on (‘skills’) 
only testifies to the limitations of our understandings. Some have even spoken of 
a holy ground here, and others of sacredness, where conversations take place and 
effort is made to enter and inhabit a space with its own infinities, evanescences, and 
subtleties. It is a space in which individuals may take off and ascend into a space 
of their own. (John Henry Newman was keen on the metaphor of ‘ascent’ in his 
depiction of liberal education.) As Richard Peters used to say, much of this can only 
be caught rather than taught. 
If any of this carries weight, we can sense something of the ideology of 
transparency so evident in the White Paper. The text exemplifies, as noted, the belief 
that all that is significant about higher education can be made explicit. Two further 
points must be made here. Firstly, the undue belief in the powers of explicitness 
focuses attention on just those aspects of higher education that can be made explicit 
and expressed in simple (and characteristically numerical) terms: the number of 
curriculum hours, the proportions of students attaining employment in different 
professions, and the proportions gaining ‘good’ degrees. In the process, the more 
elusive aspects of higher education are not merely overlooked: they become invisible. 
No attempt is made to give an account of the pedagogical ethos, its tone, and its 
spaciousness, for example. 
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Secondly, and in turn, higher education – as a matter of public discourse – 
becomes reduced to its superficial characteristics and its transformatory potential is 
lost from view. As a result, the public understanding of the possibilities it may offer is 
severely and unduly limited. More perniciously still, institutions (including students’ 
teachers) may come to sense that their responsibility lies in controlling and tightly 
bounding the space of the students’ educational experience. Rather than encouraging 
a pedagogy of risk, in which a space is opened up for students’ serendipitous and 
nomadic explorations, a risk-free pedagogy, devoid of metamorphosing potential, is 
liable to emerge.
Student engagement
Chapter 3 of the White Paper is entitled ‘A better student experience and better-
qualified graduates’. Its opening sentence reads as follows: ‘A good student is not 
simply a consumer of other people’s knowledge, but will actively draw on all the 
resources that a good university or college can offer to learn as much as they can’ 
(BIS, 2011: para 3.1). In a section on ‘student charters’ it goes on to endorse the 
recommendation of the UK’s Student Charter Group that ‘each individual should 
have a student charter … to set out the mutual expectations of universities and 
students’ (BIS, 2011: para 3.3). In the first sentence of the following paragraph, the 
White Paper emphasizes that the student’s experience ‘will be most enriching when 
it is based on a partnership between staff and students’ (BIS, 2011: para 3.4). Such 
statements prima facie – in their implications of mutuality, partnership, and an active 
stance on the student’s part, they seem to undercut many of the suggestions I posed 
earlier and suggest that the White Paper harbours an unduly passive sense of what 
it is to be a student. However, paragraph 3.4, which is a long paragraph, goes on to 
describe student charters more fully. Nothing in the following three sentences of that 
paragraph says anything about students’ contribution to their own experience. On 
the contrary, the whole orientation of the paragraph is about institutions’ provision 
to students and the contribution that charters can make in that way. For example, 
student charters: ‘will help provide consistency of practice across different subject 
areas, such as about what students can expect in terms of assessment and feedback on 
their work’ [my emphasis] (BIS, 2011: para 3.4). Nothing in this extract suggests what 
institutions might expect from their students. Nor does the extract justify why there 
should be ‘consistency of practice across different subject areas’.
It might be expected that ways in which students might be actively involved 
in framing their own experience might be developed in the section that follows on 
‘student engagement’. What ‘engagement’ amounts to in this section, however, is 
students offering feedback on their modules (BIS, 2011: paras 3.5–3.9). Nothing is 
offered here as to the manifold ways in which students might engage of their own 
volition in enhancing their experience of their course of study – for example, in 
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orchestrating their private study, in developing a schedule of work for themselves, in 
establishing intermediate goals for themselves, in constructing a reading programme, 
in engaging on course matters with the other students in the cohort, and so on and 
so forth. The section offers us a trivial account of ‘student engagement’, an account 
that, in turn, is likely to impoverish the student experience rather than enhance it. 
How can it be that, far from leading to a ‘better student experience’, the White 
Paper’s account of student engagement could actually result in its diminution? A 
genuinely higher education requires a student to give of herself. A higher education 
is an encounter with strangeness that invites the student to venture forward in her 
own way. It calls for the student to launch herself into a void that she makes her own. 
In the process, the student acquires and develops certain dispositions and qualities 
(Barnett, 2007): 
● A will to learn
● A will to engage
● A preparedness to listen
● A preparedness to explore
● A willingness to hold oneself open to experiences
● A determination to keep going forward.








● Respect for others
● Criticality
● Openness.
Such dispositions and qualities overlap in speaking to the ‘affective grip’ (Thrift, 
2008: 39) that – at their best – institutions such as universities can have. However, 
dispositions and qualities – as I am advancing them here – differ in a number of 
crucial respects. The dispositions are necessary features of what it is to be a student, 
or, at least, a graduate. They are the sine qua non of a student having the fortitude, 
painstakingly, to acquire new knowledge or skills and the persistence to keep going 
when matters become difficult. The six dispositions have, accordingly, a universal 
aspect: they are necessarily present, and are nurtured, in any process worthy of being 
called higher education. The qualities, on the other hand, are much more optional, 
and in two respects. Qualities will be developed in different measure by different 
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students – each student will come to form their own profile of qualities. Qualities are 
the kinds of attribute that lecturers recall when they come to provide references for 
individual students, perhaps some years after graduation. Whereas dispositions are 
enjoyed in common by students, qualities differentiate students. But qualities will also 
characteristically differ across disciplines and professional fields and even, perhaps, 
institutions – although such empirical work is, to my knowledge, yet to be conducted. 
Although they will overlap, disciplines and professional fields will also – we may 
surmise – characteristically orient their students to develop in certain kinds of ways. 
Another way of describing these differences is to observe that the dispositions 
are – as it might be termed – ontologically foundational. Unless the student is forming the 
six dispositions listed above, they are liable to fall by the wayside, become unengaged 
with their studies, and ultimately withdraw. The dispositions, in other words, offer a 
possible line of enquiry for the considerable volume of empirical investigation into 
(rising) student attrition rates across the world. The hypothesis here is that rising 
levels of attrition are in part attributable to a dissolution of students’ dispositions 
for learning – of their will to learn. The qualities, on other hand, are much more 
ontologically optional: though also necessary – they supply authenticity, enabling each 
student to feel personally involved with their studies, with going out on a path partly 
of their own making – their precise pattern has an openness attached to it. So students 
can and will differ, possibly quite profoundly, in the ways in which and the extent to 
which qualities unfold in them during their student journey.
It will have been noted that the term ‘engagement’ has appeared in the lists 
above and actually in the list of six dispositions, so questions arise as to how the sense 
of ‘student engagement’ posited there correlates – or doesn’t – to the sense posited 
in the White Paper (we noticed above that the phrase is used as a significant marker 
in the latter, as a sub-heading for the one and a half pages, paragraphs 3.5–3.9). 
The two senses differ significantly, hinging, essentially, the relationship the student 
has to her experiences as a student. In the White Paper, the desired engagement is 
of an outwardly oriented kind: the student is being encouraged to be critical of the 
experiences being extended to her by the institution in question. She is expected to 
participate in institutions’ student surveys and to offer her feedback in all manner 
of ways, both ‘formal and informal’ (BIS, 2011: para 3). Here, however, the idea of 
student engagement is of a much more inner kind: the student has an inner identity 
as a student, which enables her to keep going and pressing forward in engaging with 
her feelings and experiences. 
In making this distinction between inner and outer forms of engagement, I 
am not suggesting that the inner engagement is entirely the student’s responsibility. 
On the contrary: it is a major responsibility on the part of educators to nourish 
the student’s dispositions – which are necessary to develop the student’s inner 
engagement. The dispositions are fragile, they cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, 
unwittingly, they can be easily damaged, by a single careless word in a classroom 
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situation or when commenting – giving ‘feedback’ – on a student’s essay. But the will 
to learn ultimately belongs to the student. The teacher might want the student to 
acquire the will to learn (and the other associated learning dispositions) – indeed, it 
is fair to say that encouraging the dispositions is the teacher’s primary responsibility, 
and that they can – and should – strive as much as possible to help nurture and sustain 
them – but ultimately it has to be the student who drives herself forward, wanting to 
learn, to explore, and to engage with her educational experiences. It follows that, in 
large part, her educational experiences will be opened by the student herself.
Another way of putting such points is to observe that the kind of engagement 
being advocated by the White Paper is bureaucratic. The student is being enjoined to 
take up opportunities to: engage in giving feedback on her educational experiences 
to the institution concerned on ‘what to do if expected standards are not met’ (BIS, 
2011: para 3.4), engage in ‘student surveys’ (ibid: para 3.5), and engage in ‘student 
evaluations of teaching surveys’ (ibid: para 3.7). Again, none of this is, in itself, to be 
criticized. What is missing is any account of the student being pedagogically engaged, 
and the responsibilities that idea places on the student – as well as on her institution.
Students at the heart of the system
There is, then, a large void in the White Paper. While its subtitle is ‘students at the 
heart of the system’, how it frames what it means to place students at the heart of 
the system is unbalanced, focusing on the student’s bureaucratic engagement and 
largely silent on her pedagogical engagement. Such asymmetry is surely connected 
with the government’s drive to develop the higher education ‘system’ as a market. At 
the centre of a market lies a relationship – and an economic relationship at that – 
between a supplier and a customer. In turn, therefore, institutions and students are 
given the roles of supplier and customer, with the former supplying a ‘high quality’ 
experience to the student, and the student as customer being invited to form her 
views on that service’s character, and to voice her complaints if the service falls short 
of her expectations – in other words if she is left ‘unsatisfied’. 
Viewing the higher education ‘system’ as a kind of market – and attempting 
to drive its development thus – downplays the student’s role as a significant player 
in her development. In turn, learning is largely neglected in the White Paper. In its 
Foreword, the government ministers state that:
We want there to be a renewed focus on high-quality teaching in universities 
so that it has the same prestige as research. So we will empower prospective 
students … We will deliver a new focus on student charters, student feedback 
and graduate outcomes. We will oversee a new regulatory framework with 
the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) taking on a 
major role as a consumer champion. 
(BIS, 2011: Foreword)
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There is nothing here about learning. There is not even any mention of institutions’ 
learning and teaching strategies, which we might have expected to have been 
brought into play, even in helping to secure the goals of the White Paper. Nor is 
there any suggestion of continuing the HEFCE’s role as a champion of institutions’ 
learning and teaching strategies, both of which it has done much to promote over 
the past decade and more. We ought to be concerned, therefore, that this White 
Paper heralds a reversal in pedagogical thinking, for over the past 20 years or so 
the idea of teaching has been surpassed by that of learning in policy framing. Here, 
though, in this White Paper, learning has fallen out of view, and with it the student’s 
responsibilities towards her own achievements. Far from heralding a development in 
policy, as far as the student’s experience is concerned, it represents a retreat.
I have just touched on learning as a silence in this White Paper, and with it, 
too, the idea of student development. The latter silence is particularly astonishing: 
in a document subtitled ‘students at the heart of the system’ there is no reference, 
so far as I can see, to the idea that a process of higher education is one in which 
students actually develop, and in all manner of ways. On the contrary, what the Paper 
portrays, perhaps unwittingly, are students who are largely fixed, whose educational 
and pedagogical interests are well informed even before they enter higher education, 
and whose institutions function as a mere supplier of those wants. No possibility exists, 
therefore, that a student’s wants and interests might be redefined in the course of her 
educational journey and through her pedagogical relationship with her institution – 
and perhaps radically so. 
The matter is one that ought to be taken seriously since the conception 
of this relationship as a customer–supplier transaction serves not only to limit 
the student’s pedagogical possibilities but to point to their (and the student’s) 
regression. Some might take this to be an exaggeration – surely it’s unlikely for 
students to regress, educationally – but there is long-standing evidence that students 
do sometimes regress, in their comprehension of key (or ‘threshold’) concepts, for 
example, which are taken on board at a surface level, without any personal insight 
or ownership. I noted earlier how it is possible for teachers to unwittingly – and 
even unknowingly – undermine students’ pedagogical dispositions towards their 
learning. Unless students are pedagogically engaged (in the terminology adopted 
here), energised in favour of their learning, and investing of themselves as persons 
in their learning, they are liable to become disenchanted and disengaged. Under 
such circumstances, ultimately, their withdrawal from their course is a highly 
possible course of action. 
To put it more formally, their pedagogical ontology – their being as a student – 
may dwindle. Far from their higher education representing, as it should, a process 
of their becoming (Deleuze and Guattari, 2007), the kind of market relationship the 
White Paper portrays could orient the system and its students towards a process of 
their unbecoming. In a process of higher education, there is no pedagogical steady 
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state available. The student is always pedagogically in motion. Either they are going 
forward, energized and enthused by their studies, or they are disengaged from their 
work, not investing their energies and commitment in it. Insofar as there might be 
more neutral states available, these are surely highly fragile, always liable to turn into 
states of disenchantment at the slightest provocation.
As I’ve said before, to make these observations is not to downplay the 
responsibilities of an institution and its teachers towards this state of affairs. On the 
contrary, it is to open out the way not just towards a more dynamic conception of 
the relationship between institution and student than is on offer in the White Paper, 
but also towards a much more educationally nuanced conception. Simply placing 
‘students at the heart of the system’ is not sufficient, for it is an open matter as to 
what that means. When the student’s educational experience is understood merely 
as a system in which being a student is a reactive moment, where she responds to 
the workings of the institution in which she finds herself, the idea of ‘student’ is so 
severely narrowed as to vanquish the possibilities that a process of higher education 
can open.
The ministers’ defence
Were either (or both) of the ministers responsible for the White Paper to see this 
critique, a response might take the following line. ‘We understand what you are saying 
and we agree with it. Of course, a good higher education experience is one in which 
there is a mutuality between the student and institution. That, after all, is precisely 
why we want to see each institution develop a student charter, so as to spell out “the 
mutual expectations of universities and students”. Of course a good higher education 
experience also requires a student to be involved (‘engaged’) in their own studies 
so that they will develop in all the ways – and others (for example, in their “lifelong 
learning”) – envisaged in this chapter. However (so the response may run on), ‘it is 
no part of government to dictate such matters to institutions. These are matters of 
professional judgement that are properly left to lecturers and their institutions. They 
are not matters for national policy framing.’
Such a likely response needs to be addressed here. It seems to be a measured 
and fair response. It recognizes the limits of national policymaking and it explicitly 
recognizes a significant area of professional activity and decision-making in its own 
right – in which it would not be proper for the state to intervene. It seems to be 
setting up a dual set – and a proper apportionment – of responsibilities, with the state 
taking care of the financing and orchestration of the ‘system’ (the word used in the 
title of the White Paper), leaving the more educational matters to the jurisdiction 
of universities and other institutions of higher education. The problem, however, is 
that the higher education sector does not permit such a neat division of its territory.
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Two points need to be made here. The first and more significant is that national 
policymaking, ultimately (and sometimes very quickly), has an effect on the micro 
character of higher education, including the student experience and the student’s 
pedagogical relationship. Indeed, that is often precisely its point. The introduction 
of considerably higher fees, which will render students indebted to the state for much 
of their working lives, is not only a technical matter, concerning an adjustment of 
the income flows to institutions – much as some in the Treasury and the ministries 
and among vice-chancellors and some economists of higher education might 
want to suggest. It is a change that will have highly significant implications for the 
pedagogical relationship, likely to lead students to think of themselves as customers 
of their experience and to see their institutions as the providers of that experience. 
Whether one views such a change with favour or disapproval is a separate 
matter: the value judgement to be made here is beside the point (at this precise point 
in the argument). What cannot be disputed, I think, is that though this set of major 
changes to the pedagogical relationship is not only likely to occur, that, precisely, is its 
very point. It is intended to introduce this market relationship into higher education 
and, indeed, into the student experience itself. The defence, therefore, on the part 
of ministers and others – that the introduction of a more market-oriented system is 
pedagogically neutral – would be disingenuous.
The other point to be made here, and especially in relation to this White 
Paper, is that the government wants not simply to make policy at the stratospherical 
level, leaving it to institutions to fill in the educational gaps, so to speak. On the 
contrary, the government wants to see instituted, and requires, the establishment 
of several instruments that are intra-institutional in character. Changes are being 
sought here to the ways in which institutions manage their own affairs – consider the 
establishment of student charters, a greater use of online student feedback systems 
(that is, feedback from students), institutions publishing summary reports of their 
student evaluation surveys, and the public provision of a ‘key information set’ with its 
prescribed contents. All this amounts to a complex panoply of institutional changes 
that some or even many institutions would otherwise have shrunk from making. The 
imagined response (on the state’s part) to the critique I have presented – that it 
leaves the balance of responsibilities between the state and institutions untouched 
– once again seems disingenuous. Indeed, in seeking significant changes within 
institutions, the White Paper is implicitly raising matters of institutional autonomy 
that fall outside the scope of this chapter but deserve further attention. 
It follows that there is no opening for a Pontius Pilate situation here. The 
government cannot wash its hands of the effects its current policy framing is 
having and is likely to have on institutions, the pedagogical relationship, and a 
student’s pedagogical experience. Indeed it would be strikingly disingenuous if the 
government were to claim that its policies leave the student experience unchanged 
and, further, that that remains the province of institutions and students’ teachers. 
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As stated, it is precisely part of the policy intentions at play here that the pedagogical 
relationship is changed, with the student exerting more influence in it as a customer. 
In turn, it is hardly surprising if some severe educational repercussions are also felt. 
And nor is the option available to the government to ‘have its cake and eat it’: in the 
presence of a pedagogical logic it cannot say that it only intends certain pedagogical 
changes (set out in this chapter) and not others to close the pedagogical space. 
The one option that is available to the government is for it to recognize its failure 
to consider the impact its policies, including those set out in this White Paper, are 
likely to have. 
Conclusions
Much of the educational force of the White Paper lies in its assumptions that there is 
value in making explicit much of what has hitherto been somewhat hidden from view, 
so far as prospective and enrolled students are concerned. This set of assumptions 
is connected with the view that a market situation requires well-informed customers 
who can make rational choices about the goods they purchase and comment on 
and even criticise their experience from an informed position. Since, too, it is the 
government’s intention to further orient the higher education system in the direction 
of a market, it follows that as much as possible should be made explicit. 
Connected with this policy framing are the assumptions that students wish to be 
understood as customers, and that higher education is a kind of product that could be 
made transparent in advance of it being experienced, independently of the student’s 
own efforts. Every one of these assumptions, and related others, is questionable, not 
only as a kind of academic exercise – academics will question anything, after all – but 
because the policies to which they are leading in the White Paper are self-undermining. 
Far from heralding an improvement in the student experience, the policies being 
proposed here are liable to lead to an impairment of the student experience. 
Appendix: Students at the Heart of the System
Key Information Set
(from para 2.10: 28–9)
Course information
● student satisfaction:
a. Overall satisfaction with quality of course
b. Staff are good at explaining things
c. Staff have made the subject interesting
d. Sufficient advice and support with studies
e. Feedback on work has been prompt
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f. Feedback on work has clarified things
g. The library resources are good enough to meet needs
h. Access general IT resources when needed
● Proportion of time spent in different learning and teaching activities – by 
year of study
● Different assessment methods used – by year of study




● Bursaries, scholarships and other financial support
Employment
● Destinations of students six months after completing their course (e.g. 
employment or further study)
● Proportion of students employed in a full-time ‘graduate’ job six months after 
completing course
● Salary for course six months after graduating
● Salary for that subject across all institutions six months after graduating
● Salary for that subject across all institutions forty months after graduating
The students’ union
● Impact students’ union has had on time as a student
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As easy as AAB: the impact of 
the quasi-market on institutions, 




The English higher education system is still firmly rooted in the public sector. Even 
with the dramatic cuts to university teaching grants laid out in the White Paper (BIS, 
2011), so high is the bill for student support – in the form of maintenance grants 
and the proportion of student loans that remains unpaid – that the government has 
to maintain control of student numbers, effectively restricting institutions to only 
enrolling a limited number of students. This quota has been in place for many years 
and, in conjunction with constant increases in the demand for a university education, 
has resulted in a sector characterized by limited supply and excess demand.
An important side effect of the unequal supply and demand relationship is 
the little competition between institutions: some are more in demand than others 
but the majority are able to fill their annual quota eventually. With little subsequent 
competition, institutions have little incentive to improve quality, productivity, or 
efficiency, or to charge lower than the (government mandated) maximum tuition fee. 
The White Paper aimed to overturn these restrictions on competition and 
supply, and move towards a more market-based system.
Removing the cap on student numbers altogether would be highly expensive, 
so instead the Coalition has created a quasi-market. At the centre of this is the key 
reform outlined in the White Paper to remove the cap on student numbers – albeit on 
a very limited basis. From September 2012, the government abolished all quotas for 
students with A-level (or equivalent) grades of AAB or better. By removing controls 
and effecting a nearly three-fold increase in the tuition fee cap to £9,000 per year, 
the Coalition intended to drive some price variation amongst institutions. This would 
see students gravitate towards the most popular, well-run courses – which could now 
expand to accommodate them – and force less popular courses to either improve 
quality, reduce their prices, or simply shut. As an additional measure to encourage 
price competition (which did not immediately materialize after the increase in 
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the tuition fee cap was announced in the months leading up to the White Paper’s 
publication), an additional 20,000 student places within the quota system were made 
available to universities charging tuition fees of less than £7,500 per year.
In this chapter I explore the consequences for the higher education sector as a 
whole of these changes to the long-established student numbers quota, in conjunction 
with the increase in tuition fees. I begin by describing the impact changes to the 
quota system have had on different types of higher education institution, which in the 
short-term depends largely on what proportion of each institution’s student intake 
achieved A-level grades of AAB or higher and whether they chose to charge fees of 
less than £7,500 per year. However, the impact on institutions, and to the quota system 
as a whole, will also depend heavily on how students respond to tuition fee increases. 
UCAS final estimates for 2012 outline a large decrease in applications. Compared 
to 2011, 46,500 fewer students applied in 2012 (UCAS, 2012c)1. I therefore go on 
to examine which types of applicant appear to be most affected by the tuition fee 
increase – and where this, in conjunction with the quota changes, leaves the sector. 
But, 2012 is a transition year. Student numbers might be down, but this is typical in 
the first year of a fee increase and numbers tend to recover in future years, as indeed 
they have for younger students. Furthermore, the government has also announced 
that the removal of controls on AAB+ is just the beginning: further quota changes are 
planned for 2013. In this chapter I also therefore consider the shape of the sector in 
the future as controls on the supply of places for students are further relaxed.
The pre-2012 system and how the White Paper changed it
The user cost of higher education has been on the rise for the past two decades, 
beginning in 1992 with the introduction of maintenance loans and the phasing out 
of maintenance grants and continuing with the introduction of the first tuition fees 
in 1998. Despite these increases in costs, student numbers have risen dramatically. 
Figure 6.1 shows the extent of the increases in numbers from the 1960s to 2011. As is 
clear, over the entire period between the introduction of maintenance loans in 1992, 
through the tuition fee increases in 1998 and 2006, participation in higher education 
has risen almost unabated. Whilst the rise in participation has occurred intermittently 
and for various reasons – the introduction of the GCSE, for instance, dramatically 
increased staying-on rates and hence university attendance, and the conversion of 
42 polytechnics into universities increased degree enrolments overnight (Blanden 
and Machin, 2004) – it is nonetheless true that past increases in tuition fees have not 
resulted in any obvious decline in participation. The percentage of the population 
enrolled in tertiary education at age 19 (the age group at which school-leavers are 
first eligible for education) in the UK reached 36 per cent in 2010 – above the OECD 
average of 31 per cent, though lower than the participation rate for the US (55 per 
cent) and France (41 per cent) on the same measure (OECD, 2012: Indicator C1). 
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Notes: All UK-domiciled HE students to English institutions. Full-time equivalent 
data represent the institution’s assessment of the full-time equivalence of the 
student instance during the reported academic year
Figure 6.1: Degree acceptances (volume) by academic year
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) 
These numbers hide the important fact that England’s higher education sector has 
long suffered from a supply constraint, with around 1.4 applicants to every acceptance 
in 20112. As Figure 6.2 – which shows the volume of applications and acceptances 
between 1996 and 2011 – illustrates, the issue is a long-term one.
One important reason why demand has so dramatically outstripped supply was 
the strict quota system in place in England’s higher education sector before 2012. 
Since almost all English higher education institutions are, in effect, publicly owned, 
the running costs to the government are high. The two main ways the government 
subsidizes higher education are first, through block grants paid directly to universities 
to teach their students – known as the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE) 
teaching grant, which totalled £4.7 billion for English higher and further education 
institutions in 2010 (HEFCE, 2010), and secondly, through heavy subsidies to students 
via maintenance grants and tuition fee and maintenance loans. These subsidies arose 
because student tuition fee and maintenance loans were offered on quite favourable 
terms under the pre-2012 system – loans were not repaid until the borrower had 
left university and was earning at least £15,000 per year. At that point the loans were 
paid off at 9 per cent of earnings above this threshold. Thus a significant proportion 
of tuition fee and maintenance loans – issued by the government via the Student 
Loans Company – remained (and still remain) unpaid. The government estimate 
that around 15 per cent of students will not fully repay their loans under the pre-2012 
system (Bolton, 2012) translates into a sizeable cost. The public sector subsidy on 
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student support purely in the form of that which is repayable – the part of tuitionfee 
and maintenance loans which remain unpaid, and which the government has to 
write off – was estimated at 23 per cent in 2010. In other words, for every £1 loaned 
to students for tuition fee and maintenance loans under the pre-2012 system, the 
taxpayer had to pay out 23p (Dearden et al., 2010). 
Notes: Figures include degree, HND, and other HE qualifications Figures for 
degree applicants not available Data relates to Home (UK) applicants only 
Figure 6.2: Higher education applications and acceptances to English 
institutions, 1996–2011
Figures compiled from UCAS statistics online. Available at  
http://www.ucas.ac.uk/about_us/stat_services/stats_online/)
It is here that the quota system comes into play. To ensure the higher education 
bill does not become unmanageable, the government imposes a cap on numbers of 
undergraduate students that may attend higher education institutions in England. 
Supply is strictly limited and no institution may expand its numbers beyond a small 
percentage of students per year3. The cap has been in place since 1994, and whilst 
the sector has been allowed to expand since then – for example, when Tony Blair 
announced the 50 per cent higher education participation target – the extent to 
which it can grow has been firmly under the government’s control. Any university 
attempting to expand beyond its government quota will face a heavy fine.
An important side effect of the restricted supply and high demand for 
university education is the little competition between institutions. Some institutions 
are more in demand than others but the majority are able to fill their annual quota of 
places eventually, as Figure 6.3 illustrates by showing the ratio of degree applications 
to acceptances at Russell Group4 and non-Russell Group institutions5. 
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As Figure 6.3 demonstrates, demand for a place at one of the prestigious Russell 
Group universities significantly outstrips supply. The average number of applications 
for every acceptance at Russell Group universities was around 7.5 to 1 in 2011 – with 
some universities in extremely high demand. In the same year, the London School of 
Economics received 13.9 applications, for example, the University of Bristol 10.6, and 
University College London 9.56. 
Whilst the overall ratio of applications to acceptances is clearly higher at Russell 
Group universities, it is important to note that many non-Russell-Group universities 
have greater application: acceptance ratios than those found in the Russell Group. 
Non-Russell-Group universities in particularly high demand include the University 
of Bath, City University, and the University of Reading. In any case, there is clearly 
also a significant excess demand at non-Russell-Group institutions. For example, the 
University of Lancaster received 6.2 applications for every acceptance in 2011 and 
the University of Middlesex received 6.7.
It is also interesting that the ratio has decreased at both types of institution 
in the last 20 years. However, as Figure 6.2 shows, the decline is due to sustained 
increases in applications combined with little movement in acceptances, rather than 
a decrease in both.
Excess demand yields little incentive for institutions of any type to improve 
quality, productivity, or efficiency, or to charge lower than the (government mandated) 
maximum tuition fee. In response, the Browne Review of Higher Education which 
led up to the White Paper, advised against quotas, pointing out that they meant that 
‘less successful institutions are insulated from competition’ (ICSFF, 2010).
The government significantly cut the taxpayer cost of funding universities by 
increasing tuition fees to £9,000 per year. s. Since tuition fees are transferred directly 
to institutions the government was able to cut the HEFCE teaching grant by 80 per 
cent (Chowdry et al., 2011) without making universities any worse off – the increased 
tuition fee revenue would make up the difference. This did not allow the government 
to remove the quota on student numbers, however, because students are still able 
to access maintenance grants and tuition fee and maintenance loans. As the latter 
are still offered on extremely favourable terms, and are almost three times as large 
as they were previously, an even larger amount of money will remain unpaid – still a 
major cost to the taxpayer. Indeed, the maintenance and fee loan subsidy is estimated 
to rise to around 30 per cent following the 2012 tuition fee increase (Chowdry et al., 
2011). Thus the government is still in no position to remove the quota on student 
numbers and create a free market in higher education.
Instead the government has created a quasi-market, at the centre of which 
lies one of the key reforms of the White Paper that will, for the first time in almost 
twenty years, remove the cap on student numbers on a partial basis. From 2012 the 
government abolished all quotas for students with A-level (or equivalent) grades of 
AAB or better. They sought to create more competition in the sector both to increase 
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university quality and, with a tuition fee cap set at a new level of £9,000 per year, 
generate some price variation among institutions. The measures were intended to 
encourage students to gravitate to the most popular, well-run courses and force less 
popular courses to improve their quality, reduce their prices, or simply shut. 
Notes: Data relates to home (UK) students only
Figure 6.3: Ratio of degree applications to acceptances, 1996–2011
Figures derived from UCAS statistics online. Available at  
http://www.ucas.ac.uk/about_us/stat/_services/stas_online/
Between the announcement of the tuition fee cap increase in December 2010 and 
the publication of the White Paper in June 2011, the majority of universities set their 
fees at or very close to £9,000 per year. The price variation the government hoped 
to see simply failed to materialize. Given that demand continues to outstrip supply, 
this should not seem surprising. With so many students in the market for a university 
place, universities can charge the maximum tuition fee more or less without concern. 
To encourage institutions to reduce their prices, the government decided to take 
20,000 student places within the quota and re-assign them to universities charging 
less than £7,500 per year. The ‘core–margin’ policy had some effect. Twenty-four 
universities – including the University of Chester, the University of Hertfordshire, 
the University of Gloucester, and Nottingham Trent University – and three further 
education colleges dropped their prices in response to this announcement, though 
critics pointed out that many simply increased their tuition fee waivers in order to 
reduce their net fee – thereby limiting the effect (Martin, 2011). Nevertheless, 2012 
saw the most dramatic changes in the quota system since it was introduced in 1994.
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The impact of the changes in student number controls on 
institutions 
Table 6.1 illustrates the impact on student numbers of these changes in the quota 
system on the university sector in England. For simplicity, the table is divided into 
institution types – Russell Group, non-Russell Group and further education colleges.
Table 6.1: Student number control limits for 2012–13









A 2012 controlled total 268,027 24,857 217,570 25,600
B
of which, places at <£7,500 per 
year 19,997 0 9,643 10,354
C AAB students assumed 85,388 51,057 33,365 966
D 2012 implied total (A+C) 353,415 75,914 250,935 26,566
E 2011 controlled total 364,325 77,210 269,116 17,999
F change (2011–12) -10,910 -1,296 -18,181 8,567
G % change -3.0% -1.7% -6.8% 47.6%
Note: English HE and FE colleges only
Source: All numbers derived from HEFCE (2012a)
Column 1 shows the data for all types of institution. Row A shows the controlled total 
number of students for 2012, or the number of students in the quota for 2012. The 
number represents the maximum of non-AAB students universities are allowed to 
recruit for a HEFCE-funded place at a university or college, including the 20,000 
funded places for students at courses costing £7,500 per year or less. To derive the 
2012 controlled total, the HEFCE estimated the number of students predicted to 
achieve AAB or higher at A-level or equivalent – 85,388 students – and removed them 
from the overall quota of students. The government also allowed itself some leeway 
– presumably in case there was a significant and unexpected increase in students 
getting AAB or higher in 2012 – so that the implied total for 2012 (which represents 
the total number of students, including those with AAB or higher, the government 
expected to be enrolled in 2012) is 353,415. Compared to the figure recorded for 
2011 (364,325) this figure is down by 10,910. In other words, the HEFCE budgeted 
for 10,910 fewer students in 2012, representing a fall of 3 per cent since 2011.
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Columns 2 and 3 show how the government’s new system impacts different types 
of university, including Russell Group universities, non-Russell-Group universities, 
and further education colleges. Because 85,388 students have been removed from 
the quota (in addition to the overall cut of 10,910), every university has effectively 
lost some students. Only those who can attract as many AAB+ students as have been 
removed from their quota will break even in terms of students and funding. In fact, 
the government assumed that some universities – those who traditionally attract high 
numbers of AAB+ students – will, at the expense of other institutions, gain more 
such students than they did previously and hence have more students than they did 
in 2011. However, it is worth pointing out that few universities announced expansion 
plans in 2012 as a result of the new AAB+ policy, suggesting that few could or were 
willing to accommodate more students. The University of Bristol announced plans to 
expand by 600 places in 2012, and other elite institutions, such as University College 
London, also expected to grow but only marginally (Morgan and Grove, 2012). 
Given the short time frame in which universities were aware that they could expand 
their funded places for AAB+ students, this is perhaps unsurprising. However, the 
expansion of such major universities will certainly impact others, particularly those 
lower down in the pecking order.
The new rules surrounding courses charging less than £7,500 per year also had 
a greater impact on certain universities than on others. Twenty thousand students 
were effectively removed from the quota of any university charging more than that 
amount, and re-assigned to the institutions charging less. 
In general, then, any university with the ability to attract high proportions of 
AAB+ students is unlikely to have been affected by the new quota system – they might 
have even gained from it. It was assumed that the London School of Economics, for 
example, would attract 748 AAB+ students – 82 per cent of its total student number 
– as well as 162 students without AAB. Thus LSE’s implied total for 2012 – or the 
number of students the government assumed it would enrol – is 910 students, an 
increase of 75 students, or 9 per cent, on 2011.
Any university charging less than £7,500 per year may also gain. For example, 
University College Birmingham was awarded 204 places through the margin – i.e. it 
won 204 of the 20,000 places (17 per cent of its total number) allocated for courses 
costing less than £7,500 per year. University College Birmingham is only assumed to 
attract 68 AAB+ students (or 6 per cent of its total number of places), but the 204 
student places awarded through the margin far outweighs that number. University 
College Birmingham, then, will (so the government assumes) end up with a near 6 
per cent increase on 2011.
On the other hand, universities that charge over £7,500 per year for all or the 
majority of their courses, and who do not traditionally attract many AAB+ students, 
might have lost out. Middlesex University, for example, was awarded none of the 
20,000 places through the core–margin policy since it charges over £7,500 for all of 
As easy as AAB: the impact of the quasi-market on institutions, 
student numbers and the higher education sector
97
its courses. MiddlesexUniversity was also assumed to attract only 362 AAB+ students 
(or 8 per cent of its total student numbers) out of its implied total of 4,306. It was 
therefore expected to be down 599 students (or 12 per cent) compared to its numbers 
for 2011. Since Middlesex has had its quota for students without AAB decreased, and 
cannot win any students through the core–margin policy, the only way it could make 
such numbers up is by attracting more AAB+ students than it has done previously. 
Given its general failure in the past to do so, such a scenario seems unlikely. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 summarize the respective positions for Russell Group, 
non-Russell- Group, and further education colleges in 2012. For example, Column 2 
shows the total impact for Russell Group universities, indicating that despite gaining 
no places through the core–margin policy – they all charge over £7,500 per year – 
they have a very high proportion (67 per cent) of AAB+ students. If the government’s 
new assumptions are to be confirmed, there is likely to be little change between 
2011 and 2012 in Russell Group universities’ overall position – though numbers are 
predicted to be down by 1.7 per cent. This group is therefore relatively protected 
from the reforms and have little incentive to compete against each other.
Non-Russell-Group universities, on the other hand, appear to fare far worse. 
AAB+ students are assumed to make up only 13 per cent of their student body which, 
if confirmed, will cause them to struggle to make up for the cuts in their quota. 
Furthermore, only 4 per cent of their student body was constituted by places awarded 
through the core–margin policy, which again resulted in a loss of students to cheaper 
universities. The net result is damaging for such institutions – the implied total for 
2012 is down by 18,181 students (or 6.8 per cent) on 2011 – and could drive a degree 
of competition between them. Since they tend not to have a strong tradition of 
attracting AAB+ students, however – which they would need to reverse if they were to 
make up their shortfalls – such an outcome seems improbable.
further education colleges, meanwhile, fare rather well, by and large because 
of benefits resulting from the core–margin policy. Whilst these colleges attract very 
few AAB+ students (only 4 per cent of the total in 2011), they were awarded over 
10,000 students through the aforementioned policy. At 40 per cent of their total 
intake, further education colleges are assumed to be the only net gainers, up on 2011 
by 8,567 students (or 47 per cent) in 2012.
As Table 6.1 makes evident, the potential impact of the government reforms 
on student number controls is highly positive for low-cost further education colleges, 
whilst in high prestige universities such as those in the Russell Group numbers will 
be largely unchanged. However, those mid-tier universities – which the majority of 
the student population attend – were the net losers. Their quotas have been cut, 
they have lost students to cheaper universities, and their only way of making up the 
numbers is by attracting large numbers of AAB+ students, or competing with other 
mid-tier universities. Such institutions are now commonly referred to as the ‘squeezed 
middle’ (Morgan, 2010).
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As universities with a traditionally low proportion of AAB+ students are unlikely 
to be able to compete with the more prestigious Russell Group institutions, the most 
likely scenario is that institutions in the squeezed middle begin to compete with each 
other for students. However, this competition will be weak compared to the sort that 
would be generated by a completely free market; if these universities are already 
squeezed for cash due to excess capacity caused by falling demand, this will affect 
the amount of teaching and tuition fee revenue they receive and limit their ability to 
compete in any meaningful way, such as by improving their facilities. 
Table 6.2 shows the ten universities with the largest percentage fall in student 
places following the changes to the government quotas. These institutions might be 
hit worst of all by the 2012 reforms. The most severely squeezed of the ‘squeezed 
middle’, include the University of East London, Middlesex University, the University 
of Northampton and the University of Central Lancashire. For these institutions, and 
others like them, 2012 might be a difficult year, given the reduction in their quotas. 
If they also suffer falls in demand due to tuition fee increases, the increase in capacity 
might result in real funding drops. They might have also lose additional students in 
2012 if they failed to maintain expected numbers of AAB students.









University of East London 4940 4318 -12.6
University of Bedfordshire 3351 2936 -12.4
Middlesex University 4905 4306 -12.2
University of Northampton 2848 2502 -12.1
Liverpool Hope University 1490 1311 -12.0
Edge Hill University 2687 2367 -11.9
University of Central 
Lancashire 6711 5926 -11.7
University of Lincoln 3315 2930 -11.6
University of Sunderland 2852 2522 -11.6
Leeds Metropolitan University 6264 5543 -11.5
Note: Farnborough College of Technology has the largest percentage change 
between 2011 and 2012 but is excluded from this table due to the small amount 
of students studying there
Source: HEFCE (2012a) 
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In general, then, the reforms to the quota system do not seem sufficient to engender 
the sort of competition between universities the government would like to see. They 
have also caused additional uncertainty in the sector, particularly amongst universities 
in the ‘squeezed middle’.
However, two other important factors could affect the position of universities 
in 2012 and might possibly threaten the government’s reforms. Firstly, the number of 
AAB students anticipated by the government – which impacted on how many students 
were cut from the quota – turned out to be somewhat lower than expected. HEFCE 
predicted the number of students likely to get AAB by looking at historical trends 
and changes in the population. Most notably, they considered that the number of 
18-year-olds was lower in 2012 than it was in 2011 (see Vasager, 2012) and hence 
came up their estimated 85,388 students. In reality, however, the number of students 
gaining AAB or higher came to 79,186 –6,200 less than the HEFCE’s predictions 
(UCAS, 2012b). 
For the first time in two decades, the number of students gaining the top 
grades at A-level did not rise in 2012. This –– is one possible explanation for the 
miscalculation. As Figure 6.4 illustrates, a total of 26.6 per cent exam entries were 
graded A or A*, a fall of 0.4 per cent on 2011’s 27 per cent. A grades seem to have 
been affected in particular, as the Figure also indicates. 
Figure 6.4: A-level grades, 2011 and 2012
Source: Joint Council for Qualifications, 2012, all UK candidates  
Several explanations have been offered to explain why the predictions were wrong. 
Exam boards have attributed the fall in A level grades to the fact that more young 
people – with a broader range of abilities – took A-levels in 2012 than they did in 2011 
(Coughlin, 2012). Others have speculated that teachers, having learned about the 
new benefits of getting AAB, inflated some students’ predicted grades knowing that it 
would improve their chances of receiving an offer from a top institution (Fazackerley, 
2012), since university offers are made to students based on such predictions. 
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By way of a summary consider the following: the proportion of 18-year-olds 
who were accepted into higher education with qualifications in the AAB+ group 
increased significantly between 2006 and 2011. In 2012, however, it had reduced by 
around 3 per cent proportionally (UCAS, 2012c: 60).
The decrease caused further problems for the new quota system – particularly 
for Russell Group universities, who would normally recruit such types of students. 
The students themselves might have also lost out on the place they were offered 
when their predicted grades failed to materialize. Some might have even deferred 
university for a year to re-sit exams or in the hope of gaining a place at their preferred 
university in the future. Indeed by October 2012 – by which point the first university 
terms were underway – six Russell Group universities reported having unfilled places 
on their courses (BBC News, 2012).
In addition to the unexpected dip in AAB students, 2012 saw further pressure 
on student numbers due to an additional fall in the overall number of applications. 
Final UCAS figures (UCAS, 2012c) show that applications at UK higher education 
institutions were down by some 46,500 on 2011,7 with those from UK domiciled 
students down 44,600. The rise in tuition fees was, unsurprisingly, widely cited as the 
reason for the decline. 
Very little research has looked at the impact of tuition fees on participation in 
the UK. Work by Dearden et al. (2010) shows a negative impact but positive impacts 
of maintenance grants and loans. Dearden et al’s analysis indicates that the tuition 
fee increases of 2006 may have had little impact on participation because, although 
there were large increases in tuition fees, similarly large increases in upfront student 
support – in the form of grants and loans – outweighed any negative effect. It is 
difficult to apply their results regarding 2006 to the fee increases of 2012, however, 
since the latter are of a much larger magnitude. The same problem applies to work 
from the US, which provide evidence that higher education finance does affect 
participation (Dynarski, 2003; Seftor and Turner, 2002). It is nonetheless important 
to understand the impact of fees on participation, since the true impact of the 2012 
reforms on individual institutions and the sector as a whole depend significantly on 
why applications declined in 2012.
The next section considers why that particular change occurred and looks at 
the types of students – and therefore the types of institutions – that have been most 
impacted.
In 2006, tuition fees increased from a maximum of £1,300 per year to £3,300 
per year8. In 2005, the year immediately before, anxious to avoid paying the higher 
fee students applied in increased numbers. A year later applications were down by 
5.6 per cent but seemed to recover in the following few years. The tuition fee hike in 
2006 does not appear, therefore, to have caused a permanent drop in participation. 
However, it is worth noting that this occurred when the higher education sector was 
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expanding – in many OECD countries as well as the UK (see, for example, BBC News, 
2008) – and there was a demographic rise in the cohort.
The impact of changes in applications on institutions and 
the sector
Figure 6.5 shows the volume of applications made by English/Home students 
(i.e. those predominantly affected by the tuition fee reforms) to higher education 
institutions from 2004–12. As the Figure illustrates, it is common to see a large rise in 
applications in the year, or years, preceding a tuition fee increase, followed by a fall 
in the first year of the new fee regime. It may therefore be possible that the decline 
in 2012 is nothing more than a temporary dip.
Notes: Applications from England to UK Higher Education Institutions 
Figure 6.5: Volume of English applicants to UK HEIs 2004–12
Figures compiled from UCAS (2012a) and ONS population data
A slightly different pattern has emerged in the past few years, however. While there 
is clearly a significant drop off in applications between 2011 and 2012, applications 
did not noticeably spike the year before the tuition fee increase. Instead the increase 
is somewhat more spread out over the period 2009–11. After a considerable increase 
in 2010 and a subsequent increase a year later, the volume of applications reached 
an all-time high in 2011. Prior to that, of course, was the Browne Review – set up 
in December 2009 to discuss the issue of tuition fees amidst a great deal of hype 
surrounding their possible increase.. It might be the case, therefore, that certain 
types of student – older individuals who have already left school and are in a position 
to enrol in university immediately, for example – anticipated the tuition fee increase 
and decided to enrol as soon as possible. The proportion of students aged 18 taking 
a gap year or deferring university for a year might have also decreased, especially 
Claire Callender and Peter Scott
102
because students applying in 2011 for a deferral in 2012 (in order to take a gap year) 
would be liable to pay the higher 2012 tuition fees, unlike previous occasions when 
tuition fees were increased., There was thus a significant disincentive to defer entry 
in 2011 for 2012 (Clark, 2010).
The large increases in participation from 2009 to 2011 might have also stemmed 
from the UK’s deep recession during this period. Many have speculated that rises in 
university participation were driven by a lack of employment opportunities for young 
people (Curtis, 2009).
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 drill deeper into the overall numbers, examining 
applications by age group. Since application and participation rates are dramatically 
lower for older individuals, Figure 6.6 shows application rates for 18–20-year olds and 
Figure 6.7 for those over 21. It is clear from both figures that application rates were 
down for all age categories in 2012. Compared to 2011, the proportion of 18-year-
olds was down by 1 percentage point (from 33.6 per cent to 32.3 per cent), while 
the proportion of 19-year-olds was down by 2 percentage points (from 12.9 per cent 
to 10.7 per cent). There were also decreases amongst older age groups, though as 
the numbers of students in these categories are significantly smaller, so too are the 
percentage point differences.
However, since individuals of all ages applied in significantly higher numbers 
from 2009 to 2011, as the charts make evident, it may be that the pool of potential 
students was greatly reduced in 2012. This could account for a large proportion of the 
decrease in applications, which would again imply that the drop in 2012 is temporary.
Notes: Applications from England to UK Higher Education Institutions
Figure 6.6: Application rate, English 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds
Figures compiled from UCAS (2012a) and ONS population data
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Notes: Applications from England to UK Higher Education Institutions
Figure 6.7: Application rate, English students age 21+
Figures compiled from UCAS (2012a) and ONS population data
To give a better illustration of this, Table 6.3 shows the annual percentage change in 
application volumes by age group over time9. 
Table 6.3: year-on-year change in English applications, by age
% 
change
Age 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2011–12
18 13840 -4472 3090 8842 12247 11985 6414 -8732 -3.9
19 2986 -9301 11564 4607 5661 11373 5669 -15358 -17.1
20 1797 -968 1193 3382 1831 4513 1819 -5183 -17.1
21 585 -185 708 777 1589 2429 105 -2356 -16.2
22 505 -409 809 200 937 2152 -281 -1930 -20.0
23 514 -410 319 279 642 1606 -116 -1242 -18.1
24 378 -286 143 162 504 1191 -190 -997 -19.9
25-29 1095 -421 462 86 1234 3982 -629 -2816 -19.3
30-39 978 -1005 -72 -375 1129 3500 213 -2327 -17.1
40-60 605 -210 -19 -39 508 1997 -137 -994 -15.6
Note: Applications from England to UK Higher Education Institutions 
Figures compiled from UCAS (2012a) and ONS population data
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As Table 6.3 makes evident, severe declines in applications occurred between 2011 
and 2012. The greatest decreases in volume are amongst 18- and 19-year-olds: around 
24,000 fewer students aged 18 and 19 were at university in 2012. This drop will have 
severe consequences across the board and for Russell Group universities in particular, 
since they tend to attract the youngest students.
However, large declines in the student population also occurred amongst 
older age groups, for whom application volumes are smaller. Most severely, there is a 
20 per cent drop in applications amongst 22-year-olds, with volumes down by nearly 
2,000 compared with 2011. Consequences of this drop will affect mid- to low-tier 
universities and further education colleges since they are more likely to attract older 
students. 
Are these drops in application rates really cause for alarm, or do they simply 
reflect the fact that there were very large increases in applications in previous years? 
For instance, although the number of applications by 19-year-olds declined by 15,300 
(or 17 per cent) in 2012, this followed an increase of 6,400 applications by 18-year-
olds in 2011. In other words, the pool of potential 19-year-olds that could go to 
university in 2012 was reduced by 6,400 – so the increase in 18-year-olds applying 
in 2011 could account for almost half the decrease amongst 19-year-olds in 2012. 
UCAS analysis bears this conclusion out, showing, interestingly, the significant drop 
in deferrals by 18-year-olds in 2011 – i.e. those enrolling but then taking gap years – 
which resulted in a large decline amongst 19-year-olds enrolling in university in 2012. 
UCAS report that:
… a greater proportion of those acceptances were … to the 2011–12 
academic year at age 18 rather than deferring to start in the following year. 
Together these effects gave a substantially above-trend proportion of the 
18-year-old population who were accepted and started courses in 2011
(UCAS, 2012c: 32)
In other words, a higher than usual proportion of 18-year-olds chose not to defer their 
university entryin 2011 until they were aged19, but instead decided to participate 
immediately. Strikingly, deferrals amongst 18-year-olds fell from 9.1 per cent in 2010 
to a mere 3 per cent in 2011. In 2012 the figure had all but recovered to 7.8 per cent 
(UCAS, 2012c: 32). 
Similar patterns emerge amongst the younger student groups: large increases 
in applications in previous years preceded large decreases amongst applicants in the 
same cohort. A record increase in applications by 18-year-olds occurred in 2010 – 
showing an increase of nearly 12,000 applicants year on year – suggested to have been 
driven by the recession (Bawden and Mansell, 2010). Since this particular increase 
would have affected the pool of potential 20-year-olds going to university in 2012, it 
could account for why 5,100 fewer students in this age group decided against going 
to university in that year.
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Looking at those in slightly older age categories, however, there could be some 
cause for alarm. Amongst 24-year-olds, for example, there was a drop of 19.9 per cent 
in 2012. The number of 23-year-olds applying in 2011 had also fallen, however, and 
increases in 2009 and 2010 were not major. It may be the case, therefore, that amongst 
students in older categories there are signs of a genuine and more permanent 
decrease in application rates as a result of tuition fees. Indeed as Figure 6.7 shows, 
following the tuition fee increases in 2006, applications among older students took 
longer to recover. Should this conclusion be confirmed, it is particularly likely to 
affect further education colleges and mid-tier universities – the squeezed middle – in 
future years, as they become more reliant on older applicants. 
In contrast, Russell Group universitiestypically have very low rates of mature 
students. For example, less than 1 per cent of undergraduate degree students at the 
London School of Economics, , were aged 23 or over, while the corresponding figure 
at the University of Bristol was not much higher at 4 per cent (UCAS, 2012). Further 
education colleges, on the other hand, attract very large proportions of mature 
students at degree level. Indeed as figures for 2011 show, of the top 50 institutions 
whose degree acceptances came from people aged 23 and over, 46 were further 
education colleges. In the next 50 institutions ranked in the same terms, however, 
almost half are non-Russell-Group universities. The proportion of students at these 
institutions aged 23 and over is high. For example, at London South Bank University, 
35 per cent of the University’s degree intake in 2011 were 23 and over; at London 
Metropolitan 27 per cent; and at the University of Wolverhampton 21 per cent. A fall 
in the number of applicants outside the traditional age range could therefore affect 
the squeezed middle – who are not protected by increases in their intake from the 
core–margin policy – even further in future years.
New UCAS figures also allow us to examine changes in application rates by 
students from different backgrounds in 2012. Indeed a key concern amongst several 
critics of the government’s policy on tuition fees was that students from deprived 
backgrounds might be more likely to be put off attending university as a result of 
higher fees. Should this happen it would have severe consequences for institutions 
that traditionally accept students from poorer backgrounds. 
Figure 6.8 shows application rates for English 18-year-olds by IDACI10 quintile 
over time, where individuals in Q1 are from the richest areas and individuals from Q5 
from the poorest. Unsurprisingly, those from the poorest backgrounds are significantly 
less likely to go to university than are those from more affluent backgrounds are.
Interestingly, though, the largest falls in application rates between 2011 and 
2012 are amongst those from the richest quintile. It is important to note, however, 
that application rates amongst students from poorer backgrounds have been 
increasing more rapidly than for those whose from richer backgrounds. Had these 
trends continued, one would have expected a larger increase amongst those from 
poorer backgrounds compared with their richer counterparts in 2012. Taking this 
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into account, decreases in applications amongst all IDACI groups seem to be of 
a similar magnitude – suggesting that the increase in tuition fees in 2012 did not 
especially impact individuals by their family background11.
Notes: English 18-year-old application rates for areas grouped by proportion of 
children living in lower income households (IDACI Quintile 5 (Q5) = lowest 
proportion of lower income)
Figure 6.8: Participation rate by IDACI quintile
Source: UCAS (2012a)
The UCAS data also enables analysis of students’ cost preferences. UCAS analysis 
shows little evidence that those students enrolling in 2012 gravitated towards cheaper 
courses – ‘there has been no substantial move towards or away from higher fee 
courses compared to choices made by young applicants in previous cycles’ (UCAS, 
2012 p.10) – which suggests that tuition fees have not changed student behaviour 
regarding the types of courses they choose12.
To summarize, as a result of the 2012 reforms there were very few changes 
in student enrolment by background or regarding the courses students applied for. 
However, there were differential decreases in application rates and volumes by age 
group, with a substantial decrease in the volume of 19-year-olds applying in 2012 in 
particular. The decrease is likely to have a greater impact on Russell Group universities 
– which tend to take on larger proportions of younger students – and might have 
contributed specifically to the fall in numbers in 2012 at six of their institutions. 
However, applications amongst older students were also down in 2012, which will 
affect further education colleges and mid- to low-tier universities that are more likely 
to enrol such students. Whilst applications amongst older students might recover in 
future years, a permanent fall in mature students – and a fall in student numbers in 
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general – could have serious consequences for certain institutions and be a major 
threat to the government’s reforms.
As discussed, many non-Russell-Group universities were affected by the 
HEFCE’s cuts to the student quotas and would have experienced a decline in their 
numbers in 2012 as a result. Such institutions in the ‘squeezed middle’ might also be 
the hardest hit by he overall decline in applications in 2012.
What about the fate of these universities in future years? In 2013/14 the 
controlled allocation of places will be subjected to another reduction of 5,000, 
with these places reallocated by the HEFCE. No further places will be awarded to 
institutions offering courses priced below £7,500 and, more crucially, ABB, not just 
AAB, students will be removed from the quota in 2013.
What will happen in 2013 and beyond?
Upon creating the quasi-market, now in operation in the higher education sector, 
the Coalition Government also announced that the removal of controls on AAB+ 
‘will represent a starting point’ (BIS, 2011: 50). To create a truly marketized system, 
however, the government would have to remove the quota of students – and the cap 
on fees – altogether and allow universities to expand and to recruit as many students 
as they wanted to, regardless of their grades. As discussed above,some 130,000 
applicants did not gain a place in 2011 and the figure for 2012 – though down – 
remained high. UCAS statistics (UCAS, 2012c: Table 10a) report 455,414 applications 
and 343,902 acceptances in England in 2012 – i.e. 115,512 unplaced students (ibid: 
Table 1a). In other words, there is still a great deal of spare capacity in the system. If 
the government were to remove the cap on students completely, and if some more 
prestigious universities expanded their numbers, the most likely result would be a 
gradual ‘trading up’ of students. The Russell Group universities would attract high-
quality students away from the mid-tier or ‘squeezed middle’ institutions, who in 
turn could make up the difference by attracting students away from lower ranking 
universities – and so on. Assuming institutions were more willing than previously to 
accept students with lower grades, this would likely continue for a while – until all 
spare capacity was used up. However, it may eventually lead to competition between 
institutions, particularly if some announce expansion plans.
Since the Coalition is highly unlikely to remove the cap altogether – even if 
universities were willing to recruit the remaining students, the policy would still be 
very expensive – the scenario is also an unlikely one. Even if the HEFCE refused to 
fund universities for these students, there would still be a significant extra cost in 
terms of student support.
The most likely scenario will see the Coalition’s somewhat awkward quasi-
market prevail. Indeed, the government have already announced plans to remove 
the cap on ABB students as well as on those with AAB. The move is likely to have 
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a similar effect to the reforms of 2012, with Russell Group and other prestigious 
universities protected by their long-standing tradition of attracting such high quality 
students. Indeed, UCAS data for 2012 (UCAS, 2012c: 21) confirm that high-tariff 
institutions such as those in the Russell Group were less impacted by participation 
falls than were medium and low-tariff institutions. 
Meanwhile, further education colleges and universities near the bottom of 
the pecking order – those who tend not to recruit ABB+ students – will be largely 
unaffected by the policy change (though they are likely to lose some students once 
a further 5,000 places are cut from the student number control limit). Again, it is 
likely that the ‘squeezed middle’ higher education institutions will suffer in 2013 
and beyond, particularly if more of the elite institutions announce expansion plans. 
Indeed, the planned changes for 2013 might be having an impact already. ABB 
students who narrowly missed a place at their preferred university in 2012 might 
have deferred for a year, knowing they have a good chance of gaining a place at a top 
university in 2013 when these universities can expand.
But while we can be sure of the government’s plans for 2013, what is by no 
means certain is whether student numbers will recover, or if the 2012 slump in 
participation will continue for years to come, for all or some particular student 
groups. Coupled with the changes to the quota system for 2013, such questions could 
spell trouble for the squeezed middle, who may have some tough decisions to make 
in the coming years.
Conclusions
By increasing the tuition fee cap to a level almost three times as high as it was 
previously, freeing up 85,000 students from the strict quota system and auctioning 
20,000 student places to institutions willing to charge less than £7,500 per year, the 
government has further oriented the higher education system in the direction of 
a market. 
Combined with a 46,500 decrease in university applications and an unexpected 
shortfall in top-grade A-level students, far from generating the competition between 
universities it so desired, the government’s somewhat awkward ‘quasi-market’ has only 
increased uncertainty in the sector and created a ‘squeezed middle’ of institutions. 
Such mid-tier universities have had their quotas cut and lost students through the 
core–margin policy. With little history of attracting AAB students, they are unlikely to 
be able to make up the numbers. 
If the government were to completely remove the cap on students, and if some 
more prestigious universities expanded their intakes, the most likely result would 
be a gradual ‘trading up’ of students until all spare capacity is used up. This would 
eventually result in competition at all levels., However, given the cost of removing all 
controls altogether, the scenario is highly unlikely.
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Instead the quasi-market is likely to prevail in the future, which might generate some 
competition amongst ‘the squeezed middle’ universities if Russell Group institutions 
expand capacity and attract high-grade students away from less prestigious institutions. 
However, such competition is weaker than the sort that would be generated by a 
completely free market, and hence unlikely to lead to vast improvements in the 
quality of courses.
And with student numbers down in 2012, and fears of further declines in the coming 
years, the future of higher education in England – and the success of the government’s 
reforms – is highly uncertain.
Notes
1 Applicants for full-time undergraduate courses at UK higher education institutions (all 
student types); UCAS, 2012c: Table 4a.
2 UCAS statistics (UCAS, 2012c: Table 10a) report 498,119 unique applicants, and 368,316 UK 
domiciled accepts for England in 2011. 
3 The UK higher education system is devolved, but quotas are in place in all four constituent 
countries, and operate in a similar way.
4 The Russell Group represents 24 UK institutions, which are considered to be particularly 
prestigious because of their focus on research. In 2010, Russell Group members received 72 
per cent of all university research grant and contract income in the UK. The Russell Group 
was formed in 1994 by 17 British research universities: Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Imperial College London, Leeds, Liverpool, London School of 
Economics, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Sheffield, Southampton, University 
College London and Warwick. In 1998 Cardiff University and King’s College London joined 
the group. In 2012, a further five institutions (Durham, Exeter, Queen Mary, University of 
London, and York) joined the group, though these are not included in Figure 6.3 (source: The 
Russell Group website: http://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/research/)
5 Note that unlike Figure 6.2, these figures depict the ratio of applications to acceptances, rather 
than unique applicants since applicants can make applications to as many as 5 universities 
simultaneously through the UCAS system. 
6 Application: acceptances ratios are for UK students applying to individual institutions, 
derived from UCAS statistical services, available at www.ucas.ac.uk/about_us/stat_services/
stats_online/
7 See footnote 1; End of Cycle figures for English institutions not available at time of writing.
8 At 2012 prices. In nominal prices, fees were set at £1,000 per year in 1998 and £3,000 per 
year in 2006.
9 Note that these figures are derived from application rates and population data so are 
approximate. 
10 The IDACI measure shows the percentage of children in each area that live in families that 
are income deprived (i.e. in receipt of Income Support, income based Jobseeker’s Allowance, 
Working Families’ Tax Credit or Disabled Person’s Tax Credit below a given threshold). A 
rank of 1 is assigned to the most deprived area and a rank of 32,482 is assigned to the least 
deprived area.
11 For more details on this, see UCAS (2012), 28–31.
12 See UCAS (2012a) 48–9.
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In the last 50 years higher education has expanded substantially in England. While only 
around one in twenty young people attended a university in the 1960s (CHE, 1963), 
now more than 40 per cent of each generation goes to university. Such a transformation 
of higher education was supposed to bring about major improvements in social 
mobility by providing a route to better jobs and higher income for young people 
previously unable to access it. Yet in practice the expansion has not allayed concerns 
about the under-representation of certain types of students in higher education . 
In particular, it remains the case that young people from poorer backgrounds are 
very much under-represented, relative to their share of the population as a whole. 
The need to further widen participation for these poorer students, and indeed for 
other groups currently under-represented in higher education, therefore remains a 
pressing policy issue (HM Government, 2010). 
Given the extensive evidence that higher education is an important route by 
which individuals might achieve social mobility, the case for widening participation 
in higher education is a compelling one. Indeed the recent White Paper dedicated 
an entire chapter to make the argument that higher education is an important driver 
of social mobility. Particularly striking about that chapter was how it firmly reaffirmed 
the government’s commitment to making improvements in relative social mobility – 
it explicitly states that the policy aim is not just to increase the chances of someone 
from a lower socio-economic background going to university but to increase their 
chances relative to their more socio-economically advantaged peers. This is a bold 
statement: it necessarily implies a decline in the relative chances of a young person 
from a middle or higher socio-economic status family going to university – a policy 
unlikely to be popular with their parents. The White Paper is therefore not lacking 
in ambition. The Paper does acknowledge, however, that there is a long way to go 
in terms of improving social mobility and indeed in ensuring that higher education 
plays a key role in our efforts to improve the economic success of those from poorer 
backgrounds. There is reason to be cautious on this point. Some research has 
suggested that the chances of a student from a disadvantaged background going to 
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university actually fell in relative terms during the 1980s and early 1990s, and hence 
during the period of higher education’s rapid expansion the socio-economic gap in 
higher education participation worsened (Blanden and Gregg, 2004; Galindo-Rueda 
et al., 2004; Glennerster, 2001; Machin and Vignoles, 2004). More recent research 
is more optimistic about whether the socio-economic gap in university enrolment 
has actually widened (Raffe et al., 2006) but most commentators, including the 
government, are in agreement that there remains a need for further policy action 
to widen participation in higher education to students from lower socio-economic 
groups. Also increasingly clear is that simply expanding the size of higher education 
does not necessarily lead to major improvements in relative social mobility. 
Of course widening participation and the role of higher education in 
improving social mobility have become more topical issues in light of fears, following 
the introduction of – and continued increases to – university tuition fees, that we may 
be pricing poorer students out of higher education. Certainly, the cultural shift from 
the ‘free at point of use’ system that we had 20 years ago to a system where universities 
are charging substantial sums, has led many to question whether this will make it even 
harder to encourage poorer students into higher education. The tuition fee reforms 
introduced in 2012 have ensured that poorer students continue to receive means-
tested financial support for their studies and, even more importantly, that all students 
do not need to find the means to pay their tuition fees upfront. Despite this, however, 
the reforms have not assuaged fears that the psychological impact of introducing 
higher tuition fees will tend to put off poorer students. Going forward, the level of 
fees and arrangements for their means testing and repayment are also likely to be 
important factors. When fees were introduced in 1998 the amount charged was low 
(£1000) and means tested, though students did need to find the fees upfront. Even at 
that time there were signs that the fear of fees might create a barrier to participation 
for poorer students (Callender, 2003) and indeed that poorer students were more 
debt averse (Pennell and West, 2005). In fact, the higher education participation rate 
of poorer students did not decline after the introduction of fees in the late 1990s, 
nor did the socio-economic gap in higher education participation widen (Ramsden 
and Brown, 2007; Wyness, 2009). However, as we enter an era of much higher fees of 
£7,000 to £8,000 plus, we may not remain so sanguine about their impact (Chowdry 
et al., 2010). 
In this chapter I describe how poorer students remain under-represented 
in higher education despite the substantial expansion in the proportion of young 
people going to university. I then explain the significance of this for social mobility 
and the life chances of young people. I conclude by considering the various policy 
issues that arise in our attempt to widen participation and discuss the specifics of the 
proposed policies in the White Paper.
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Trends in higher education participation
As Figure 7.1 makes apparent, the higher education participation rate in the UK has 
increased significantly over the last decade. 
Figure 7.1 Higher Education Initial Participation Rate (HEIPR) for English-
domiciled first-time participants in higher education courses at UK higher 
education institutions and English, Welsh, and Scottish Further Education 
Colleges (males and females)
Source: Statistical First Release: Participation Rates 2006/07 to 2010/11. 




During the mid-2000s, the previously sharp upward trend in higher education 
participation somewhat stagnated, despite the target set by the previous Labour 
Government that 50 per cent of the population should attend higher education. 
The government has since recalculated the way it measures participation rates, which 
has led to a discontinuity in the official figures for 2006. Despite this, both figures 
from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and from the University and 
College Application System (UCAS) – the body responsible for the UK centralized 
higher education admissions process – indicate that since 2006 the upward trend in 
higher education applications and participation continued before plateauing from 
2009/10.1 A decline in the cohort size is also expected over the next few years, which 
is also likely to impact both on applications and higher education participation, 
independently of any impact from increased tuition fees (McNay, 2012).
Of course an overall rising higher education participation rate might still 
disguise a different trend for lower income students. However, as UCAS data2 
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indicates – see Figure 6.8 in chapter 6 – application rates from pupils in poor areas 
(with a high proportion of children living in low income households) and from 
pupils living in richer areas displayed a similarly upward trend during this period. In 
other words, there is evidence to suggest that even after the introduction of tuition 
fees in the late 1990s, not only did the higher education participation rate continue 
to rise, the increase occurred in poorer areas as well as in those where individuals 
are wealthier. Certainly, there is very little to suggest that participation amongst the 
poorest students fell during this period. So why do we need to remain concerned 
about widening participation in the face of what appears to be a steady increase in 
participation or at least no major decline amongst poorer students? Somewhat at 
odds with the tone of regular newspaper reports of declining applications to higher 
education from poorer students, UCAS calculate3 that the general higher education 
entry rate for young people was on trend in 2012. More specifically, in the same 
year the entry rate for disadvantaged young entrants (18-year-olds) rose, even in the 
face of impending financial reforms. However, despite no overall decline in higher 
education participation after the introduction of higher fees (see Figure 6.1 in 
chapter 6), and no decline amongst disadvantaged young people in particular, we 
cannot ignore the fact that there remains a very large socio-economic gap in higher 
education participation rates. 
The size of the socio-economic gap in participation really is substantial. 
Ermisch et al. (2012) report that students with graduate parents are approximately 
2.8 times more likely to go to university than students whose parents have a low level 
of education. Looking at the issue in a slightly different way, Chowdry et al. (2012) 
show that students from the bottom fifth of the socio-economic status distribution are 
40 percentage points less likely to go to university than a student from the top fifth. 
However one measures the socio-economic gap in higher education participation, 
all the evidence clearly suggests that family background significantly determines the 
likelihood of going to university. There is much more to be done before we can claim 
to have widened participation to the poorest students and hence to have provided 
them with equal access to the better jobs and higher pay associated with many 
degrees. However, to determine what policy action is needed to widen participation 
further, we need to be clear about the reasons for the low participation rate of poorer 
students. 
The drivers of university participation
I have made the point that even if higher education participation has increased for 
all students, irrespective of family income, there is no doubt that a young person’s 
chances of going to university are heavily influenced by their family background and 
that the problem of socially disadvantaged students’ underachievement is historically 
entrenched (Ball, 2003; Field, 2010). Research from the UK, the US, and indeed 
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other OECD countries has conclusively found that parental characteristics – and 
parents’ education levels and socio-economic status especially – are key determiners 
of whether their children will participate in higher education (Blanden and Gregg, 
2004; Blanden and Machin, 2004; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002; 2003; Gayle et al., 
2002; Meghir and Palme, 2005; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). More controversial, 
however, are the causal mechanisms by which a child’s family background influences 
their chances of going to university. 
It is agreed that socio-economic gaps in children’s educational achievement 
emerge very early on (Feinstein, 2003). In the pre-school period we can already see 
poorer children falling behind their more advantaged counterparts. The trend is 
not just unique to the UK but is also evident in numerous other countries – the US 
in particular (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Demack et al., 2000) – and has important 
implications for how we think about widening participation in higher education. 
There are two possible stories one could tell here. The first is of poorer students 
being unable to access university because they cannot afford to go, either because 
they need to start contributing to the family finances or, alternatively, because they 
are put off by high tuition fees – this is especially relevant to the US, where fees can 
be very high indeed. Should this view be borne out, then clearly we ought to be very 
concerned about the introduction of and continued increases in higher education 
tuition fees in the UK. An alternative view, more compatible with the evidence that 
socio-economic gaps in education achievement emerge early, is that a child’s family 
background has such a major influence on their early development that by the 
time the student reaches university age they do not have the necessary educational 
achievement to access higher education, regardless of the tuition fees being charged. 
Should this view be borne out it would suggest that our primary policy response ought 
to be targeted at improving poorer children’s prior achievement whilst they are in 
the compulsory phase of their schooling. 
The evidence on whether barriers at the point of entry into higher education 
prevent young people from going on to higher education varies by context. Firstly, 
the evidence from the US has indicated that tuition fees and the problems arising 
from poorer parents having low income and a lack of access to funds have not, 
historically, played a major role in determining whether or not a young person from 
a poorer background goes to university (Cunha et al., 2007; Carneiro and Heckman, 
2002). The situation might be changing, however, as tuition fees continue to rise and 
parents’ economic situations deteriorate. Even before the US’s recent recession, a 
paper by Belley and Lochner (2007) suggested that financial considerations were 
indeed starting to play a more important role in determining higher education 
participation. 
In the UK, early evidence from Gayle et al. (2002) and Dearden et al. (2004) 
suggested that financial considerations, specifically credit constraints, did play a role 
in ensuring that poorer students were less likely to enrol in university, even allowing 
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for differences in their educational achievement in secondary school. However, 
more recent evidence from Chowdry et al., (2012), Ermisch and Del Bono (2012) 
and Bekhradnia (2003) shows that if one compares students with similar levels of 
academic achievement in secondary school (i.e. similar GCSE and A-level grades), 
socio-economically disadvantaged students have quite similar higher education 
participation rates, though a modest socio-economic gap remains. In other words, it 
is primarily because poorer children have lower levels of prior achievement in school 
that they are less likely to go on to university. Anders (2012) has also confirmed that 
whilst poorer students are less likely to apply to go to university, for a given level of 
prior achievement poorer students are almost as likely to be accepted into university 
as those from wealthier backgrounds. 
If we factor such evidence into our consideration about the fact that socio-
economic gaps in children’s educational achievement emerge early in the UK – and 
indeed are large by international standards – it suggests that policy action needs to 
be targeted at an earlier stage of schooling (Goodman and Gregg, 2010; Jerrim et al., 
2012; Vignoles and Crawford, 2010). A successful policy is therefore likely to focus 
on pre-school and school-aged children, rather than just on students applying for 
university – a key point realized by the UK’s AimHigher programme4 which switched 
its focus to younger school children in light of the aforementioned evidence. We 
must also acknowledge how difficult is the task of narrowing socio-economic gaps 
in educational achievement, and that despite being the focus of much government 
effort in the last 30 to 40 years, progress has been slow. We know it is not easy for 
schools to overcome pupils’ social disadvantage (Mortimore and Whitty, 1997). 
Furthermore, while schools might be the main policy lever we can use to try and 
improve poorer children’s educational achievement, we also know they are not the 
most important determiners of achievement: family characteristics matter far more 
than which school a child attends. The challenge of improving poorer children’s 
educational achievement almost certainly requires policy action not purely focused 
on improving school quality, necessary though that may also be, but on other factors 
such as the home and community environment, and, of course, parenting.
While low achievement at school is the main reason why poorer students do 
not go to university, we do know that students face a range of other barriers when they 
are considering applying (see comprehensive reviews from the National Committee 
of Inquiry into Higher Education (NCIHE) (1997) and, more recently, by Gorard 
et al. 2006). Thus the university sector also has a role to play, firstly in encouraging 
as many students from disadvantaged backgrounds as possible to go into higher 
education, and secondly in ensuring that these students complete their studies and 
go on to access better quality and higher paid jobs when they do. We cannot of course 
allow universities to avoid taking up their role simply because socio-economic gaps in 
achievement emerge early on in a child’s life. 
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Higher education and social mobility
Clearly, widening participation in higher education is a goal in its own right, ensuring 
that individuals, regardless of their family background, can get the wide range of 
benefits that come from it. However, widening participation in higher education is 
also crucial because a degree is likely to have a substantial impact on an individual’s 
economic prosperity and hence on their social mobility. Higher education is 
undoubtedly a potential pathway by which individuals from poor and modest 
backgrounds can acquire higher quality jobs and better earnings. Here I discuss why 
this is so.
The evidence on higher education’s economic benefits for the individual is 
convincing. Having a degree has a significant impact on future earnings: on average 
graduates earn considerably more than non-graduates (Blundell et al., 2004; Bratti 
et al., 2005; O’Leary and Sloane, 2005; Walker and Zhu, 2011). Latest estimates 
from Walker and Zhu (2011) suggest that male graduates can make anywhere from 
between a 5–30 per cent return on their degree, women a 15–20 per cent return. 
The estimates are so varied because the wage benefit or economic return having a 
degree confers contrasts quite substantially according to several factors: whether the 
graduate is male or female, which institution they attend, and which degree subject 
they take (Hussain et al., 2009; Walker and Zhu, 2011). For women, for example, 
regardless of their degree subject, the impact of higher education on their wages is 
substantial (Walker and Zhu, 2011). For men, by contrast, the subjects students study 
cause the value to vary quite significantly: some, such as economics, have a much 
higher value than others like English, for example. In general, however, the impact 
of a degree on a student’s subsequent wages is likely to be significant. 
In sum, if poorer students are less likely to access higher education, they will 
be subsequently less likely to secure a professional level job and, in turn, to achieve 
higher levels of income (Ermisch et al., 2012). The strength of the relationship 
between a parent’s socio-economic background and their child’s achievement in the 
educational system appears to strongly account for the very marked relationship in 
some countries between parental income and a child’s eventual income – i.e. low 
social mobility. The extent of the UK’s social mobility is an extremely controversial 
issue amongst researchers. Some studies have suggested the UK has a particularly 
low level of social mobility, with a very strong link between a parent’s income and 
their child’s (Blanden, 2011; Jantti et al., 2006). Others have been more sceptical 
about whether the UK is an outlier in this regard, arguing that the UK’s level of 
social mobility is not particularly low, nor has it worsened over time (Gorard, 2008; 
Goldthorpe, 2012; Saunders, 2012). The difference in view partly derives from how 
one measures social mobility – specifically, whether one emphasizes occupation or 
income as denoting the more important measure of economic success.
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Whilst I do not here attempt to resolve the complex issues of how best to 
measure social mobility, what is very evident from a broad range of research studies 
using different data and different methods is the strong link in the UK between 
family background and educational achievement. In particular, there appears to be 
a large gap in educational achievement between the most advantaged pupils – those 
from, say, the income distribution’s top quintile – and the rest of the student body 
(Jerrim et al., 2012). The gap is not entirely driven by the private school sector – 
only around 7 per cent of students attend private schools – though its role in British 
society undoubtedly explains part of it. What it does imply, however, is that policies to 
increase the higher education participation of the poorest students – e.g. individuals 
in the bottom quintile, such as those eligible for Free School Meals – will not address 
an evidently large gap in the likelihood of going to university between the very rich 
and the rest. In turn, this implies that occupations carrying the highest status will 
continue to be dominated by students from the richest fifth of families. Again, this 
reinforces the point that higher education is an important route to occupational and 
economic success and hence to social mobility.
Policy developments and widening participation
The aforementioned evidence implies that any attempt to make substantial 
improvements to social mobility in the UK is likely also to need to widen participation 
in higher education. Indeed it is for this reason that widening participation in higher 
education has been an important goal of education policy for a long time (CHE, 
1963; NCIHE, 1997). However, running alongside this clear policy imperative is a 
parallel policy development: namely, the push to increase students’ contribution 
towards the costs of their higher education. On the face of it, these two policy goals 
appear to be contradictory: how can we reconcile our desire to encourage poorer 
students to enrol in higher education whilst reducing the subsidies paid to students 
for the costs of their higher education? 
Certainly, the public seems to view these two policy aims as contradictory. 
The introduction of tuition fees by the Labour Government in 1998 was met with 
widespread opposition from students and parents while recent reforms resulting in 
much higher fees – averaging £8,389 in 20125 – have been even more vehemently 
opposed – even by politicians. Much of the opposition has been expressed as a fear 
that fees will prevent young people from poor or middle income families accessing 
university. But it has also illustrated a clear desire that our system should be designed 
in such a way that students should not need to have high levels of income in order for 
that to happen.
However, policies aimed at widening participation and at reducing the 
subsidies paid to some students for their higher education are not necessarily entirely 
incompatible. On the tuition fee front, the design of the finance system is important. 
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Means-tested tuition fees and fees that only need to be paid back after graduation 
are one way to protect poorer (and indeed richer) students from the impact of the 
proposed financial changes. The UK currently has an income-contingent loan system 
for tuition fees, designed to ensure that students do not need to find the resources 
to pay their fees upfront. Poorer students, in theory, then, should not be deterred 
from attending university if they know that their degree is a good investment, one 
that will lead to a better job and higher earnings in the long run. Whether poorer 
students really are reassured by the income contingent loan system is a moot point, 
however – and debt averseness a serious issue (Callender, 2003). Furthermore, as 
the White Paper has recognized, many students lack good information about the 
value of different degrees in the labour market. Both problems – and their potential 
impact on the higher education participation rate of poorer students – have been 
acknowledged by the government so means testing to reduce their tuition fee burden 
consequently remains in place. 
However, equally importantly, tuition fees are not the only form of subsidy 
received by students. Previously, students were paid a living expenses grant to assist 
them with the costs of studying and it has long been recognized that the costs they 
incur whilst doing so are an important factor in making higher education accessible 
to students whose parents do not have the resources to support them. In policy 
terms, what we have seen alongside increases in tuition fees is a decline in the level 
of support for students in the form of grants. The trend has not been linear, however. 
In fact there have been a number of changes to successive governments’ policies 
on the issue of student support. For example, the real value of grants was reduced 
systematically throughout the 1990s before grants were abolished completely, 
leaving poorer students with little in the way of financial support whilst they were at 
university. Current policy has actually reversed this position with a number of reforms 
to the system designed to increase the funds available to poorer students during their 
studies. Hence when fees were increased to £3000 in 2006, grants were simultaneously 
increased – an important and insufficiently discussed policy development. 
Work by Dearden et al. (2011) has shown that whilst the introduction of higher 
tuition fees is likely to have a negative impact on higher education participation, it 
can be offset by the countervailing effect of improving the level of support available 
to students while they study. For instance, Dearden et al. calculated that a £1,000 
increase in fees (at 2006 prices) would have reduced participation rates by 4 per cent. 
However, they also calculated that £1,000 worth of non-repayable support in the form 
of maintenance grants resulted in a 2.6 percentage point increase in participation. 
The White Paper has partially recognized this point and I discuss the proposed means 
to help poorer students with their living costs – and their limitations – in the next 
section of this chapter.
Before I discuss the White Paper’s specific proposals and how well evidenced 
they might be, I first consider some important policies that have previously aimed 
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to widen participation and discuss whether or not they have been successful. 
Calculating the impact particular policies have had on higher education participation 
is, of course, problematic. Many policy developments occur simultaneously and it is 
therefore difficult to untangle the impact of tuition fees from other policy changes. 
For instance, the recent abolition of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) 
scheme, in addition to the abolition of AimHigher, is likely to impact on attempts 
to widen participation. Such policy changes will then interact with any impact the 
increase in tuition fees in 2012 might have. 
Certainly, since the Education Maintenance Allowance scheme was found to 
have increased staying-on rates amongst 16-year-olds from poorer backgrounds, it is 
distinctly likely that removing it will have a negative impact on the participation of 
such students in post-16 education. Whether this subsequently reduces the number 
of lower income students participating in higher education is unclear, however, 
although McNay (2012) has highlighted the small fall in the proportion of 16–18-year-
olds staying on in full-time education beyond 16 in 2012. Any downward trend in 
post-16 participation amongst lower SES pupils might of course be countered by 
another recent policy: raising the education participation age to 18. While the policy 
will require students to undertake some education to age 18, its effectiveness will 
depend on whether it has any ‘bite’ – in other words, if it does indeed increase how 
much education or training young people participate in and how long they do so for. 
Evidence of how the AimHigher scheme impacted disadvantaged students’ 
higher education participation is rather more mixed. It is therefore far from clear 
that abolishing it will have a negative impact. Harrison (2012) suggests though that 
whilst AimHigher was not found to have had a major impact on the higher education 
participation of young people from poorer backgrounds, this might have been partly 
because it attempted to influence the aspirations of younger children not yet at an 
age where they could have progressed into higher education (Harrison, 2012). If the 
policy was successful in this regard, in the longer term its abolition may yet have a 
negative impact on higher education participation rates amongst the target group of 
more disadvantaged young people.
In any case, we need also to be mindful that one aim of introducing higher 
and variable tuition fees was to influence pupils’ choices. As I discussed previously, 
the economic benefits of a degree vary substantially both by institution attended and 
by degree subject. In other words, whilst higher education is potentially a route to 
improved social mobility, the choices graduates make when enrolling significantly 
determine the benefits they will reap from their degree. Widening participation 
will only improve graduates’ earnings and social mobility if poorer students enrol in 
high-quality institutions and on courses in economically valuable subjects. Following 
the introduction of higher tuition fees in 2012, then, students might think harder 
about which institutions they intend to study at and the subject they plan to take. 
Theoretically, therefore, the introduction of higher fees might encourage students 
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to make more economically rational subject choices, which could lead in turn to 
actual improvements in social mobility. Work by Walker and Zhu (2011) suggests this 
is only a theoretical benefit of the reforms, however. As their evidence indicates, even 
a large rise in tuition fees – such as what occurred in 2012 – is unlikely, in practice, to 
make a significant difference to the value of particular degrees since the economic 
gain for high-value subjects far outweighs the marginal increase in costs implied by 
the rise in tuition fees. Students, consequently, are unlikely to change their choice of 
institution or subject just because there are relatively small differences in tuition fees 
for different degree courses.
We also need to think further about the experience higher education affords 
poorer students – and particularly about the types of institutions such students tend to 
access. Poorer students are not only less likely to apply to and enrol in Russell Group 
institutions (or institutions with a similar research quality) compared to their equally 
qualified but more advantaged counterparts, they are also more likely to drop out 
of university (Chowdry et al., 2012; Vignoles and Powdthavee, 2009). It is therefore 
key for universities to help disadvantaged students make aspirational choices in 
terms of institution and indeed to help them remain in higher education until they 
have completed their degree. In the next section I consider how the specific policy 
proposals in the White Paper relate to the evidence I have just outlined and the 
argument I have put forward. 
The White Paper
What has the White Paper promised in terms of policy development on widening 
participation and how effectively are the policy proposals likely to address the 
underlying causes of social immobility?
First and foremost, although the onus to widen participation remains with 
universities and colleges, the government has recognized the central role of schools. 
If we are to expect higher education to serve as an engine for social mobility, this will 
only be achieved by improving poorer children’s educational achievement in school. 
We should therefore welcome the acknowledgement of this in the White Paper. 
The government has also recognized the tension school performance measures 
have created in the system. Schools have, not surprisingly, focused on improving their 
performance on the metric by which they are judged, which up to now has largely 
been the total of GCSE points per pupil or, indeed, the proportion of pupils who 
achieve five A*–C grades. Encouraging pupils to get more GCSE points does not 
necessarily improve their chances of getting into university, however, if certain of 
their qualifications are not widely respected or accepted by universities. Another 
performance measure has been introduced in response to this problem: namely, 
the proportion of students achieving a particular GCSE curriculum described as the 
English Baccalaureate, which includes a set of subjects universities are more likely to 
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favour. It remains to be seen whether the English Baccalaureate will usurp the focus 
on the GCSE and become the main metric by which schools are judged. However, it 
is possible that schools will shift their focus towards a curriculum more likely to be 
favoured by many universities. 
A more significant shift, however, is the potential publication of school-level 
information on students’ progression rates into higher education. Undoubtedly, 
parents will be very interested to know what proportion of students is going on to 
university. More importantly, compared with other performance markers – such as 
total GCSE point scores – the measure is much more difficult to ‘game’. Publishing 
such data will also likely increase the emphasis in schools on university bound 
students. Such effects raise the question, however, as to what schools will be able to do 
to get their poorer students into higher education. Encouraging them to apply and 
helping them with the application process are two possibilities, as is providing better 
information and guidance. The last of these suggestions is one the government has 
also recognized: schools will have a legal duty to provide independent careers advice 
to students in years 9 to 11. The government has also proposed policies to improve 
the quality of the advice given and to up the number of skill career advisors. All 
this is to be welcomed, but the resources available within schools to provide advice 
and guidance are very limited and are likely to be scarcer going forward as limited 
budgets bite. Perhaps more importantly, all schools – and not just academies – need 
to have sufficient flexibility to find adequate space in the timetable to cover such 
issues thoroughly. Advice is also crucial for students not bound towards university and 
we need to ensure that support for them is not squeezed out.
The White Paper is not silent on the role of higher education institutions 
– indeed the biggest proposed change will enable universities to use contextual 
data when making decisions about student admissions. In other words, universities 
now have political insurance to use specific and transparent criteria to take social 
background into account when making offers to students. The move is likely to make 
a difference at the margin, providing universities with more flexibility in admitting 
students who are somewhat less well-qualified on paper but whose grades represent 
a greater level of achievement once their socio-economic background is taken into 
account. How this operates in practice, the extent to which parents will see it as 
fair, and, most crucially of all, how universities validate information provided by 
students about their socio-economic background remain important and unanswered 
questions.
The White Paper also ups the ante on access agreements, stating that greater 
priority and greater investment needs to be given by universities to widening 
participation issues. A strengthened and larger Office for Fair Access (OFFA) is likely 
to put still more pressure on universities to make real and measurable progress on 
widening participation in order to improve social mobility. What is less clear is how 
OFFA will judge universities’ widening participation efforts and what will constitute 
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success. The research evidence described above suggests that universities should be 
working with disadvantaged school children well before they make their GCSE and 
A-level choices, and that clearly the pay-off to that kind of outreach will be both a 
long time coming and might also result in students attending institutions different 
to the one doing the outreach. While such activity might be valuable, it is difficult 
to know how it would satisfy OFFA’s need to measure success. There is a clear 
danger that universities will focus less on such long-term outreach work and more 
on getting students to apply to their particular institutions. The net result might 
increase competition between universities in their efforts to attract those poorer 
students who are university bound, but it will not necessarily increase the overall 
number of disadvantaged students applying to university. It is important that OFFA 
strikes a balance between recognizing the value of general outreach activity whilst 
ensuring that universities make measurable improvements in the proportion of 
poorer students who enrol. Trying to measure the former’s effectiveness is another 
pressing issue for the sector as a whole.
The National Scholarship Programme (NSP) is obviously the White Paper’s 
major initiative, requiring, as it does, all institutions charging fees over £6,000 to offer 
scholarships to undergraduate students. However, here the government has granted 
universities autonomy to decide how they operate the programme – a move that has a 
major drawback: students cannot possibly understand the daunting array of university 
schemes currently on offer. Furthermore, in many institutions the amount a student 
will receive depends on numerous personal characteristics and is conditional on the 
number of other poorer students who apply. Students are often only told how much 
support they will receive very late on in the day. If they cannot be clear about the 
figure before they make their application, it is unlikely to have a major influence on 
their decision. Moreover, if a student does make a decision about their degree choice 
on the basis of the scholarship, it is unlikely to be in their long-term interests since the 
benefits of a degree are likely to be greater than the amounts the scholarship scheme 
makes available. Decisions about degree subject or institution in response to small 
differences in financial support are therefore unlikely to be beneficial. In summary, 
the benefits of a national scheme that varies by student characteristics rather than 
by institution – and that is well publicized and transparent – would be substantial 
and the weaknesses of the NSP have been recognized. In addition, incentivizing 
universities to use their resources to undertake outreach work and other activities 
that have been shown to make a difference (e.g. summer schools) is likely to be more 
effective at widening participation (Chowdry et al., 2012).
Finally, one set of students receives welcome attention in the White Paper. 
Part-time students will now have access to loans to cover their tuition fees, a step 
in the right direction and important for social mobility since many from more 
disadvantaged backgrounds often enter higher education as mature part timers. 
Issues facing part-time students are discussed in more detail by Claire Callender in 
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chapter 8. Unfortunately, the White Paper is not forthcoming on how we can tackle 
another pressing issue: access to postgraduate study, as discussed by Whitty and Mullan 
in chapter 10. Whilst most policy attention has focused on ensuring that poorer 
students have access to university at undergraduate level, higher level occupations 
increasingly require applicants to possess postgraduate qualifications, which do not 
enable deferred payment and whose fees are high. Thus to make improvements in 
social mobility, access to postgraduate study also needs to be needs blind and at the 
moment it is far from that. 
Conclusions
In this chapter I have affirmed and confirmed the importance of widening 
participation for improving levels of social mobility: access to higher education is 
certainly a major route by which poorer students can achieve labour market success. 
Thus far, however, progress in narrowing the socio-economic gap in access to higher 
education has been slow.
Widening participation in higher education therefore needs to be a long-term 
project. I have made the case that the causes underlying the socio-economic gap in 
higher education participation are largely rooted in lower levels of prior achievement 
amongst students from poorer backgrounds. A continued policy effort needs to be 
directed at improving the school achievement of our society’s disadvantaged children 
– something that has indeed been recognized in the White Paper. In this context, 
the impact of the 2012 financial reforms on widening participation is unlikely to 
be substantial for two reasons. Firstly, poorer students have been protected from 
some of the reforms, not least by the continued access to means-tested support whilst 
studying for a degree. Secondly, the reason why poorer students are less likely to go to 
university is not so much because they are put off by tuition fees, but rather because 
they failed to reach the level of achievement necessary to go to university.
That said, we must be clear on one point. Even amongst students who achieve 
similar results at A-level there remains a modest socio-economic gap in who is more 
likely to go to university. Students with the necessary level of prior achievement but 
who are from poorer backgrounds are more likely to pursue non-degree options than 
similarly qualified students from higher income backgrounds (Sutton Trust, 2004). 
While tuition fees have not been solely responsible – the gap has persisted since 
the pre-fee era – it still requires policy action nonetheless. We need to encourage 
universities to do outreach work that connects with this group of students and find 
ways of getting them to apply to university (Tough et al., 2008). I have argued, along 
with others, that the National Scholarship Programme is not necessarily the right 
way to achieve this. There is a huge amount of work to be done to reassure poorer 
students that tuition fees are not a barrier to them participating in university and that 
they will receive support whilst studying. As evidence of a continuing information 
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deficit – not helped by the dismantling of the advice and guidance service in schools 
– many are not aware of this.
Notes
1 Whilst a very small (0.1 per cent) decline in undergraduate student numbers was reported 
by the Higher Education Statistics Agency for 2010/11, this did not translate into a decline 
in the official initial higher education participation rate as calculated by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. See UCAS (2012).
2 UCAS analysis (July, 2012: Figure 18) How Have Applications for Full-time Undergraduate Higher 
Education in the UK Changed in 2012?
3 http://www.ucas.com/documents/End_of_Cycle_Report_12_12_2012.pdf 
4 AimHigher was a UK government programme introduced in 2004 to improve the chances 
of poorer children enrolling in university. It was recently abolished and is discussed in more 
detail later in the chapter.
5 www.ucas.com/documents/End_of_Cycle_Report_12_12_2012.pdf 
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According to many observers, one of the most positive elements of the 2011 White 
Paper Students at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011) is the enhanced support for part-
time undergraduate students, with the introduction – for the first time – of loans 
for their tuition fees. The government, too, proudly points to this achievement, 
declaring in the White Paper that this change ‘remedies a longstanding injustice 
in support for adult learners’ (BIS, 2011: 61). This chapter provides a critique of 
the reforms of part-time student finances, and of the White Paper more generally. 
It argues that the new loans are more likely to re-enforce or perpetuate existing 
injustices rather than eradicate them. The loans’ very restrictive eligibility criteria 
mean that the majority of part-time undergraduates do not qualify for them, and yet 
are faced with far higher tuition fees which they have to pay upfront, and out of their 
own pocket. These policies are designed for the ‘typical student and graduate’: a 
young school leaver who studies full-time and who, on graduation, enters the labour 
market for the first time. Such students are the focus of the White Paper, and the 
higher education sector’s and media attention. The policies fail to acknowledge the 
distinctive characteristics of the part-time student population and consequently most 
miss out on the loans, while others shun them. This is depressing demand for, and 
the supply of part-time study, contrary to the government’s intentions. 
The chapter, therefore, focuses on the ‘forgotten’ third of all English 
undergraduate students who study part time. Arguably, part-time study is central 
to lifelong learning and national skills policies, promoted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012) and others (CBI, 2013) 
to transform lives, drive economies by providing high-level skills, and thus enhancing 
a country’s competitiveness and economic strength. Part-time provision is significant 
for the higher education policy too. It can contribute to a more flexible, diverse 
higher education sector (Santiago et al., 2008) and help broaden higher education 
access and social mobility, enhancing social justice (Eurydice, 2011). Older part-time 
students are also an alternative source of recruits in the face of the demographic 
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downturn of traditional university-age students. Indeed, recent research confirms the 
considerable value of investing in part-time study and its private and public benefits 
(Callender and Wilkinson, 2012; 2013). 
In this chapter I explore part-time undergraduate financial support in England, 
highlighting some of the funding challenges. By way of context, I start by defining 
what is meant by part-time study, and examine trends in part-time enrolments. I then 
outline the key socio-economic characteristics of part-time undergraduates and how 
they differ from their full-time peers. The regional distribution of part-time provision 
is also charted as this is likely to affect prospective students’ access to higher education. 
Next, I explore the financial support available to part-time undergraduates before and 
after the 2012/13 reforms, and the limitations of the systems introduced. I question 
whether the student loans introduced for part-time students in 2012/13, designed 
specifically for full-time young students, are an inappropriate student support tool 
for part-timers given their ‘atypical’ characteristics. 
Defining part-time undergraduate higher education study 
In England, there is no clear definition of part-time study or students. The most 
common definition, employed in research and in the statistical analysis below, is the 
one used by the Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA), the official agency 
for the collection, analysis and dissemination of quantitative information about UK 
higher education. This definition of part-time undergraduate students is negative – it 
is those who do not fit the definition of full-time students. 
Full-time includes students recorded as studying full time, normally 
required to attend an institution for periods amounting to at least 24 
weeks within the year of study, plus those enrolled on a sandwich course 
(thick or thin), irrespective of whether or not they are in attendance at 
the institution or engaged in industrial training, and those on a study-
related year out of their institution. During that time students are normally 
expected to undertake periods of study, tuition, or work experience which 
amount to an average of at least 21 hours per week for a minimum of 24 
weeks study/placement.
Part-time includes students recorded as studying part time, or studying full-
time on courses lasting less than 24 weeks, on block release, or studying 
during the evenings only 
(HESA, n.d.).
This definition characterizes part-time study by attendance whereby all distance 
learning students, irrespective of their hours of study, are defined as part-time 
students, and by the length and intensity of study. 
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A review of UK research on part-time undergraduate students (Callender and 
Feldman, 2009) also identified an important conceptual and practical difficulty in 
this research. The research neglected the diversity of part-time students, who were, 
as a result, frequently subsumed under other headings. For instance, ‘part-time’ was 
often added to descriptions of students as diverse as, non-traditional, working-class, 
mature, or having low entry qualifications. Consequently, part-time students were 
classed as just another disadvantaged student group, and ‘part time’ ceased to be a 
mode of study, but a student attribute. Even where part-time students were included 
among these groups, the specific barriers they might face and their different needs 
were often neither specified nor explored. 
Trends in part-time enrolments
Demand for part-time undergraduate study in the UK is far more volatile than 
demand for full-time study, with some years (until 2012/13) recording a fall in 
numbers in contrast to the steady rise amongst those studying full time. Overall, part-
time UK student enrolments increased by around 13 per cent between 2000/01 and 
2009/10 – a much slower rate than the 24 per cent recorded for full-time students. 
However, this expansion was driven exclusively by the Open University (OU), which 
dominates the part-time sector. Excluding the OU, over the same period part-time 
student numbers fell by just over 1 per cent while the OU’s undergraduate numbers 
increased by 54 per cent. Furthermore, at an institutional level, enrolments also 
fluctuated. Between 2000/01 and 2009/10, half of all higher education institutions 
in England increased their part-time undergraduate numbers – in some cases more 
than doubling their provision. The other half saw their part-time provision decrease 
(Pollard et al., 2012). 
The socio-economic characteristics of UK part- and full-time 
undergraduates 
The first defining characteristics of UK part-time undergraduates are that they are 
older and more likely to be female than their full-time peers (Table 8.1). In 2009/10, 
80 per cent of part-time undergraduates were aged 25 and over compared with 14 
per cent of full-timers, while 63 per cent were female compared with 56 per cent 
of full-timers. They were slightly less likely to come from an ethnic minority group 
(18 per cent compared with 22 per cent) (Pollard et al., 2012). Survey data confirm 
that around two-thirds have family responsibilities and two in five have children 
(Callender et al., 2010a) whereas the vast majority of full-time students are single (85 
per cent) and childless (92 per cent) (Johnson et al., 2009). 
Part- and full-time students also have different educational backgrounds 
(Table 8.1). Part-timers are more likely than full-timers both to have had some prior 
experience of higher education and to enter their part-time course with higher entry 
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qualifications, or to have low levels of prior educational attainment and to start their 
part-time course with lower qualifications or none at all. Such polarization of the 
part-time undergraduate population helps to distinguish between those with existing 
higher education qualifications who are mostly re-skilling, and those with low-level 
qualifications who are up-skilling, for whom part-time study offers a second chance 
at learning. In 2009/10, 54 per cent of part-time undergraduates started their studies 
with a bachelor’s degree or higher, 37 per cent with A-levels or equivalent, and 8 
per cent with other or no formal qualifications. The comparable figures for full-
time students were 10 per cent, 85 per cent, and 5 per cent respectively (Pollard et 
al., 2012). 
Another distinguishing characteristic of part-time students, compared with 
their full-time peers, is where and what they study. The OU, which exclusively 
provides distance learning courses, is the main UK part-time provider, absorbing over 
a third (36 per cent) of all part-time undergraduates. Birkbeck College, University 
of London, is the only research-intensive university with nearly a 100 per cent part-
time provision, and around 2 per cent of all part-time undergraduates study there. 
Outside of these two universities, part-time students are concentrated in less research-
intensive higher education institutions and colleges, and are less likely than full-time 
students to attend the most prestigious research-intensive Russell Group universities 
(8 per cent compared with 22 per cent). 





Under 25 years 20 86






Not White 18 22
Highest qualification on entry
Postgraduate & PGCE 8 0.5
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First degree, other graduate, HE credits, 
other HE & professional 46 9
GCE A Level 37 85
Other and no formal qualifications 8 5
Qualification aim
Bachelor’s degree 37 90
Sub-degree and other HE qualifications 63 10
All 100 100
Source: HESA student records 2009/10. In Pollard et al. (2012)
Associated with this concentration, in 2009/10 only 37 per cent of part-timers aimed 
for a bachelor’s degree, with most (63 per cent) studying for other sub-degree 
undergraduate qualifications including professional qualifications, higher education 
certificates, and institutional undergraduate credits. By contrast, 90 per cent of full-
time students studied for a bachelor’s degree (Table 8.1). Part-time undergraduates 
also are more concentrated than full-time students in vocational subjects such as 
those allied to medicine, business and administrative studies, and education.
The final distinct characteristic of part-time undergraduates is that they 
combine paid work with their part-time studies. Around 81 per cent of part-time 
students are employed, mostly in full-time, public-sector jobs, while around half of 
full-timers also work at some point in the academic year (Johnson et al., 2009). In 
most cases, both the nature and level of the work undertaken is very different, as 
is the role it plays in their identity. Part-time students tend to have full-time jobs in 
higher level occupations; they fit their studies around their jobs, and see themselves 
as workers who study (Callender and Wilkinson, 2012). In contrast, full-time students 
work part-time in lower level occupations (mostly retail and catering) that they fit 
around their studies, and see themselves as students who happen to work. In 2010/11, 
the median earnings of part-time students with full-time jobs of £25,000 were in line 
with the national average (Callender and Wilkinson, 2012), while in 2007/08 the 
median part-time earnings of full-time undergraduates amounted to £380 (Johnson 
et al., 2009).
Part-time undergraduate students, therefore, are a heterogeneous group. 
There is no ‘typical’ part-time student. Many, but not all, are at a disadvantage 
compared with their full-time peers. Some have low-level entry qualifications, come 
from low-income backgrounds, are concentrated in less prestigious universities and 
in sub-degree programs, and have to work full-time and/or care for their families 
while studying. Given part-time students’ work and family pressures and the need 
to juggle their studies around such commitments, perhaps unsurprisingly, they also 
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have higher non-completion rates than their full-time colleagues. In 2008/09, a third 
of part-time bachelor degree students dropped out after two years of study compared 
with 12 per cent of similar full-time students aged 30 and over after one year of 
study (HESA, n.d.). However, some of these students may have ‘stopped out’ rather 
than ‘dropped out’, and may eventually return to study. Even so, 56 per cent of first 
degree part-time students commencing programs at higher education institutions 
(other than the OU) had not completed that program within seven academic years 
(HEFCE, 2009). 
The geographical spread of undergraduate part-time provision
As discussed, most part-time students fit their studies around their work and domestic 
commitments. They are less mobile then their full-time peers and usually live at 
home while studying, and so opt for local higher education providers that are easy 
and convenient to reach. Indeed, around three-quarters of part-time undergraduates 
travel an hour or less to their place of study from their home or work (Callender 
et al., 2006). Ultimately this limits their choices of where to study. Consequently, the 
geographical spread of part-time provision is vital in determining prospective part-
timers’ access to higher education, and their higher education choices.
Part-time provision, as mentioned, is dominated by the OU and all their students 
are recorded as studying at Milton Keynes in the South East. Excluding OU students, 
the regions with the largest proportions of non-OU part-time undergraduates are 
London (16 per cent), the North West (12 per cent), and the West Midlands (11 per 
cent). Those with the smallest are Northern Ireland (2 per cent), the East Midlands 
(5 per cent) and the South West (6 per cent). This pattern generally mirrors that of 
full-time students but when compared with full-time students, part-timers are over-
represented in the North East, and under-represented in the East Midlands (Pollard 
et al., 2012).
These data, while interesting, tell us nothing about whether the supply of 
part-time provision meets the potential demand while the regions are too large to 
judge whether part-time courses are available within prospective students’ reasonable 
travelling distance. In a recent study (Callender et al., 2010b), we used data on the 
proportion of people in the working population who lack qualifications at least 
to NVQ4 level as a proxy for demand for part-time study, along with smaller ‘city 
regions’. By combining Labour Force Survey data with HESA data, we estimated 
– at city-region level – the ratio of part-time higher education student numbers in 
universities per 1,000 working-age persons without a NVQ Level 4 or equivalent.. 
Our exploratory study shows large disparities in part-time provision. For 
example, in some city-regions, such as Preston, Cambridge, Coventry, Brighton/
Hove, and Plymouth, the ratio of part-time university-based undergraduates to 
persons without NVQ4 qualifications is two to four times the national average. At the 
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other extreme some city-regions such as Peterborough and Ipswich have no part-time 
university-based undergraduate courses at all. Thus opportunities to study part time 
are very unequally distributed across the UK. However, there is no obvious overlap 
between employment rates and the distribution of part-time higher education 
provision and correlation analysis confirms that the two variables are not significantly 
related at city-region level (Callender et al., 2010b).
Tuition fees and financial support for part-time undergraduate 
students prior to the 2012/13 reforms of higher education 
finances1
Student funding and financial support policies reflect the ideological, economic, and 
social functions of higher education and are shaped by a society’s prevailing history, 
culture, ideology, or politics. This helps explain the enormous variation in policies 
globally regarding part-time study and students (Eurydice, 2011). At one extreme 
are countries where the legal status of a part-time higher education student does not 
exist, nor does any financial support. At the other extreme are countries like Australia 
which are ‘mode of study blind’ – there is no distinction in tuition fee and student 
aid policies between those studying part time and those studying full time. Between 
these extremes is a raft of other policy approaches. England had two separate systems 
of financial support, one for part-time students and another for full-time students, 
although developments in full-time provision influenced policies targeted at part-
time students. The two systems were separate but unequal.
Prior to 1997 and the Dearing Report, part-time students did not qualify for any 
government-funded financial support. It was assumed that because part-time students 
are older and in paid employment, they did not need government financial help with 
fees or the costs of study, or that their employers would pay for their studies. Despite 
a variety of reforms since Dearing (Callender, 2011), these strongly held beliefs still 
inform financial support policies for part-time students today. 
For historical reasons, part-time tuition fees were unregulated and providers 
were able to charge whatever fees they liked, unlike those for full-time courses. 
When full-time undergraduate fees were increased to £3,000 a year in 2006, some 
universities set their part-time fees at a pro rata rate of full time fees, some did not 
raise their fees, while others set them in line with the maximum level of public fee 
support available for low-income part-time students (discussed below) (Brown and 
Ramsden, 2009). 
In part, these fee variations reflect the nature of the part-time undergraduate 
market, which is much more segmented than the full-time undergraduate market. As 
noted, the part-time student population is heterogeneous, while students’ extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivations for studying and their study outcomes are also mixed 
(Feinstein et al., 2007; Swain and Hammond, 2011; Callender and Wilkinson, 2012; 
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2013). In addition, their qualification aims and programmes of study are more varied 
and they are concentrated in vocational courses but also take non-vocational courses. 
No national data are systematically collected on part-time tuition fees, unlike 
data on full-time fees since 2006. Part-time study lay outside the remit of the Office for 
Fair Access, set up by the 2004 Higher Education Act to safeguard access following the 
introduction of higher tuition fees in 2006. HEFCE data from 2007/08 suggests that 
the average undergraduate part-time equivalent fee was £1,805, significantly less than 
the undergraduate full-time fee of £3,070 (BIS, 2010b), while survey data suggest that 
in 2009/10 tuition fees averaged around £1,4672 (Callender and Wilkinson, 2012). 
Since 2004/05, the government has provided part-time undergraduates with 
two means-tested grants: a grant for tuition fees of between £820 and £1,230 (in 
2011/12) with the amount varying depending on a student’s intensity of study3; and 
a course grant to meet the costs of books, travel and other course expenditure of up 
to £265 (in 2011/12). Eligibility for these two grants was restricted to a narrow and 
arbitrary definition of part-time student and part-time study. The grants were limited 
first to students who did not already hold a bachelor’s degree, secondly, to students 
studying 50 per cent or more of a full-time course, and finally, to students with very 
low household incomes (lower income thresholds compared with full-time students’ 
means-tested grants). 
Consequently, part-timers’ access to financial support was not driven by 
financial need, but was determined initially by a student’s existing qualifications and 
how many hours they studied. The rationale for excluding students already with a 
bachelor’s degree was supposedly on the grounds of equity, but was also a device 
to leverage the greater involvement of employers in funding higher education. 
However, there was no obvious reason for the cut-off of 50 per cent of a full-time 
course. As the profile of part-time students discussed above highlights, together these 
eligibility criteria automatically disqualified the majority of part-timers from receiving 
government-funded support. Moreover, the amount of tuition fee and course grants 
received by part-time undergraduates was inadequate as they did not cover students’ 
costs in full (Callender et al., 2010a). 
In 2009/10, 57,000 students received a fee grant of an average value of around 
£700 a year, while 59,000 benefited from a course grant worth an average of £260 
a year (BIS, 2010b). Consequently, only a minority (15 per cent) of all part-time 
undergraduates and those studying for a bachelor’s degree (35 per cent) received any 
government-funded financial assistance (BIS, 2010a). The majority paid their tuition 
fees upfront. For these students, higher education was not free at the point of access 
and they, rather than the state, were expected to meet their costs. Cost sharing was 
limited, the financial burden rested primarily on the shoulders of individual students.
By comparison, full-time students’ financial support was, and continues to 
be, far more comprehensive and generous. First, all first-time full-time students, 
irrespective of their family’s household income, are eligible for government-
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subsidized, income-contingent student loans to cover all their tuition fees. They repay 
these loans on graduation, so that no full-time student is required to pay tuition fees 
upfront. Second, all students qualify for government-subsidized, income-contingent 
maintenance loans to cover some of their living costs. Third, low-income students also 
receive means-tested, government-funded maintenance grants towards their living 
costs. Finally, some students, especially low-income students, can get institutional 
grants or bursaries. Full-time students continue to receive all these forms of financial 
support, even after the introduction of the 2012/13 student finance reforms.
The case for reform of financial support for part-time 
undergraduate students
To summarize, the main drawbacks with government funding support for part-
time undergraduates in England until the 2012/13 reforms were as follows. First, 
the system clearly favoured full-time higher education at the expense of part-time 
higher education, and younger school leavers at the expense of mature students. In 
effect, the government guaranteed and underwrote the tuition fees of all full-time 
students via student loans but provided no such guarantees for all part-time students, 
not even among those receiving tuition fee grants since the grants did not always 
cover all of their fees. From a higher education institution’s perspective, student 
loans for full-time students meant all full-time students were creditors and were a 
guaranteed income stream. Part-time students, by contrast, were potential debtors 
and an unpredictable income stream. Such an unequal playing field was considered 
inequitable by many. 
Second, part-time financial support (or lack of it) was based on two flawed 
assumptions: that employers pay for their employees’ higher education, and that 
those who are employed can afford higher education and meet their costs through 
their earnings. Survey data refute both assumptions. Surveys over time consistently 
show that only around a third of part-time undergraduates receive financial help from 
their employer with their tuition fees (Woodley, 2004; Callender et al., 2006; Johnson 
et al., 2009; Callender et al., 2010a). Our most recent survey of nearly 4,000 part-time 
undergraduates shows how, understandably, employers are cautious and selective in 
whom they sponsor. They favour the most advantaged employees to the detriment 
of those most in need – those from low-income households with poorly paid, part-
time jobs and low levels of educational attainment. Our multivariate analysis revealed 
that the part-time students most likely to benefit from financial help with their 
tuition fees, once a range of characteristics were controlled for, were white, full-time 
workers from the wealthiest households who already held a bachelor’s degree and 
were taking a vocational qualification (Callender et al., 2010a). Consequently, the 
most disadvantaged groups missed out. Moreover, employer support is an unreliable 
source of financial aid, especially in a recession, as education and training budgets are 
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cut (Mason and Bishop, 2010), particularly in the public sector where most part-time 
students work. In addition, evidence suggests that liquidity constraints inhibit the 
participation of potential part-time students from low-income households who are 
unable to receive employer support, leading to unmet demand (Pollard et al., 2008).
Third, most part-time students do not receive financial support and have to pay 
their own tuition fees upfront because of the restrictive eligibility criteria. For those 
who do receive government support, the level of help is inadequate. As research on 
full-time students, in the UK and elsewhere, demonstrates, university tuition fees may 
have a negative impact on participation, and fee increases tend to cause a decline in 
participation, particularly among students from lower socio-economic backgrounds, 
unless accompanied by equivalent increases in student support (London Economics, 
2010; Long, 2008). For instance, Dearden et al’s (2010) results imply that a £1,000 
increase in fees results in a 4.4 ppt decrease in university participation, while a £1,000 
increase in loans results in a 3.2 ppt increase in participation, and a £1,000 increase 
in grants results in a 2.1 ppt increase in participation. However, their results indicate 
‘that a £1000 increase in loans or grants is not sufficient to counteract the impact of 
a £1000 increase in fees’ (Dearden et al., 2010: 24).
They conclude:
These results are highly relevant for policy makers, who ought to be aware 
of the negative impact of upfront fees – i.e. those not covered by a fee loan – 
and the positive impact of aid on participation. Maintenance grants can 
potentially be used to offset the negative influence of fee increases, given 
their opposing influences on participation. Policy makers should also be 
aware of particularly vulnerable groups when setting levels of fees and 
grants, and may need to target specific groups with more generous aid to 
counteract any increases in tuition fees. 
(Dearden et al., 2010: 31; my italics)
The relevance of these findings for part-time students is unclear, however. Dearden 
et al.’s, (2010) research – like the vast majority of other research, both in England and 
elsewhere, that models the impact of tuition fees and financial support on higher 
education participation – is based on the university participation decisions of 18-year-
olds and the financial assistance available to full-time students. This begs the question 
of the extent to which, first, the costs of part-time higher education are a barrier to 
participation, and second, the relative effectiveness of different types of financial aid 
in promoting part-time higher education study.
The 2012/13 reforms 
Elsewhere in this volume the context and contents of Lord Browne’s review of higher 
education – Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance – and 
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the Coalition Government’s subsequent 2011 White Paper Higher Education: Students 
at the Heart of the System (BIS, 2011) are discussed at length (see chapters 1, 2 and 3) 
and will not be repeated here.
The Coalition Government’s reforms of undergraduate funding, outlined in 
the 2011 White Paper (BIS, 2011) and introduced in 2012/13, aim to make higher 
education financially sustainable, to improve the student experience, and increase 
social mobility. The economic context within which these reforms occurred – the 
global recession and unprecedented cuts in public expenditure – are paramount 
in understanding them. The reforms seek to reduce both undergraduate student 
support costs and higher education public expenditure, in line with the Coalition’s 
broader strategy to cut the fiscal deficit and stimulate economic growth. The 
Coalition’s ideologically driven vision is of a higher education sector defined by the 
market which they believe delivers high-quality services efficiently, equitably, and is 
responsive to consumer choice (BIS, 2011). For choice and competition to operate 
effectively, money must follow users’ choice, there must be a variety of types of 
provision, with new providers entering the market and failing ones exiting, and users 
must be properly informed. 
This political and ideological environment is not exceptional. As Johnstone 
and Marcucci in their global review of funding remind us, tuition fees are the ‘political 
and ideological flashpoint for debates over the need for, and the propriety of, cost-
sharing in all its forms’ (2010: 102). They continue, ‘tuition fees are almost everywhere 
contested’ (p. 123), reflecting the cultural and historical acceptability of tuition fees 
as well as the prevailing political ideologies. Johnstone and Marcucci insist that ‘cost-
sharing for almost all countries is not only an imperative for the financial health of 
their colleges and universities, but it can also bring about enhanced efficiency, equity 
and responsiveness’ (2010: 282). 
Discussion in the White Paper focuses nearly exclusively on full-time students. 
However, it announced that ‘We are committed to ensuring that higher education in 
England is affordable for students too … And one of the biggest changes we are making 
is that many part-time and distance-learning students will also be able to access loans 
to cover the full tuition costs for the first time’(BIS, 2011: 16) [emphasis added].
The one paragraph in the White Paper devoted exclusively to part-time 
students reads: 
For the first time, students starting part-time undergraduate courses in 
2012/13, many of whom are from non-traditional backgrounds, will be 
entitled to an up-front loan to meet their tuition costs so long as they are 
studying at an intensity of at least 25 per cent, in each academic year, of 
a full-time course. This is a major step in terms of opening up access to higher 
education, and remedies a long-standing injustice in support for adult 
learners. Up to around 175,000 part-time students will benefit. Under the 
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new system, distance learning students studying full-time will also benefit 
from a loan to cover their tuition costs. 
(BIS, 2011: 61, my italics)4
The rationale for this change is discussed in Lord Browne’s 2010 report, Independent 
Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance (IRHEFSF, 2010). One of the 
principles informing the Browne Report was:
Part-time students should be treated the same as full-time students for 
the costs of learning. The current system requires part-time students to 
pay upfront. This puts people off from studying part-time and it stops 
innovation in courses that combine work and study. In our proposal the 
upfront costs for part-time students will be eliminated, so that a wider range of people 
can access higher education in a way that is convenient for them.
(IRHEFSF, 2010: 5, my italics)
Browne also observed:
The lack of support for part-time study makes it much more difficult for this 
country to catch up with other countries on the skill levels of the existing 
workforce. Individuals who are already in work and do not have a higher 
education qualification are usually unlikely to give up their jobs and enter 
full-time study. Part-time study may be a realistic option for them, but access 
to part-time study is hampered by the lack of Government support. The potential 
exists to combine the experience of individuals already in work with the 
skills that higher education can provide; but it is not being exploited. 
(IRHEFSF, 2010: 22–3, my italics)
This policy change has to be located alongside the other finance reforms introduced 
in 2012/13; specifically, the withdrawal of universities’ teaching grants for most 
undergraduate courses and its replacement with higher tuition fees; and the raising 
of the government-set cap on full-time undergraduate tuition fees from £3,290 to 
£9,000 a year including, for the first time, a cap of £6,7505 on part-time tuition fees. 
This maximum part-time fee is independent of intensity of study, so in theory a 
university could charge this for a course which amounts to only 25 per cent of a full-
time course. All full-time students as before, and now some part-time students for 
the first time, can repay their tuition fees through government-subsidized income-
contingent loans. 
Consequently, there is no, or limited, taxpayer support for part-time 
undergraduate teaching; these costs are met by students paying higher fees. 
Government support for some part-time undergraduates, therefore, has shifted from 
teaching grants to student loans – from a block grant to private contributions from 
individual students – informed by the idea of cost sharing. Ultimately, these changes 
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valorize the private benefits of higher education at the expense of the public benefits, 
and in not questioning the private subsidy of public benefits, they position higher 
education as a private investment rather than as a public good (Reay, 2012).
To reduce the government’s costs of extending loan provision, the interest rate 
on loans was increased so that both student loan repayments and the interest charged 
on them vary according to a graduate’s earnings. Both graduates from part- and full-
time study do not repay their loans until they are earning £21,0006 a year (up from 
£15,000 for full-time students), while the interest on their loan is limited to the rate 
of inflation. Graduates earning between £21,000 and £41,000 per annum are charged 
interest on a sliding scale up to a maximum of inflation plus three percent when 
earnings exceed £41,000 per year. Both graduates from part- and full-time study will 
pay 9 per cent of their income until they have repaid all their loans, with outstanding 
debt written off after 30 years (up from 25 years for full-time students). 
A key difference in the treatment of part- and full-time students is when loan 
repayments commence. Part-time students are liable for repayments four years after 
their course begins, or in the April after their course ends, if their courses last for less 
time. Students on courses lasting more than four years, namely most bachelor degree 
programmes, therefore start repaying their loans while still studying and before 
graduating. This brings into question whether higher education is really free at the 
point of access for most part-time bachelor degree students. In contrast, graduates 
from full-time bachelor degrees start repaying their loans in the April after they 
graduate, irrespective of the duration of their course.
The overall structure of student financial assistance for full-time students 
remains unchanged by these reforms; although some of the terms and conditions 
attached to them have altered. In contrast, tuition fee grants and course grants for 
part-time students have been abolished, so that in future new part-time students, even 
the poorest, will receive no financial help with other study costs. And it is still presumed 
they do not need help with their living costs, even when not in paid employment, as 
these are paid through the social security system. Such benefits are worth less than 
maintenance loans and grants afforded to low-income full-time students, however.
Assessing the 2012/13 reforms 
Loan eligibility, like part-time student grants before them, is restricted. Only part-
time students who do not already hold an equivalent level or higher qualification 
qualify for the new loans. Again, those who already have had one bite of the higher 
education cherry are barred from receiving financial aid for a second. This criterion 
excludes about 54 per cent of all part-time undergraduate students. In addition, 
entitlement is limited by students’ intensity of study – only those studying more 
than 25 per cent of a full-time course can access the new student loans eliminating a 
further 15 per cent of students from qualifying (Pollard et al., 2012). Consequently, as 
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before, access to financial support is not driven by financial need, but is determined 
initially by a student’s existing qualifications and how many hours they study.
According to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, twice as 
many part-time students could benefit from tuition fee loans compared with those 
receiving fee and course grants. Government calculations suggest 30 per cent of all 
part-time undergraduates will be entitled to student loans in 2012/13, and around 67 
percent of those will be aiming for a bachelor’s degree (BIS, 2010a). Other estimates 
are not as optimistic. While a similar proportion (32 percent) of all UK domicile part-
time students studying at English higher education institutions will be eligible, only 
45 per cent of those taking a bachelor’s degree and 23 per cent of those taking other 
part-time undergraduate qualifications will qualify (Pollard et al., 2012). Whichever 
estimate proves correct, the majority of part-time students cannot access the new 
loans and their upfront costs are not eliminated, as Browne suggests.
A central objective of these loans, reflecting Ziderman’s classification (2013), 
is cost-sharing. The replacement of fee and course grants with loans both reduces 
public expenditure and shifts the costs of higher education away from government 
and taxpayers so that more of these costs are borne by students. The loans also 
facilitate the raising of part-time tuition fees, while their income-contingent nature 
makes fee increases more politically and socially acceptable. The disincentive effects 
of upfront tuition fee increases, raised by the Browne Report, are offset by the loans.
Moreover, in line with market principles, and the Coalition’s desire to create a 
quasi-higher education market, the bulk of universities’ money will follow students’ 
choices, while student loans – which are like an educational voucher that students 
redeem at the institution of choice – will encourage both consumer choice and 
provider competition. Theoretically, consumer demand will determine what courses 
higher education institutions offer, while higher education institutions will compete 
on price. 
The new system of financial support for part-time students replicates and 
exacerbates the previous system’s limitations, except now more students will 
qualify for government help. It continues to favour full-time higher education and 
school leavers at the expense of older, part-time students. All full-time tuition fees 
are underwritten by student loans but the same cannot be said for all of part-time 
students. Higher education institutions will continue to recruit full-time students 
where there is an excess demand for such places, rather than fill their places with 
’riskier’ part-time students. And the abolition of HEFCE’s part-time premium, which 
sought to compensate institutions for the additional costs associated with part-time 
provision could make part-time courses even less appealing, unless institutions can 
charge higher pro-rata tuition fees. 
It is still assumed that employers will pay tuition fees for their employees, 
especially those ineligible for loans. It is impossible, however, to gauge how the 
availability of loans might affect employers’ willingness to sponsor those employees 
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who are entitled to loans, or the level of deadweight. Similarly, it is presumed that 
part-time students do not need any help with their study or maintenance costs, apart 
from tuition fees. As the government has argued, ‘part-time students are also most 
likely to be in employment, so there is the assumption that income derived from 
this should cover their maintenance costs’ (BIS, 2010b: 21). In their response to the 
consultation on the White Paper, they claim:
We understand the desire to make maintenance support available to 
part-time students, but government must also consider what is affordable 
within current spending limits. Students on part-time courses are able to 
combine study and work, and access other government benefits, which is 
generally not true for full-time students. This is why we are maintaining 
our decision not to extend maintenance support to part-time students. 
Our judgement is that access to loans for tuition costs represents a more 
significant benefit for these students.
(BIS, 2012: 8)
Budgetary constraints were also the reason given for denying loan access to those 
students who already hold an equivalent level or higher qualification. ‘…it remains 
our policy to focus support on those entering higher education for the first time 
and to provide no further support to students once they have achieved an honours 
degree’ (BIS, 2012: 8). This policy is likely to thwart those wishing to re-skill without 
employer support.
Part-time tuition fees in 2012/13
Predictably, undergraduate part-time tuition fees have risen as a result of the reforms. 
Despite part-time study now falling within its remit, the Office of Fair Access (OFFA) 
have yet to publish any detailed national data on part-time fees as it has done for full-
time courses. However, OFFA estimates7 that under the new system higher education 
institutions’ fee income above the basic part-time fee8 will amount to £31.2 million 
in 2013/14, and rise to £46.7 million in 2016–17 (OFFA, 2012a). No similar data are 
published by OFFA for 2012/13. Yet it is clear that part-time tuition fees for 2012/13 
vary, and more so than full-timers’, whose average annual fees are £8,527, and £8,363 
after fee waivers9 (OFFA, 2012b). 
Table 8.2 shows the maximum tuition fees charged in 2012/13 for part-time 
bachelor degree courses for a full-time equivalent (FTE) course (120 credits) at those 
universities in England which had the largest number of part-time undergraduates 
in 2009/10.10 Among the universities listed, their fees range from £3,000 to £9,000 a 
year for a full-time equivalent course.11 As discussed, this wide variation reflects the 
fragmented and highly segmented nature of the part-time market, and in line with 
government aspirations, sharpens the price competition between part-time providers. 
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However, we might question the impact on the quality of provision arising from such 
competition and aggressive pricing.
Table 8.2 Maximum tuition fees to be charged in 2012/13 per 
year for a part-time bachelor degree for a full-time equivalent 
course at English universities with the largest number of part-
time undergraduates




University of Central Lancashire £3,000
London South Bank University £8,450
University of Plymouth £9,000
 University of Hull £9,000
Source: Derived from OFFA agreements www.offa.org.uk/access-agreements/ 
and each university’s website 2012
It is far too early to know what impact the 2012/13 reforms may have on the demand 
for, and supply of, part-time higher education. However, it is clear from the Browne 
Review and the White Paper that the government seeks to open up access to higher 
education for part-time students, make it more affordable, encourage more people 
to study part-time, and hence stem the decline in part-time higher education study. 
They aim to do this while reducing public expenditure on higher education. In the 
remainder of this chapter I assess the reforms and question their policy objectives 
and whether the policy goals are achievable.
The costs of the loans for part-time students
Turning to the Coalition’s desire to reduce public expenditure on part-time higher 
education and to put part-time higher education on a financially sustainable footing. 
According to BIS (2010b), the reforms to part-time student finances will lead to savings 
in public expenditure because of the cuts in the HEFCE teaching grant for part-time 
students and the abolition of the existing student fee and course grants. Prior to the 
2012/13 reforms, just over £400 million was paid through the funding council for 
109,000 full-time equivalent part-time students. The funding council provided direct 
support for around 240,000 part-time students (headcount). In addition, £63 million 
was spent on fee and course grants plus £13.5 million on targeted support. The cost 
of providing loans is estimated to be £220 million by 2014/15. The net effect of the 
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changes to funding for part-time students will be to cut public expenditure. The 
annual saving is estimated at £150 million in 2014–15 (BIS, 2010b)12.
Both the money the government currently provides higher education 
institutions for teaching and the part-time student grants, are counted as public 
expenditure and assist in the reduction of the structural deficit. However, most 
spending on student loans, which will replace the teaching funds, is not – apart 
from the loan subsidy. As Barr (2011: para 2) observes: ‘Though little has changed 
in cash terms (since the government has to finance the upfront cost of loans), there 
is an apparent reduction in the BIS budget; it is not unfair to say that an accounting 
trick is driving deleterious policy change.’ The cash needed to provide loans will be 
borrowed and thus add to the stock of public sector debt. 
In reality, it is difficult to estimate accurately the costs of the new part-time 
loans because it is unclear nationally what universities are charging for their part-time 
courses, what proportion of part-time students are taking out the loans, what their 
loan repayments will be, and so what the Resource Accounting and Budgetary (RAB) 
charge will be – that part of a loan written off by the government that will never be 
recovered fully from graduate loan repayments. The RAB charge is important because 
it represents the government subsidy on student loans, counts as public spending (as 
measured by the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement) and appears in BIS’s budget 
as current spending. Consequently, it is a cost to the taxpayer. 
Numerous commentators have tried to assess these loan costs and RAB 
charges for full-time students and the government has provided detailed analysis too, 
although estimates vary considerably. But, at the time of writing, only one study has 
examined the costs of loans for part-time students (Million+/London Economics, 
2013). Their calculations suggest that the RAB charge will be negative for part-time 
students who take out loans, and that part-time fee loans could actually generate 
income for the Treasury. 
We estimate that the removal of part-time fee and course grants between 
2010/11 and 2012/13 will save the Treasury approximately £55 million, 
while the introduction of part-time fee loans is expected to generate £33 
million from the 2012/13 cohort for the Treasury. 
(Million+/London Economics, 2013: 7) 
The extra income will come from the positive real interest rates on the part-time 
loans, the smaller size of their loans13, and because most part-time students are 
older and employed and have earnings in excess of the loan repayment threshold 
of £21,000. As Callender and Wilkinson (2011) also confirm, the higher pay levels 
of graduates from part-time study suggest that they are likely to repay their student 
loans at a faster rate than graduates from full-time study, and to pay higher interest 
rates. Both will benefit the Exchequer and make loans for part-timers potentially 
cheaper for the public purse than those for their full-time equivalents. 
Part-Time Undergraduate Student Funding and Financial Support
147
The London Economics study suggests an overall RAB charge for all part 
time students of +7.5 per cent which means that for every £100 of student loan the 
government lends a part-time student, it gets back £107.5.14 This increases to +29.8 
per cent or £129.80 for male part-time students but falls to a negative RAB charge of 
-11 per cent or £89 for female students. It will take an average of 14 years for male 
students to pay off their loans and 22 years for women (Million+/London Economics, 
2013: 15). 
London Economics’ calculations have assumed an average part-time tuition 
fee of £3,990 and that this fee increase will lead to a 5 per cent fall in demand. 
Consequently, they estimate that the gross tuition fee income for higher education 
institutions between 2010/11 and 2012/13 will rise from £175 million to £630 million 
but higher education institutions will lose £314 million in HEFCE teaching grant so 
will be about £141 million better off. 
While the London Economics study is to be welcomed, there is no way of 
knowing if the assumptions underpinning their modelling are accurate because of an 
absence of data. So, their calculations should be treated with considerable caution. 
Indeed, they warn that gains to higher education institutions could be wiped out if 
fewer undergraduates started their courses in 2012/13. 
Similarly, London Economics’ positive RAB charge for part-time students, 
alongside Callender and Wilkinson’s (2011) conclusions depend on how many and 
what sort of people enrol in part-time study post-2012/13. It cannot be presumed that 
the profile of the part-time undergraduate student population will remain the same 
following the 2012/13 reforms. Namely, that part-time study will continue to attract 
highly qualified and fairly well paid people working full-time, or that those taking out 
loans will have these characteristics. Indeed, it is likely that as a result of the funding 
changes the composition of part-time student body will alter. Specifically, in line with 
the findings of Dearden et al. (2010) and others (London Economics, 2010), the fall 
in demand for part-time study is most likely to occur amongst students experiencing 
higher fees who do not qualify for loans and have to pay their fees upfront – those, 
in other words, with high level entry qualifications and higher levels jobs. Conversely, 
those most attracted to part-time study might be those who are eligible for loans to 
cover the higher fees, individuals who tend to have low entry qualifications and lower 
earnings. Hence, the earnings profile of part-time graduates may well change and 
their average earnings may well fall. Such developments would lead to a rise in the 
overall RAB charge of part-time loans.
In reality, the exact consequences of the 2012/13 reforms and the reductions 
in government spending are currently difficult to assess. They depend on the 
reactions both of potential part-time students and higher education institutions to 
the changes. Indeed, the government acknowledges that: 
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… it is not only difficult to estimate what overall demand levels for part-
time study will look like under the new system – it is also impossible to 
estimate the change in benefits, particularly if the composition of part-time 
students is going to change (and hence the average part-time premium).
(BIS, 2010b: 21) 
The funding changes and demand for part-time study
The number of part-time undergraduate entrants has fallen by 40 per cent since 
2010/11 – equivalent to 105,000 fewer students (HEFCE, 2013: 13). These falls are far 
greater than those for full-time students (UCAS, 2012a), which have been the focus 
of attention. Significantly, even universities which had bucked the national downward 
trend in part-time recruitment and had experienced a steady rise in enrolments 
over the past five years or more, such as the OU and Birkbeck, are reporting falls 
of around this magnitude for 2012/13 (NIACE, 2013). These universities account 
for a significant proportion of the overall decline, but ‘cannot explain the scale of 
reductions across the sector’ (HEFCE, 2013: 13).
This headline figure is of deep concern. However, one year after the 
introduction of the new funding regime, we still have no idea which student groups 
are most affected or have any insights into the socio-economic characteristics of those 
who are, or are not, participating in part-time higher education, as we do for full-
time students. We do not have any early warning system about changes in part-time 
applications and enrolment patterns. Unlike full-time students, part-time students do 
not apply to university through UCAS, but instead apply directly to the institution of 
their choice. The absence of a centralized application system means we cannot assess 
demand nationally. Instead, we have to rely exclusively on enrolment data which 
reflect both the demand for, and supply of, part-time provision. Moreover, these 
detailed national HESA data on part-time enrolments are only released 18 months 
after the end of the application cycle. So we will not gain a detailed insight into the 
initial effects of the reforms on part-time recruitment in 2012/13 until January 2014.
In the absence of such hard data, we can only speculate about the impact of 
the changes. In line with the aspirations of the White Paper and the Browne Report, 
will they improve the student experience and promote social mobility by ‘opening up 
access to higher education’ (BIS, 2011: 61) and by ‘ensuring that higher education in 
England is affordable for students’ (BIS, 2011: 16)? 
In turn, this raises a number of questions about why demand appears to have 
fallen so dramatically and whether it is associated with the changes in funding and/
or other factors such as the recession. Are those who are eligible for these loans 
taking advantage of them? Are these particular loans a suitable funding mechanism 
for part-time students? Given that the majority of part-time students do not qualify for 
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the loans, what is happening to demand among these students who face far higher 
tuition fees which they have to pay themselves, upfront (or with employer support)?
Are part-time students taking advantage of the new loans? By May 2013 only 
34,200 or 22 per cent of part-time 2012/13 entrants had taken out a loan, a far smaller 
proportion than the third predicted by the government (Hansard, 2013). However, 
more detailed information on the characteristics of these students is unavailable. We 
have very limited insights from existing research about part-time students’ attitudes 
to loans. Some research, conducted before the rise in tuition fees, suggests part-time 
students have little appetite for student loans (Callender et al., 2006). However, loans 
might be attractive to older people, those with low-earnings or incomes, or those 
who are retired. Such individuals would be heavily subsidized by government as they 
are unlikely to pay off their loans in full because the loans are income-contingent 
and outstanding debt is forgiven after 30 years. The average income of pensioners is 
well below the £21,000 income threshold for repaying the loans. Yet other potential 
part-time students may not take out loans, especially those who already have sizable 
financial commitments such as mortgages, those who are debt averse, and those 
who feel that paying 9 per cent of their income on their student loan repayments is 
more than they can manage or are prepared to pay given the uncertainties about the 
returns on their investment during a recession. They may not feel that the benefits 
of study outweigh the costs.
Research suggests that while part-time undergraduates have varied motivations 
for studying, their actual decision to enter higher education is not taken lightly. Like 
other mature students (Osborne et al., 2004), they are far more likely to weigh up the 
costs and benefits of studying and take time to decide whether or not to do so. Going 
to university is not ‘the normal thing to do’ or next step for someone like them, 
unlike younger full-time school leaver students where it has become ‘normalized’ 
(Purcell et al., 2008). Indeed, part-time students may well be making more ‘informed 
choices’ than their younger peers: the opportunity costs as well as the risks may well 
be greater for some of these potential students. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even where potential students were well 
informed about funding arrangements for new study and understood the costs, they 
still failed to enrol and take advantage of the loans. So while investing in properly 
targeted communication about the new funding arrangements is important – indeed 
the inadequacies of the government’s communication strategy on part-time funding 
has been heavily criticized – this cannot explain all of the fall in demand, as some 
would argue (NIACE, 2013). As one commentator has observed: 
It may not have been a failure to communicate, more a failure to persuade 
… Students … were not convinced that they would achieve an appropriate 
return on this increased investment ... They understood the costs but were 
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not necessarily convinced enough about the value to enrol in 2012. … 
their confidence in the value of a degree is low.
(King, 2013: 15)
Such issues might also help explain the greater falls in applications in 2012/13 from 
mature full-time students compared with their younger peers (UCAS, 2012b). Sotoo, 
might they also account for why applications into 2013/14 continue to fall amongst 
students in England aged 30 and over, while applications from younger students have 
begun to recover (UCAS, 2013) (see also chapter 6 by Wyness).
The right sort of loans for part-time students?
Until we have a better understanding of which type of part-time students have taken 
out loans and which have rejected them, it is difficult to propose any policy changes. 
However, we might consider whether these particular loans are the right sort for 
encouraging greater participation in part-time study.
The justification for student loans and cost sharing loan policies is predicated on 
the financial returns of higher education and other private benefits, and the ideology 
that those who benefit from higher education should contribute towards its cost. 
The analysis by London Economics suggests that part-time students benefit enough 
financially from their studies to warrant the introduction of income-contingent loans. 
However, other evidence from the international literature on the returns to lifelong 
learning is mixed (Dorsett et al., 2010). A number of studies suggest graduates who 
delay their education receive a premium relative to those who do not (Ferrer and 
Menendez, 2009; Garrett et al., 2010; Blanden et al., 2010). By contrast, others suggest 
that lifelong learning is not as beneficial as conventional learning would have been 
to those who undertake it (Light, 1995; Holmlund et al., 2008; Egerton and Parry, 
2001; Jenkins et al, 2002). If, as some now argue, the private financial returns of part-
time study are lower than those for full-time students in terms of higher earnings and 
employment opportunities– are the current loans an equitable or efficient option? 
Ziderman (2013) demonstrates how government-sponsored student loan 
schemes around the world differ in the central objective pursued: objectives which 
are important because they have implications for the loan schemes’ design and 
provisions. He identifies three main categories of objectives: cost sharing, social 
targeting, and student independence. As suggested, the loans in England can be 
characterized as cost sharing since they facilitate cost-recovery and the raising of 
tuition fees. Social targeting is explicitly and directly concerned with the accessibility 
of the poor while the student independence objective seeks to ease student financial 
burdens during study. 
Arguably, if the government is committed to ‘opening up access to higher 
education’ (BIS, 2011: 61) and increasing the participation of poorer and more 
marginal groups, then a social targeting model may be more appropriate than a cost 
sharing model. Such a model offers financial incentives to poor potential students, 
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both in terms of overcoming the financial burden of tuition fees and by offsetting fears 
that the benefits of higher education may not be sizeable. This may be particularly 
important for part-time students given the lower financial returns of part-time study, 
their high non-completion rates, and the negative financial returns associated with 
non-completion (London Economics, 2010) whereby students may end up with large 
student loan debts but little or no financial returns. 
Ziderman (2013) argues that the most effective method of enhancing the 
poor’s educational access is through means-tested grants for tuition fees (and living 
costs). These are expensive, however. Consequently, heavily subsidized loans with low 
interest rates to encourage borrowing are a potential solution. He does not advocate 
loan subsidization more generally: ‘… the aim should be near full loan recovery, loan 
schemes targeted on the poor may constitute an acceptable exception’ (Ziderman, 
2013: 37). However, these loan subsidies also are expensive to government:
Since a grant offers a stronger and more direct incentive for access than 
does a (partially) repayable loan, the apparent advantage of loans over 
grants is less clear-cut. This highlights a central conundrum in loan policy: 
at what level of built-in loan subsidy does a grant become a more cost-
effective instrument for helping the poor than a subsidized loan (with 
hidden grants)? This suggests that, in country settings where state budgets 
are constrained, a more appropriate financial aid program for the poor is 
likely to involve a combination of both loans and grants, with a relatively 
larger overt grant element for the very poor. 
(Ziderman, 2013: 43)
Finally, turning to the majority of potential students who do not qualify for loans 
under the new funding regime: they will have to pay their tuition fees upfront, as 
they did before the 2012/13 reforms, except now their tuition fees have increased 
threefold. These individuals might also think the fees are too expensive an investment, 
or simply unaffordable. As discussed, the extensive international research warns 
against upfront tuition fees without adequate financial support since they can 
depress participation. Moreover, given the evidence on the lower financial returns 
of part-time higher education, this will tend to discourage students unless the state 
subsidizes them. 
Other research also indicates that part-time students and their employers 
may be unwilling or unable to meet the large increase in tuition fees introduced in 
2012/13, especially given the recession and lower levels of investment in learning. Cuts 
in public expenditure are likely to have a disproportionate impact on opportunities 
to study part-time, too, since the majority of part-time students work in the public 
sector. Callender and Wilkinson’s (2012) longitudinal study of part-time students, 
covering the current recession but before the introduction of the 2012/13 reforms, 
shows how part-time tuition fees rose by 27 per cent, well above the rate of inflation 
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(4.4 per cent RPI). Both students and employers shared the costs of these tuition fee 
increases. However, employers were less likely to pay all of students’ fees, and more 
students were making a contribution toward their fees. 
Using this survey data, Callender and Wilkinson (2012) also assessed the 
optimum tuition fee price for maximizing participation by using price sensitivity 
modelling, following Van Westendorp (1976). The underlying premise here is that 
there is a relationship between price and quality: you get what you pay for. At the time 
of the study these students’ annual tuition fees were £1,467, below the £2,264 they 
estimated to be the average price at which part-time courses would be too expensive 
for them to consider taking them. If the fees increased to £2,000, between 59 per 
cent and 74 per cent of surveyed students reported that the course would be too 
expensive. If it rose to £3,200, the figure jumped to between 78 per cent and 89 
per cent. 
Taken together with the changes in employer behaviour and financial support, 
this does not bode well for new part-time entrants. Both the maximum tuition fee 
of £6,750 and the average tuition fees reported in Table 8.2 are far higher than 
students’ perceived ‘too expensive’ threshold. More part-time students will no longer 
be able to rely on their employer for financial help to pay for all of their fees, and 
will have to pay for some or all of these themselves. Together they are likely to restrict 
opportunities to study part-time and depress demand. It is difficult to see how for 
this majority of would be part-time students, these reforms are ‘opening up access to 
higher education’ (BIS, 2011: 61) and ‘ensuring that higher education in England is 
affordable for students’ (BIS, 2011: 16)? 
If the government is truly committed to part-time study and its importance for 
economic growth in re-skilling the existing workforce – and does not want to see a 
fall in the demand and supply of part-time higher education – then, at a minimum, 
it should reconsider the current eligibility criteria for student loans. Specifically, it 
should extend eligibility for loans to those who already hold an equivalent level or 
higher qualification. If the government were to do so, the RAB charge on loans for 
these individuals could be lower and even positive, given their higher earnings and 
the higher loan interest rates they would pay. Indeed the government may make a 
profit out of part-time undergraduate loans, in line with London Economics’ (2013) 
findings. There would be no excuse for budgetary constraints.
Importantly, while the private financial returns to part-time study might be low, 
our research suggests that the non-pecuniary returns are high in terms of improving 
both graduates’ working and non-working lives (Callender and Wilkinson, 2013). For 
instance, two years after graduation, 80 per cent of those surveyed believed that their 
ability to do their work had improved as a direct result of their course, while 88 per 
cent reported greater personal development, 78 per cent more confidence , and over 
a half were happier. Moreover, the majority of part-time students begin to reap these 
benefits before they graduate and complete their studies (Callender and Wilkinson, 
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2012). Indeed, our research suggests that the non-financial returns of part-time study 
are potentially relatively greater in comparison to the private financial returns, and in 
turn, justify more generous state funding. 
Conclusions
There continue to be significant unresolved issues regarding the funding of part-time 
higher education study. In part-time providers’ favour, part-time student places remain 
uncapped, unlike the strict controls on full-time student places, which makes part-
time provision a potentially attractive revenue source in an environment of restricted 
full-time places. It also makes market competition keener because if a university’s 
quality drops, we would expect reduced demand and a downward pressure on price, 
although part-time students’ limited mobility restricts their choices. Indeed, we 
already see greater variation in tuition fees within the part-time sector – because of 
its segmented nature – than we do in the full-time sector. However, it is unlikely that 
uncapped part-time student places will continue in the longer term.
Another important issue untouched by the White Paper, is flexible funding. 
In theory, student loans make moving in and out of part- and full-time study easier. 
However, if there is a desire to make higher education study more adaptable and 
attractive to a wider range of students whereby they can change their mode of study 
and higher education institution while pursuing a qualification, as happens in the 
US, then a system of funding around credit accumulation is required. For instance 
in the US, an estimated 38 per cent of undergraduate enrolments in degree-granting 
institutions were part time in the fall 2010 (United States Department of Education, 
2012). Over an academic year, however, the proportion attending part time for some 
or all of the year is considerably higher (Chen & Carroll, 2007). Indeed, the rules 
associated with the receipt of loans work against such flexibility. Students have to 
enrol for a specific undergraduate qualification in order to qualify for one. Prior 
to the introduction of loans, for instance, OU students could sign up for a variety 
of modules and gain a qualification through credit accumulation. Now this is not 
possible. Nor is it easy for students to transfer to another higher education institution. 
The absence of modular or credit-based funding, therefore, inhibits flexible provision 
and delivery which can respond to the needs of students and their employers.
The aims of the 2012/13 reforms of part-time student financial support were 
to encourage more people to study part-time, to open up access, make part-time 
study more affordable, and to stem the decline in part-time undergraduate study, 
while at the same time reducing public expenditure. These policy objectives are 
welcome, but it is questionable whether such goals can be achieved through the 
policy instruments introduced and whether they are the most appropriate for part-
time students. Indeed, these reforms are having the opposite effect. It may well be 
the case, therefore, that part-time higher education study continues to decline rather 
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than grow: not what the government or the sector wanted. Part-time students and 
part-time study may well be one of the main casualties of the White Paper, and are 
certainly not at the heart of the system.
The government’s part-time student funding policies are unproven, and as 
they admit, have unknown consequences and unforeseen unintended consequences. 
We will not know their outcome for several years. The type of people attracted to 
part-time study may change, with only those eligible for student loans or gaining 
employer support participating. This may be one of the unintended consequences of 
these reforms and would lead to a more homogeneous undergraduate student body, 
and arguably a less diverse higher education sector. Ultimately the government’s 
policies for part-time students fail to heed Johnstone and Marcucci’s words that ‘cost-
sharing is no miracle cure’ (2010: 282) and ‘our advocacy of cost-sharing is always an 
advocacy for its ability to supplement and augment government revenue, never to 
replace it’ (2010: 283). 
As the 2011 White Paper acknowledges, the changes represent a radical 
reform of the higher education system. They herald a retreat from the state’s 
financial responsibility for part-time higher education with a shift towards individual 
universities, but especially students who are ineligible for loans carrying all of this 
responsibility and the risks. Implicit in this strategy is a fundamental ideological 
revision about the purpose of higher education, driven by economic competition 
and the dominance of financial values. Undergraduate higher education is not seen 
by government as a public good, of value to society as a whole beyond those who 
receive it, and so worthy of public funding, but instead as a private good with private 
economic returns from individual investment. Higher education’s private-good 
functions are pitted against its public-good functions and reveal a policy mind set 
and political ideology where the public and private benefits are a zero-sum game. 
The direct non-market benefits of higher education, which McMahon (2009) argues 
exceed the market benefits, are ignored. 
In the short term, the changes are having a destabilizing effect on the part-
time higher education sector. There may be some fiscal savings but will these be at 
the expense of the longer term effects on quality, social equity and universities as 
public, civic, and cultural institutions? We need a much better understanding of what 
is happening across the part-time sector before recommending any reforms. Are 
the declines in part-time study associated with tuition fee policies, the limitations of 
student financial support, and/or other factors, such as the economy, occupational 
regulation, employer behaviour, and other government higher education policies? 
Most importantly, we need the political will both within the sector and the government 
to tackle the challenges posed by part-time study. 
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Notes
1 The following discussion only relates to United Kingdom domicile undergraduates students 
studying in England since devolution provision for part-time undergraduates varies within the 
UK countries.
2 Note this is an average figure and will vary by intensity of study. 
3 In 2011/12 students studying 50 per cent to 59 per cent of a full-time course could get a 
maximum of £820, those studying between 60 per cent and 74 per cent could get up to £985, 
and those studying 75 per cent or more can get up to £1,230.
4 The government subsequently announced that there will be no age limit for the receipt of 
tuition fee loans.
5 This is equivalent to 75 per cent of the maximum full-time fee of £9,000.
6 For the tax year ending 5 April 2011, the median gross annual earnings for full-time employees 
were £26,200, for men they were £28,400, and for women £22,900 (ONS, n.d.).
7 It is not clear how these estimates are calculated given the absence of data on part-time 
enrolments.
8 For part-time new system students, the basic fee is £4,500 and the maximum fee is £6,750.
10 Each higher education institution had a minimum of 7,000 part-time undergraduates 
in 2009/10.
11 Students study at different intensities of study, so to make the tuition fee comparable, the 
tuition fees listed are for a full-time equivalent course.
12 These BIS calculations were undertaken before the decision to extend eligibility to loans 
to courses of 25 per cent or above rather than 33 per cent or above. This change will have 
reduced these savings by a small amount.
13 Part-time tuition fees are lower than those of their full-time peers and part-time students are 
ineligible for maintenance loans.
14 The equivalent RAB charge for full-time students, they calculate, is +39.6 per cent.
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Chapter 9 
Aspects of UK private higher 
education
Paul Temple
Private higher education in higher education systems
In his 1983 comparative study of higher education systems across the world, Burton 
Clark characterized one of the major system types he had identified as ‘private and 
public systems: multiple sectors’ (Clark, 1983: 59). By this he meant that there are 
multiple categories of institutions, funded variously from public and private sources. 
The most important examples of this category were the United States and Japan, with 
a number of Latin American countries following them. By contrast, he placed the UK 
in the category of ‘multiple public systems: multiple sectors’, by which he meant that 
there were institutions funded from different public sources – notably, at that point, 
the universities and the polytechnics – but that institutions in each of these systems 
were far from homogenous: Clark noted the differentiation between the ancient 
universities, the civic universities, the 1960s foundations, and so on. Clark did not 
identify a private sector of any significance in the UK. If he were writing today, he 
might place the UK in his ‘private and public systems: multiple sectors’ group, while 
probably noting the small proportion of students studying in private institutions, 
compared to those other national cases he had identified. He would probably go 
on to observe, however, that since the majority of funding for university teaching, 
in whatever type of institution it takes place, will arguably be private money from 
2012 – public money loaned to students, to be repaid on favourable terms, but not 
appearing as public spending in the national accounts – then the whole UK ‘public’ 
system has shifted substantially towards the private system. It could even be argued 
that a new category within Clark’s typology, with only one national case extant, had 
come into existence: multiple private systems: multiple sectors.
Private higher education in the UK, as it is usually thought of, has hitherto 
made an insignificant contribution to the overall pattern of educational provision, as 
in most other European countries. In all such countries, state policies and, crucially, 
state funding have determined higher education policies throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the period when modern higher education was effectively 
created. In many continental European countries, university creation was an integral 
part of nation-building, nowhere more so than with Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 
creation of the University of Berlin in 1810 – the model for the development of 
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research universities around the world. The subtle relationship planned by von 
Humboldt between the university and the state was intended to prevent both 
political interference in teaching and research and what today would be called 
‘producer capture’ by the professoriate (Wittrock, 2006: 112). It is apparent that von 
Humboldt’s conception of the university as the embodiment of the unity of teaching 
and research, and the delicate balance of power he considered necessary to maintain 
this unity and everything he saw as flowing from it, could not be left in private hands.
In the twentieth century, the combination of a relatively high standard of 
state-backed higher education, with no or minimal tuition fees for most students, 
has, with other factors, relegated private sector provision (whether for-profit or non-
profit) to a marginal position in European national patterns of higher education. An 
important exception in some European countries are denominational universities, 
usually Catholic ones – Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain offer examples. And we 
may note that the Catholic University of Ljublin, in Poland, claims it continued as 
‘the only independent university in the Soviet Bloc’ during the communist period 
(Slancheva, 2007: 67).
The explosive growth of private higher education institutions in central 
and eastern Europe following the collapse of communist power in 1989 is another 
special case. Here was an unmet demand for places in a public university sector 
where expansion pre-1989 had, in most countries, been strictly limited. The range of 
subjects on offer was also limited – the emphasis in most countries was on science and 
technology, often of a highly applied kind. After 1989, the combination of this pent-
up demand,in terms of volume and breadth, with a temporary absence of formal 
accreditation or other quality-control processes – previously regarded as unnecessary 
in systems operating through detailed state regulation – made the creation of a private 
sector almost inevitable. Across the region, large numbers of small institutions quickly 
sprang up, typically relying on teaching by professors ‘moonlighting’ from nearby 
public universities (Nicolescu, 2007; Slancheva, 2007). Whatever the formal position, 
it seems likely that the profit motive played a large part in their development – not 
least by providing a second source of income for academic staff whose salaries, where 
they were paid at all, had been eroded by rapid inflation (Kwiek, 2008; Slancheva, 
2007). It is hard to judge the long-term stability of these private sectors, even that 
of Poland, where currently around one-third of higher education students are in 
private colleges. Questions of quality and standards continue to be raised, and 
sharply falling birth-rates across the region may be expected to create spare capacity 
in the public sector in the near future, perhaps thereby siphoning-off demand in the 
private sector (Vasagar, 2011). It also seems that students typically prefer to pay fees 
to attend public universities (in countries where the public universities charge fees to 
lower-achieving applicants) rather than private ones – hardly surprising, as the public 
universities in such countries are usually historically established and have higher 
local reputations (Nicolescu, 2007: 212). These countries’ private sectors, then, 
Aspects of UK private higher education
161
are in a dynamic equilibrium with their local public sectors, rather than operating 
independently of them.
When the post-war expansion of higher education began in western Europe 
in the 1960s, driven partly by increasing numbers of school students staying on 
beyond the minimum school-leaving age – and which in countries such as France 
led automatically to increased numbers of young people with a right to a university 
place – as well as by economic growth and increased demands for higher skills, it 
might have been assumed that private provision would have developed to help meet 
this new demand. Instead, everywhere in western Europe, the expansion of higher 
education was seen as a state responsibility, on a par with state responsibility, in the 
European post-war settlement, for improved health care, social welfare, modernized 
transport infrastructure, and so on. Even private provision supported by state 
financial aid, either directly to institutions or to their students (what might today be 
called a public–private partnership), seems not to have been an option. This did not 
just reflect the continental étatisme in the period of post-war reconstruction: when 
higher education’s expansion was being planned in the late 1950s and 1960s in the 
UK, no public case was made, so far as is known, that private provision might, at 
least in part, have a role to play. Instead, it seems to have been taken for granted 
that the correct approach was one ‘where the state intervened to create wholly new 
universities’, with generous state financial support for their students, but which then 
left the universities alone to act ‘as a kind of intellectual conscience of the nation’ 
(Shattock, 2012: 10, 43).
Public and private in the UK: a distinction without a difference?
In the UK, the distinctive historical pattern of university development meant the 
public/private distinction was never so clear-cut as it was elsewhere in Europe and 
in most other countries. In the United States, however, the position up to the early 
nineteenth century was more akin to that of the UK: there, the public/private 
distinction was not considered significant – there was often ‘a fusion of “public” and 
“private” concepts within the same institution’ (Thelin, 2004: 71). A strong public 
role in the provision of higher education can be traced back to the colonial period, 
when the first colleges were generously supported from public funds – Harvard, for 
example, received a quarter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s tax revenues in its 
early years (Thelin, 2004: 12) – but were not ‘public’ in the modern sense. 
In contrast to continental Europe, UK universities, starting with Oxford and 
Cambridge and going on to the ancient Scottish universities, had always been private, 
non-profit institutions but with important links to the state – nicely exemplified in 
the case of medieval Oxford by a series of Royal Decrees, upholding what would 
now be described as the University’s autonomy. Henry III, in the mid-thirteenth 
century, appears to have been particularly well-disposed towards the University, to the 
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considerable annoyance of the townspeople of Oxford (Leff, 1968). Six centuries later, 
the origins of England’s third university, the formally private, non-profit University 
of London, were also bound up with the government’s view of higher education: 
the University was established in 1836 ‘by direct government action ... [a] paradox 
of being a state educational foundation in the age of laissez-faire’ (Harte, 1986: 79). 
In these developments we see the public/private boundary blurring further, a state 
of affairs that continues to baffle foreign visitors to UK universities to this day: a 
nominally private institution being created by the central state.
The public/private boundary UK universities straddle can be appreciated by 
examining the funding sources of a typical pre-war university or (often) university 
college – that is, an institution without its own degree-awarding powers, perhaps 
teaching the syllabus laid down by the University of London’s ‘external’ programme, 
which led to the award of London degrees (Moodie and Eustace, 1974: 32). Typically, 
the largest single source of funding was student tuition fees. The rest was made up 
from endowment income and grants from local councils and charitable foundations 
and – though not always – the central University Grants Committee (UGC), which 
made financial support available to its ‘grant list’ but not to all higher education 
institutions (Williams, 1988). To read the minutes of a provincial university governing 
body from the 1920s or 1930s is to see decision-making in a medium-sized, locally-
based enterprise, balancing precarious income streams against carefully-watched 
spending and whose long-term future was anything but secure. Operationally, there 
would be little difference between a ‘public’ university of this period and a small for-
profit college, validated by a university, today. Perhaps the key difference might have 
been that the pre-war university would be strongly rooted in its city and the recipient 
of practical and moral support from its business and civic communities.
In the post-war period, UK universities became dependent on increasing 
amounts of public money to support their growth, particularly as any endowments 
had been badly eroded by wartime inflation (UGC grants made up 63.9 per cent 
of universities’ incomes by 1949/50 (Shattock, 2012: 12)), but never became 
nationalized concerns, at least formally. (Although there is a substantial literature 
on the theme of ‘scholastic leadership and tradition collaps[ing] in the face of 
state intervention’, which permitted, in this instance, ‘one of [Mrs Thatcher’s] 
most vigorous “nationalizations”’ (Jenkins, 1995).) I shall refer to traditional UK 
universities as ‘public’, in inverted commas, as a reminder of this ambiguous point. 
Emerging as a public–private partnership, the view of the UK higher education 
system as an anomaly thus became internationally entrenched. It is evident in the 
difficulty international studies of higher education have in classifying the UK: a 
2005 UNESCO study, for example, placed the UK in its category of ‘countries with 
a large private higher education sector (over 50 per cent of enrolments)’ – ahead 
of the United States, which it placed in its ‘countries with a medium-sized private 
higher education sector (between 25 per cent and 50 per cent of enrolments)’ 
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(UNESCO, 2005: 90). Clearly, the authors of this study identified the whole of UK 
higher education as non-state, and then, presumably, concluded that this must mean 
‘private’.
The University of Buckingham was established in 1973 in the small market 
town of Buckingham, about 60 miles from London. It admitted its first students as a 
university college in 1976, and currently has around 1,000 students. It claims to be the 
UK’s ‘only independent university with a Royal Charter’. What it means by this is that 
it does not itself receive any direct public financial support, although, as its UK/EU 
students are entitled to receive student loans on the same basis as students at other 
English universities, the University does receive indirect support from the taxpayer 
via subsidized student fees. But in terms of formal governance and ownership, , it 
is no different from UK ‘public’ universities, if we leave aside the fact that it was 
established as an ideological project, by a group led by Max Beloff, who then became 
its first principal,– to provide a counterweight to what was seen by its founders as 
higher education’s excessive politicization. The website of the University’s Centre for 
the Study of Liberty gives us an indication of the University’s ideological position: 
‘But liberty is constantly under threat from governments and their apologists who 
seek to over-tax and over-regulate. We have thus sought to create a countervailing 
institution that will reinforce the value of liberty’ (University of Buckingham, 
2012). Despite such rhetoric, however, the basic governance and operation of the 
University of Buckingham is not different in kind to that of other UK universities. 
In 2001, one of Buckingham’s academic staff unwittingly showed that the gap in 
the market Buckingham was intended to fill was rather small. Despite healthcare 
and education in the UK being ‘organized under principles … redolent of Stalinist 
central planning’ – understating one’s case clearly being frowned on at Buckingham 
– it was, he thought, ‘disturbing [that there is still] little interest in expanding the 
private sector [of higher education] here’ by following Buckingham’s lead (Barry, 
2001: 211). Or possibly, the ‘Stalinist central planning’ apparently characterizing the 
UK public sector was not as distasteful to the majority of potential students as it was 
to the writer in question.
However, if we can accept that Buckingham is a sufficiently different type of 
UK higher education institution to merit the title of private provider, then it is unique 
in being established with a particular political goal in mind. More recently, a small 
group of private providers have received degree-awarding powers: BPP University 
College, the College of Law, Ashridge Business School, the IFS School of Finance, 
and, most recently, in 2012, Regents College – all of which have restricted degree-
awarding powers subject to renewal every six years; only Buckingham has unrestricted 
degree-awarding powers, in common, again, with ‘public’ universities. Of these, 
BPP, which obtained degree-awarding powers in 2007, was, until recently, the only 
for-profit institution. A holding company, BPP Holdings Ltd, controls a number 
of separate companies providing different types of professional education – if the 
Claire Callender and Peter Scott
164
McTimoney College of Chiropractic can be so described. BPP Holdings, in turn, 
was acquired in 2009 by the US-based Apollo Global, owner of the online provider 
the University of Phoenix, and a major operator of for-profit higher education in 
the US and internationally. However, the College of Law has now been bought by a 
private equity firm, and in late 2012 gained the title of the University of Law. Its new 
owners will clearly expect to see a financial return on its investment, and so it may be 
assumed to be in the for-profit sector (Morgan, 2012c). 
The cases of BPP and the College of Law show that the legal and ownership 
positions of private universities or colleges cannot be regarded as stable when they 
can be bought and sold (and presumably closed if they become unprofitable) 
without hindrance: the time limits on the degree-awarding powers of organizations 
which are not university institutions in the typically accepted sense seem a sensible 
safeguard. What has at times seemed an archaic mode of institutional creation, the 
Royal Charter, can also be seen to offer a level of permanence that differentiates an 
institution from a mere organization. As the 1904 Royal Charter of the University of 
Leeds puts it (to take a random example): ‘There shall be from henceforth for ever 
in Our said City of Leeds a university of the name and style of “The University of 
Leeds”, which shall be and continue one body politic and corporate with perpetual 
succession ... ’ 
Typologies of private higher education
The environment for higher education, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, has 
changed radically over the last few decades. The expansion of higher education 
and associated institutional changes in the UK since the 1980s – notably with the 
title ‘university’ now covering a wider range of institutional types than previously 
– have created a more fluid landscape and encouraged the growth of private 
providers. A range of specialist private organizations fill particular niches in an 
increasingly complex higher education ecology – providers of purpose-built student 
accommodation on or adjoining university campuses or providers of pre-sessional 
education for international students, for example. Globally, it has been estimated 
that some 30 per cent of higher education enrolments are in private, mostly non-
profit, institutions (Levy, 2009), with strong growth in Latin America and Asia. In 
some countries whose wealth and the local higher education supply and demand 
situation might have indicated opportunities for private providers, strong state 
regulatory oversight of higher education, perhaps associated with a desire to exert 
political and/or religious controls, has limited what can be done. Saudi Arabia is an 
example, but there are now signs of change even there (Jamjoon, 2012).
There are a number of categorizations of private providers internationally. 
This broadly follows the one put forward in a recent study by Universities UK (2010):
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● Apex, elite and semi-elite: only the US has private institutions in the ‘apex’ 
category, although in several other countries there are examples of universities 
in the next few steps down from the most prestigious universities. These 
institutions are invariably non-profit
● Identity institutions, mostly religious in orientation, again mostly non-profit
● Demand-absorbing – the most numerous category, found where public 
provision is inadequate in terms of quantity or quality: the UUK report divides 
this category further into ‘dubious’ and ‘serious’. Both for-profit and non-profit 
examples are to be found in this category
● Public/private partnerships, normally between a public university and a for-
profit organization: a recent UK example is the partnership between Pearson 
Education and Royal Holloway, University of London, under which the new 
Pearson College will offer a bachelor’s degree in business studies validated by 
Royal Holloway.
Another categorization (Geiger, 1986) is based on the drivers for private provision, 
considered against the local context of the public sector: ‘better’ (elite or similar 
private institutions), ‘more’ (demand-absorbing private institutions), or ‘different’ 
(identity-based institutions, specialist niche markets, or where public institutions fail 
to offer some type of provision, for example). Geiger also offers a categorization 
into parallel, mass, and peripheral, which fulfils essentially the same purpose. It 
is interesting to reflect how the UK private sector might be analysed against this 
typology. The ‘better’ label clearly does not apply, as all the UK’s institutions with 
any claim to international prestige are firmly in the ‘public’ sector. Given the UK 
‘public’ system’s expansion in recent decades, it is also hard to believe that the ‘more’ 
category applies in a meaningful way. And – with the exception of Buckingham’s 
libertarian claims – in the missions espoused by most private institutions it is hard 
to detect much in the way of ‘different’, unless a focus on low-cost subjects in high 
demand is considered to be distinctive. The UK private sector appears, then, to be 
anomalous in terms of accepted typologies. To some extent, this is because the sector 
is located in the UK but deals mainly with non-UK students, often studying for non-
UK awards. Much of it is in, but not of, the UK, in other words. Insofar as it does cater 
for UK/EU students, it is niche provision of various kinds – particularly part-time 
professional courses – that are prominent.
The 2011 White Paper and private provision in the UK
In the UK, government policies from the late 1980s have stimulated competition 
between existing universities, both for student recruitment and for research funding. 
The increasing significance, sophistication, and cost of university marketing activities 
– barely in existence a generation ago – is one testimony to the policies’ success 
(Maringe and Gibbs, 2009: 29; Temple, 2011). Competition for research funds is 
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worth particular examination, as it is readily quantifiable in cash terms (although of 
course excellent research and expensive research are not identical, and the focus on 
cash raises the profiles of universities with ‘big science’ departments at the expense of 
others), and because a major research portfolio affects the external perception of the 
university via league tables and publicity generally, and so feeds through into student 
recruitment. The first Research Assessment Exercise (to be known from 2014 as the 
Research Excellence Framework), intended to assess institutions’ research capabilities 
and to allocate funds differentially as a result, took place in 1986. As a result of 
successive exercises in 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001, and 2008, obtaining research funding 
has become increasingly competitive and led to a highly concentrated distribution. 
In 2006/07, six institutions each received over £100 million in dual support research 
income (that is, research funding from the Funding Councils and the Research 
Councils combined), while the median figure was around £2.5 million (UUK, 2008: 
44). Even this figure, modest enough in research grant terms, tails off rapidly once 
the median institution is passed, meaning that nearly half of all UK universities carry 
out only very small amounts of research, or, effectively, none at all. On the criterion 
of research income alone, then, UK policy over the past quarter-century to increase 
competition among universities has, it may be argued, been highly successful: it has 
led to a more diverse university system, containing institutions that have increasingly 
little in common other than the title ‘university’. Indeed, it may even be thought that 
the very success of this policy has reached the point where it has the perverse effect of 
actually limiting competition, as a variety of factors – costly research infrastructures, 
existing research groups, international partnerships, and other matters – have made 
it very difficult indeed for a non-research-intensive university to compete with the 
handful of ‘premier league’ institutions. The football analogy is obvious, but a similar 
picture can be seen in other artificial attempts to create competition: in utilities, for 
example, where barriers to entry are so high that a small number of companies – 
including, in a further irony, foreign state-controlled companies – are able to manage 
the market.
But while the higher education market has become more competitive, the very 
title ‘university’, which effectively limits entry to this market, has become more fluid. 
There has been a slow but steady process over recent years of lowering the barriers 
to gaining degree-awarding powers and a university title. This led to a significant 
increase in the number of full universities in the UK: between 1992 and October 2012, 
in addition to the former polytechnics and their Scottish equivalents, 29 universities 
have been created in the UK from institutions that did not previously have the title. 
The process has been accelerated under the Coalition Government which took 
office in 2010. In November 2012 Minister David Willetts announced that a further 
ten institutions would be put forward for the title of ‘university’. The government’s 
2011 White Paper had previously set out a number of measures intended, apparently, 
to encourage greater private sector involvement in higher education – crucially, by 
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making it easier to gain a university title. The requirement to have a minimum of 
4,000 students – dating from the previous government’s 2003 White Paper, which 
led to the requirement that a university should undertake research and be active 
in a range of disciplines being removed – has now been reduced to 1,000: about 
the size of the average English state-funded secondary school. The government also 
intended to remove any legal impediments to private companies buying existing 
universities. Such other changes will, the White Paper suggested, ‘make it easier for 
[new providers of higher education] to attract private investment’ (BIS, 2011: para 
4.35). The implication here, though unstated, must be that these new providers will 
be for-profit organizations, as non-profit institutions are unlikely to be attractive to 
private investors (as opposed to philanthropists). It was expected that legislation to 
implement these and other changes would be proposed in 2012: in fact, it seems as if 
the government has had second thoughts about the political wisdom of at least some 
of these moves, despite their being strongly backed by the minister concerned, David 
Willetts.
A striking feature of the 2011 White Paper’s approach to the encouragement 
of greater private provision is the absence of a clear rationale: the precise problem 
that private providers are expected to help solve is never set out. In its Foreword 
the White Paper tells us: ‘Our university sector has a proud history and a world-class 
reputation, attracting students from across the world. Higher education is a successful 
public–private partnership’ (BIS, 2011: 2). So quality or standards – or attractiveness 
to students – are presumably not the problem, and nor is the relationship between 
universities and government. No examples of significant failures among existing 
institutions are given. Instead, and to add to Stefan Collini’s (2011) typology of tenses 
now used in official documents on higher education (mission statement present, 
future dogmatic), the conditional optimistic is widely deployed. So we learn that ‘new 
entrants to the sector ... may have different strengths ... they may offer particular well-
honed teaching models ... [and they] may find it easier to include an international 
higher education experience for their students’ (BIS, 2011: para 4.5). Leaving aside 
the curious notion of seeking a ‘well-honed teaching model’ – the usual criticism 
of university teaching is that models are only too well-honed, through constant 
repetition – and the implication that existing universities lack international links 
– when a regular criticism is that universities spend too much time on supposedly 
glamorous international ventures rather than attending to domestic matters – what 
we see here is a breathtaking lack of specifics. The text bears the hallmarks of a writer 
casting around in an attempt to find vaguely plausible reasons to support a decision 
which has already been made on quite different grounds. 
The White Paper also assumes that private providers are discriminated against 
by the current arrangements, and that legal and other changes need to be made to 
allow them to compete on equal terms with the ‘public’ sector. The ‘level playing 
field’ cliché makes an early appearance in the relevant chapter of the White Paper: 
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‘To achieve [wider] choice for students, all higher education providers, whatever 
type of course they offer, must be able to compete on a level playing field’ (BIS, 
2011: para 4.7). However, a level playing field implies that neither end slopes. At 
present, public sector institutions have certain duties laid upon them which private 
colleges do not have, including being subject to the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOI) and the decisions of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA) in 
respect of student complaints. Both involve costly and time consuming processes, 
potentially involving awkward or otherwise undesirable (from the institution’s point 
of view) disclosures. Moreover, it is hard to believe that a commercial organization 
such as BPP would be willing to make available the kind of internal documents public 
institutions are routinely required to produce under FOI and OIA requests. The 
private sector currently benefits from such advantages over public institutions since 
they do not receive public funding, even if some of their students do – this argument 
is a less than compelling one, however, as the FOI applies equally to university 
activities that are not publicly funded, such as research or consultancy projects for 
private clients. The funding arrangements for undergraduates from 2012, however, 
will erode this distinction, if not completely remove it, and it is the logic of the White 
Paper’s position, in any case, that the public and private sectors should be ‘treated 
on a more consistent basis’ (BIS, 2011: para 4.10) and thus be subject to the same 
regulatory requirements.
Neither the supposed weakness of the current arrangements are set out, nor 
are the concrete benefits of an alternative approach described. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that increasing the number of private providers was set as an ideological 
goal and a policy framework (if that is not too grand a title) was put together to 
support such an objective. 
It is worth pausing here to reflect on the significance of profitability because in 
the UK, as I have shown, the public/private divide that would be significant in many 
other countries has little real relevance if non-profit institutions – of the Buckingham 
model, say – are what are being considered as ‘private’. The recent growth of for-
profit institutions in the UK raises new considerations. In economics, the notion 
of profit is usually seen as having theoretical benefits by signalling opportunities 
for investment and for indicating where innovation may generate high returns. 
Both could potentially lead to increased wealth for the economy in question. So, 
in principle, why should profitability not have a role to play in providing higher 
education? The argument that education is ‘too important’ to be left to the vagaries 
of the profit motive is not compelling: there seems to be little controversy in most 
countries about the supply of food being determined by judgements of profitability 
by food producers, distributors, and retailers. 
There are several reasons why profitability is a difficulty in education, however 
– and in higher education in particular. One has to do with externalities (or spillover 
effects): the benefits of education are felt well beyond the individuals directly 
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involved in learning. Just as the construction of an urban subway line might be shown 
to be profitable if the increases in property values and the economic activity which it 
generates could be represented on the subway authority’s balance sheet, so a university 
receiving a public subsidy might be shown to be profitable if the increased incomes 
of its graduates, and the economic value-added and wider social benefits which they 
generate over their lifetimes, could be captured in the university’s financial accounts. 
While the argument applies most strongly to basic education – the returns to the 
whole society of near-universal literacy and numeracy are huge – it also applies to 
higher education since the benefits of high skills are also experienced widely. But 
if educational provision depended on the profitability of individual enterprises, it is 
likely that provision would be less than optimal since these externalities would not 
figure in calculations of profitability.
Supply could be increased through public subsidies to students and/or 
institutions but this would then create a set of perverse incentives that are hard to 
manage in an educational setting. Running a profit-making enterprise is problematic 
when your customers are both your raw material and your finished product: as with 
most other enterprises, you want to maximize the quantities of both – which sets up 
tensions in an educational institution. In countries with both non-profit and for-profit 
higher education institutions, this helps explain why it is the former which tend to 
be of the higher status, while the latter focuses on standardized courses in technical 
or professional fields. It also means that for-profit institutions have ‘an ambiguous 
relationship to the question of civic and community engagement’ (Watson et al., 
2011: 11), which further limits their roles in creating educational value.
A large number of private institutions actually do provide higher education in 
the UK. There are certainly over a thousand of them, although no comprehensive 
register exists – and it would in any case become immediately out of date. Most are 
very small, typically teaching international students, often for non-UK awards. The 
business model of many of these institutions is puzzling to an outside observer: 
they seem to have no distinctive academic or professional expertise or a marketing 
proposition that would not be available, at a similar price, in more established, better-
known institutions that are themselves degree-awarding bodies. They certainly do 
not have a recognized brand to offer. One conclusion must be that they are teaching 
students who would not be admitted to a mainstream university on attainment 
grounds, whether in terms of academic ability or English language competence. It 
might be that the government’s new, more restrictive, visa regime, in the teeth of 
opposition from the entire university sector, will put some of these small colleges out of 
business. It would be deeply ironic if one strand of the current government’s ideology 
– restricting immigration, even when the people affected are not immigrants at all in 
the usually accepted sense of the term – undercut another ideological objective, that 
of enlarging the private higher education sector..
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Meanwhile, in the United States, a devastating critique of for-profit higher 
education was made in 2012 by Senator Tom Harkin, chairman of the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. ‘In this report’, Senator Harkin was 
reported as saying, ‘you will find overwhelming documentation of exorbitant tuition, 
aggressive recruiting practices, abysmal student outcomes, taxpayer dollars spent on 
marketing and pocketed as profit, and regulatory evasion and manipulation’ (Lewin, 
2012).The widely syndicated Doonesbury cartoon strip made this a storyline in summer 
2012 in which the president of a less-than-stellar private but non-profit college, of 
which many of the strip’s characters are alumni, considers turning it into a for-profit 
organization. As his provost tells him: ‘Remember, for-profits take any warm body 
with federal aid. They’re all about enrolment, not completion.’ 
Similar cases appear to be emerging in the UK, where a lightly-regulated for-
profit sector is now able, as in the US, to gain access to public funds. UK/EU students 
at private colleges are able to apply for student loans on courses designated by the 
government department responsible (currently, BIS), which gives the colleges access 
to tuition fee income from the Student Loans Company. The number of students 
at private colleges receiving this support more than doubled in 2011/12 compared 
with the previous year, involving £100 million in loans (Morgan, 2012b). While such 
provision appears to have encouraged their growth, problems apparently similar 
to those uncovered in the Harkin report in the US are now emerging. In a recent 
case, Guildhall College in London (not to be confused with the long-established 
Guildhall School of Music and Drama) was found to be registering students on 
courses designated for student support, when in fact the students concerned wished 
to study on courses that were not so designated. The College benefitted by some 
£750,000 before designation was withdrawn (Morgan, 2012a). It is difficult to see 
how, in practice, abuses of this kind can be prevented in a systematic way if there 
are hundreds of such colleges, each with relatively small numbers of students: it is 
unrealistic to expect BIS to police a system like this, constantly in flux, and likely to 
become even more fluid once opportunities for large-scale, low-risk fraud become 
more widely appreciated.
The changing ecology of UK higher education
The ecology of UK (or at least, English) higher education is changing. The private, 
for-profit and non-profit sectors are expanding and gaining highly prized degree-
awarding powers, once reserved for a relatively small number of well-established, 
publicly-funded institutions. Another niche in this ecology is being filled by further 
education colleges, which are expanding their higher education provision. Under the 
new tuition fee system, colleges have been allowed to expand their higher education 
offer at lower fee levels than most universities – even, sometimes, when that university 
is the validating partner for the college in question. Government market-oriented 
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policies are, again, pointing to a more diverse pattern of provision (Parry et al., 2012). 
As noted, a range of private for-profit firms are playing an increased role in providing 
ancillary services – as a glance at any issue of the glossy magazine University Business, 
established in 2006, will show.
I therefore see a more complex pattern of higher education developing, with 
intersecting fields of public and private provision and a wider range of overlapping 
institutional types. While the two sectors remain largely self-contained, there might 
be more interactions in the future – most perhaps involving larger non-profit colleges 
(of the Regents College type, for example) with research ambitions. But it must be 
open to question to what extent we can still speak of a single higher education ‘system’ 
or ‘sector’ if it contains such diverse organizations. Even the term ‘institution’ seems 
inappropriate for for-profit providers which are bought and sold in the way ordinary 
businesses would be: they cannot possess anything of a university’s stability or values 
as such terms are normally understood.
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Geoff Whitty and Joel Mullan 
The importance of both research and postgraduate education is neglected in the 
White Paper (BIS, 2011). Indeed, its very title – Higher Education: Students at the Heart 
of the System – gave an unfortunate message about the nature of the English higher 
education system in so far as it seemed to understate the importance of research to 
our understanding of modern universities. The previous government’s framework 
for higher education, Higher Ambitions (BIS, 2009), which effectively brought about 
the Browne Review and prefigured some of the current government’s policies, did 
at least contain a whole chapter on research, innovation, and knowledge exchange. 
It might be argued that the UK’s global standing in research is exceptional and 
may not therefore be in need of urgent attention to the same extent as universities’ 
teaching functions. Indeed, a report commissioned by the government from Elsevier 
recently described the UK as a ‘leading research nation’ and ‘a world leader in 
terms of article and citation output’. However, it also pointed to some ‘potential 
areas of vulnerability’ and suggested that ‘its leadership position may be threatened 
by its declining share of researchers globally, and by its declining share of global 
spending’ (2011: 5). Another recent report by the Prime Minister’s Council for 
Science and Technology stated that ‘the UK’s position needs to be strengthened if 
it is to remain competitive in research’ (2010: 18). In this situation, one might have 
reasonably expected a major White Paper on future higher education policy to have 
had considerably more to say about research and its supply line1.
Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that the Coalition Government has 
protected existing public funding levels for research to a greater extent than might 
have been anticipated given its general approach to public spending. Even so, to 
those on the ground the small print on capital spending and research councils has 
made initial claims about ring-fencing seem rather hollow and, of course, the extent 
of protection for research spending in the future remains unclear. The effects of 
recession and public expenditure cuts on other parts of the economy have also 
limited the amount of research funding coming to universities from other sources. 
This has been particularly evident in fields such as education, where much of the 
contract research funding has come from government departments in the recent 
past (BERA/UCET, 2012). 
Meanwhile, there has been increasing concentration of public research 
funding through greater selectivity in the distribution of the so-called QR (quality 
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related) core funding to universities for research and in the allocation of research 
studentships. The former comes from the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE), which distributes this funding to universities on the basis of 
the outcomes of a periodic Research Assessment Exercise (soon to be replaced by 
the Research Excellence Framework). The latter increasingly come via Doctoral 
Training Centres established by the UK Research Councils. While there may be 
strong arguments for these developments, the failure of the government to consider 
in any depth their implications for the relationship between research and teaching, 
except to encourage the development of teaching-only universities including new 
private sector providers, is to be regretted. Furthermore, as Sir Peter Scott, former 
vice-chancellor of Kingston University, has pointed out ‘it would be “naïve” to assume 
that the research funding landscape would not be affected by the changes to teaching 
funding in “substantial but unpredictable ways”’ (Jump, 2012: 8). 
But even if, given its title, this particular government White Paper was 
understandably focused on students, it also marginalized two increasingly important 
groups of students themselves: taught postgraduates (PGT) and research students 
(PGR). The Browne Review of higher education funding (ICSFF, 2010), despite 
having postgraduate funding explicitly included in its terms of reference, used only 
one of sixty-odd pages in its Report to deal with the funding of postgraduate courses. 
Even the White Paper itself devoted only nine paragraphs to the issue in an 80-page 
document. 
Initially, the government seemed to accept the Browne Report’s assumption that, 
not only was there no need to extend the proposed undergraduate student support 
package to postgraduates, existing core funding to institutions for most taught 
Master’s courses could cease on the same basis as for undergraduate courses. Ministers 
claimed that withdrawal of funding for courses would be offset by an increase in 
public funding for student support. Yet no new support package for postgraduate 
students similar to that being introduced for undergraduates was being proposed. 
Even when the government did acknowledge a potential problem, it referred 
it to the HEFCE, which instigated a temporary fix by maintaining existing levels 
of core funding for postgraduate teaching in higher cost subjects. Meanwhile, the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the central government 
department responsible for higher education policy, reactivated an earlier working 
party, and both BIS and the HEFCE initiated some useful fact finding exercises. So 
far, though, the government has failed to provide any real leadership on the issue 
and, as recently as September 2012, the minister responsible, David Willetts, was 
reported as having appealed for people with ideas about how to address the problem 
of funding for postgraduate students to ‘make themselves heard’ (Jump, 2012: 8).
To be fair to the government, the higher education sector itself was slow to 
recognize the issue. Indeed, Willetts has even suggested that one of his problems 
in getting postgraduate education higher up the government’s agenda was that 
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there ‘isn’t a particularly lively debate in the sector’ about it (Jump, 2012: 8). It is 
certainly true that at meetings of vice-chancellors in the immediate aftermath of the 
Browne Report, voices concerned with the issue got lost among what were seen as more 
pressing matters involving undergraduate provision under the proposed new fees 
regime. At first, it was largely the leaders of postgraduate institutions for the arts 
and social sciences who led efforts to highlight the dangers, but subsequently there 
has been a wider recognition that the consequences of not getting postgraduate 
education right could be considerable. The 1994 Group of smaller research intensive 
universities addressed the issue directly in its own report The Postgraduate Crisis 
(1994 Group, 2012), and given the high concentration of postgraduate provision in 
London, London Higher, the regional consortium of higher education institutions 
in the capital, has taken a particular interest in the issue. 
As for a wider constituency, there has been relatively little discussion of 
postgraduate education in debates on higher education in parliament or in the 
press. However, influential bodies, such as the British Academy, picked up the issue 
(Roberts, 2010; British Academy, 2012) and an unofficial cross-party parliamentary 
body, the Higher Education Commission (HEC), instigated an inquiry into the future 
of postgraduate education, the work of which is discussed in some detail below. 
Why postgraduate education matters 
While we do not know what impact the Coalition Government’s new regime for 
undergraduate fees will have, we can anticipate how potential postgraduates might 
respond to the prospect of adding debt to the tens of thousands they will have already 
accumulated as undergraduates. As a result, demand for postgraduate education 
could well fall, which would be of concern for a number of reasons. 
First, any threat to the future of postgraduate education could have a serious 
impact on universities. Quite apart from specialist postgraduate institutions, 
around half the intake of some comprehensive universities is now postgraduate in 
one way or another. Aside from any direct detriment to institutional income from 
falling postgraduate recruitment, the concern within the Academy itself has related 
particularly to the impact of a decline in postgraduate numbers on the future 
strength of UK research and scholarship. As British Academy President, Sir Adam 
Roberts (2010), put it, ‘if fees reform puts graduates off postgraduate study, where 
will academia find its new blood?’ 
Even Browne himself accepted a need to monitor the impact of higher 
undergraduate fees on postgraduate recruitment but took undue comfort from 
the fact that, under previous arrangements, overall enrolments at postgraduate 
level had increased significantly between 2002–03 and 2008–09. Yet the rate of 
increase for home students was significantly lower even then. UK postgraduate 
education is highly thought of elsewhere in the world and full-time courses in many 
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subjects attract far more international than home students. Most of the growth in 
postgraduate student recruitment in this country has been from non-EU countries. 
Even though home recruitment began to rise significantly between 2008 and 2010 
– and some people suggested that, as some of those students were already repaying 
undergraduate loans, there was clearly no problem – that increase seems now to have 
stalled particularly in relation to STEM subjects (Willetts, 2012). So, despite a short-
term increase in the numbers and proportion of home students during two years 
of recession, home student recruitment to both PGT and PGR remains a matter of 
concern. Given that there is evidence from Futuretrack, a major longitudinal survey 
of existing undergraduates (Purcell et al., 2012), that debt already deters students 
from undertaking postgraduate study, increased debt under the post-Browne 
arrangements could take us into dangerously uncharted territory. 
Second, postgraduate education is essential to the UK, not just in terms of 
the income it brings from international students, but also to the health of our own 
economy. David Willetts has acknowledged that ‘it would be clearly detrimental to this 
country if we saw a big fall in postgraduate numbers’ (Willetts, 2011). He therefore 
asked Sir Adrian Smith, then director general for knowledge and innovation in BIS, 
to review the future of postgraduate study in the new funding environment, although 
it is unclear whether this review led to a report, and the main emphasis to date has 
been on monitoring impact. 
In the context of globalization – however we understand it – the pressures on 
the economy, industry, and jobs are likely to intensify and postgraduate skills will 
be of vital importance to future economic success. In his report for the previous 
government, Smith argued that the skills of postgraduates are ‘critical for tackling 
major business challenges and driving innovation and growth’ (2010: 5). He pointed 
out that postgraduates are ‘innovation catalysts’, bridging the gap between ideas and 
business, and adding capacity to the UK’s research and development workforce. 
Disturbingly, a recent Bologna process report shows that substantially fewer 
UK students move on to ‘second cycle’ education, typically at Master’s or doctoral 
level, than in other European countries. The UK is one of only three countries with 
a progression rate of less than 10 per cent within two years, alongside Andorra and 
Kazakhstan (Eurydice Network, 2012). Globally, emerging economies have also 
recognized the important role of postgraduate skills, with Brazil and China, for 
example, investing huge sums on educating their citizens to postgraduate level, 
many of them – at least for now – at foreign institutions including our own. In the 
longer term, these countries will substantially increase their own home provision. 
Since 2003, China has already more than doubled its new postgraduate enrolments 
to nearly 600,000 per year, and its Ministry of Finance has recently announced a 
system of National Graduate Scholarships for both Master’s and doctoral students 
(Luo and Yang, 2012). 
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A failure to increase – let alone stem any decline in – the flow of UK students 
coming properly equipped to provide British industry with what it needs could have 
serious economic consequences. The inventor Sir James Dyson has, for instance, 
often pointed to a crisis of recruitment of UK-based postgraduate engineering 
students. He claimed that, in 2008, only 70 out of 3,825 additional postgraduate 
engineering students were from the UK. More recently he cautioned about the huge 
impact this could have on the economy and called for more government grants to 
enable UK students to study at postgraduate level (Richardson, 2011). If companies 
are struggling to find the skilled staff they need they are likely to at least start 
considering relocation. Other postgraduate skills shortages have been identified by 
Sir John Beddington, former government chief scientific advisor in fields such as 
cybersecurity and the nuclear sciences (Beddington, 2011). 
Third, although it has been relatively neglected in the debate so far, there 
is the contribution that postgraduate education makes to the wider cultural health 
of the nation. While some of this can be – and often is – expressed in economic 
terms of supporting the ‘creative industries’, there is surely still a case to be made 
for postgraduate education in its own right. The failure to consider this is part of a 
wider emphasis on instrumentalism in the policies of all recent governments and a 
lack of serious discussion about the role of universities in our society (Collini, 2012; 
Furlong, 2013). 
Fourth, there is the specific contribution that postgraduate study makes to 
the professions. For example, the government itself has noticed that school teachers 
in high-performing countries are educated to Master’s level. Yet, while encouraging 
more teachers to take such courses, it has stopped funding a scheme that enabled 
them to do so (Noble-Rogers, 2011). 
Fifth, there is a social justice and access argument for thinking about how 
to support postgraduate education. Thus, in addition to the overall supply issues 
identified above, there are major concerns about fairness, equity, and opportunities 
for social mobility. 
For example, even after the government’s reforms, fees for home undergraduate 
students will remain regulated. At postgraduate level, with some exceptions, they are 
not. Average fees for a one-year Master’s course for a home student rose to £4,000 in 
2011, while an MBA cost an average of £12,000 (Tobin, 2011). Fees for non-subsidized 
subjects are likely to rise significantly following the tripling of undergraduate fees 
from 2012, as many universities will be reluctant to price postgraduate courses below 
undergraduate courses. Fees for higher cost subjects that continue to receive some 
core funding may also rise. Indeed, there are reports that such rises are already 
happening in some places (Reddin et al., 2011; Morgan, 2011). 
Yet compared with provision for undergraduates, financial support for 
postgraduates is ‘hit or miss’. The UK Research Councils’ programme of studentships 
for research postgraduates provides support to only 22 per cent of those studying full 
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time and just 1.4 per cent of those studying part time. Taught postgraduate students 
are eligible to apply for Professional and Career Development Loans – although 
only 44 per cent of loan applicants were successful in 2011/12, down from 59 per 
cent in 2009/10 (HEC, 2012). A small number get support from their employers, 
most notably part-time students on taught courses, but many more fund themselves. 
Cost sharing is already widespread at postgraduate level, but the removal of any state 
subsidy for many students has made the extent of a student’s own means to contribute 
increasingly important.
Browne (ICSFF, 2010) himself quoted figures that showed that private 
school students are already more likely than their state school peers to undertake 
postgraduate study. They are significantly over-represented in the postgraduate 
population, accounting for 17 per cent of all postgraduates, despite being drawn 
from only 7 per cent of the population. 
Table 10.1: The backgrounds of postgraduates and undergraduates 
Privately educated State school 
educated
Postgraduate population 17% 83%
Undergraduate population 14% 86%
Total population 7% 93%
ICSFF (2010), drawn from Sutton Trust, itself drawing on DLHE data
In arguing for ‘fairer financial support for postgraduate students’, Alan Milburn 
(2009) suggested that a lack of postgraduate funding for access to the professions 
had serious implications for social mobility. Evidence from other countries confirms 
that as undergraduate qualifications become the norm, postgraduate study is an 
increasingly important social sorting mechanism. Speaking more recently, Milburn, 
as the Coalition Government’s social mobility tsar, warned that access to postgraduate 
education was ‘a real time-bomb in terms of social mobility’, saying that:
Everyone agrees that nobody should be barred from undergraduate 
education because they can’t afford fees, and yet we completely accept this 
barrier when it comes to postgraduate education. The fact is, postgraduate 
education is not a luxury for the individual, it is a necessity for our economy 
and wider society.
(Milburn, 2012a) 
Paul Wakeling and Chris Kyriacou (2010) have shown that rates of progression 
to postgraduate research degrees are higher among students at Russell Group 
universities, which tend to have more privileged intakes than most other universities. 
More generally, working-class students are somewhat less likely than others to progress 
Postgraduate education: overlooked and forgotten?
179
to postgraduate study immediately after a first degree, but rates of progression to 
higher degrees by social class after three years show sharper social class differentiation. 
Wakeling (2012) attributes this to the use of postgraduate study as a ‘second chance’ 
by those who can draw upon familial resources to facilitate further study. There is 
a real danger, then, that postgraduate education will become the new frontier of 
widening participation or, if we get it wrong, a new arena for the perpetuation of 
privilege. 
Finally, there is a risk of ‘market failure’ in some specific fields of postgraduate 
study. Terence Kealey (2011), the vice chancellor of the University of Buckingham, 
has claimed that ‘the UK market in taught postgraduate courses has long been 
liberalized, so its fees are correspondingly high, yet demand rises inexorably.’ He, 
like Browne, may have been unduly influenced by buoyant recruitment for Business 
School MBAs and similar courses, which are associated with high subsequent earning 
premiums. For, while higher degrees as a whole do bring benefits to individuals and 
the Exchequer, not all subjects can command high fees, nor do they all produce 
impressive returns for the student. Smith (2010) showed that recent postgraduates 
earned on average £23,500 six months after graduating – a postgraduate premium 
of around 24 per cent (Smith, 2010). However, business and administrative studies 
postgraduates earned 36 per cent more than first-degree holders, while languages 
and engineering students gained only an 11 per cent premium (O’Leary and 
Sloane, 2005). 
Clearly, in this situation some parts of the sector are more likely to thrive in 
the market place than others. It would therefore be a ‘hard sell’ to argue that there 
is a strong case for the government to intervene in the MBA market. There are, 
however, other parts of the sector that are not as healthy, particularly in terms of 
UK recruitment. In these areas we can anticipate market failure taking place, to the 
detriment of individuals and society, if remedial action is not taken. 
There are thus a number of specific ‘at risk’ areas of study, some of them with 
high public benefits but low private returns. In some arts subjects, individual financial 
benefits from study at this level could be minimal, despite its wider social benefits, 
something future funding options will need to take into account. Furthermore, the 
majority of home postgraduate students are part-time and unless things change they 
will face the triple disincentive of increased undergraduate debt, higher postgraduate 
fees, and no student support package. There are also particular concerns about 
some post-qualification courses in education, health, and social care, where 
public expenditure cuts have affected both salaries and the availability of support 
from employers. If we want to ensure that we have high standards of professional 
education in these fields, some intervention and investment from government might 
be required there as well. 
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Towards a topography of postgraduate education 
One of the reasons why the visibility of postgraduate education is limited is the 
relative paucity of data about it. Both BIS and the HEFCE have now recognized this 
as a problem and are seeking to establish a better database to inform future policy 
deliberations. For example, the 2010 Smith Review recommended that the sector 
should advise government on what additional information was needed to inform 
policy decisions on widening access to postgraduate study, and in a letter to HEFCE 
in January 2012 the responsible ministers at BIS, Vince Cable and David Willetts, 
expressed support for the work the Funding Council was doing to understand more 
about the purpose, characteristics, and outcomes of postgraduate study. 
Having said that, postgraduate education is a notoriously difficult concept 
to define. Postgraduate education can be defined as courses which are more 
advanced than undergraduate courses, usually studied by those who already hold 
undergraduate degrees (Sastry, 2004). However, as such, it is something of an 
umbrella term, encompassing a diverse array of provision – from short certificate 
courses to four-year PhD research projects to professional doctorates studied largely 
in the workplace. The key distinctions are between postgraduate taught courses in a 
wide range of disciplines, postgraduate courses specifically designed as professional 
training and development, and postgraduate research degrees, including many 
professional doctorates. 
However, as the British Academy (2012) points out, the line between PGT 
and PGR provision is sometimes blurred. The same is true of the line between 
PGT and PGP, especially in respect of what counts as Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD). 
The HEC, which we discuss below, mapped existing HESA student data onto 
this new typology, although the mapping is not exact. It has not been possible, for 
example, to disaggregate professionally-oriented Master’s degrees from the ‘taught 
Master’s’ category. It does, however, provide a rough overview of the current size and 
structure of the postgraduate sector.
Enrolment onto postgraduate courses has increased steadily over the last 
decade with research enrolments rising by 20.5 per cent and taught enrolments by 
34.3 per cent between 2002 and 2010. As indicated earlier, the rise is predominantly 
due to rapid increases in uptake by international students. The trend is particularly 
marked in PGT, where international enrolments increased by 105.8 per cent 
compared to an increase of 15.8 per cent in home enrolments. Uptake of PGR courses 
by international students over the same period increased by 26.8 per cent, compared 
to a 14.1 per cent increase in domestic uptake. In a handful of disciplines at PGT 
level, rapid increases in international enrolments have actually masked a decline in 
the number of domestic enrolments (HEC, 2012: 34).
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Table 10.2: A typology of postgraduate provision 
PG Taught PG Professional PG Research
Postgraduate diploma 
and Master’s courses, 
extending an 
individual’s knowledge 
or allowing them 




Research Master’s – 
e.g. MRes: includes 
methods training and 
often used as a stepping 
point to a PhD; Mphil: 




PGCE (Initial Teacher 




e.g. Open University 
courses 
Vocational Master’s 
courses – either as CPD 
or preparing individual 
for a particular 
profession
‘New route’ PhD – with 
larger taught elements 
and wider skills training
MBA Some professional 
doctorates – that count 
in REF (Research 
Excellence Framework)
Some professional 
doctorates – where 
required as licence to 
practice but not included 
in REF 
Adapted from the Higher Education Commission, 2012
Table 10.3: Summary of all postgraduate students at UK HEIs 
in 2010–11
 
Arts Sciences Combined 
subjects
Total
PGR PhD 35,535 52,245 5 87,780
  Mphil 8,185 7,290 5 15,475
  Total – PGR 43,720 59,535 10 103,255
PGT Taught Master’s 198,775 107,690 110 306,575
 
Other at taught Master’s 
level 6,900 3,075 0 9,970
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  Integrated Master’s 4,050 63,190 0 67,245
 
PG diplomas, certificates 
and institutional credit 52,250 27,680 1,925 81,850
  Total – PGT 261,975 201,635 2,035 465,640
PGP Professional/regulated PG 25,300 6,390 140 31,820
  MBA 26,345 380 0 26,720
 
PGCE (Initial Teacher 
Training) 28,530 0 0 28,530
  Total – PGP 80,175 6,770 140 87,070
HEC, 2012: 24 
Over half of PGT students in the UK study part time, with around 60 per cent of 
students aged 26 or over – although the number of young, full-time students has 
increased steadily in the last few years (Bell and Chester, 2011). By contrast, only 29 
per cent of PGR students in England study on a part-time basis.
There is a degree of concentration of postgraduate students in certain subject 
areas. Bell and Chester report that over 60 per cent of all taught postgraduate students 
are studying in just four subject areas: business and administrative studies, education, 
subjects allied to medicine, and social studies. As can be seen from Table 10.2, there 
are significantly more students studying towards research degrees in science subjects 
than in the arts, humanities, and the social sciences. It should also be noted that 
69 per cent of Research Council funding for postgraduate research is focused on 
science disciplines.
In a number of areas our understanding of the postgraduate landscape 
remains inadequate. These include, but are not limited to, a lack of comprehensive 
and consistent applications data owing to the absence of a common application 
system, a lack of consistent and reliable data on the socio-economic backgrounds of 
the postgraduate cohort, and limited data on longer-term employment outcomes for 
postgraduate students. Information in all three fields, and the latter two in particular, 
is vital to inform deliberations on how far a new approach to funding postgraduate 
education in the UK is needed. 
Even in the area of fees and finance for postgraduate education, crucial to 
the current policy debate on funding, the data are limited. However, the following 
figures show the main sources of funding currently available to home and EU PGT 
and PGR students:
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Postgraduate Taught
Figure 10.1: Sources of tuition fee income for full time taught postgraduates
The majority of home PGT students receive no financial support towards the cost of 
their tuition – although this category includes students who receive a small interest 
rate subsidy from the government through state-supported Professional and Career 
Development Loans. HESA data from 2010–11 suggest that 8.4 per cent of all PGT 
students were supported by their institution through fee waivers or similar. Only 0.4 
per cent were supported by the Research Councils, whose financial support for taught 
postgraduate study has increasingly been phased out. Part-time PGT students are 
more likely than full-time students to have funding from an employer (HEC, 2012: 
56). The 10.8 per cent of all PGT students who have such funding may, however, 
be an underestimate, as those students who pay their own tuition fees directly to 
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their institution and later receive reimbursement from their employer might go 
undetected. 
Postgraduate Research
Notes: The population is restricted to students registered at HEIs in England, 
and includes students in all years of study (rather than just entrants)
Figure 10.2: Sources of tuition fee income for full-time research postgraduates
By contrast, a significant proportion of home PGR students receive funding towards 
the cost of fees and living costs either from the Research Councils (16 per cent of 
all such students in 2010–11) or from their institutions (20.5 per cent in 2010–11). 
A further 3.7 per cent of all PGR students are funded by charitable organizations. 
HESA data suggests that only 3.7 per cent of all research students are funded by their 
employer, though here again this is likely to be an underestimate due to shortcomings 
in the reporting method. Nevertheless, 37.6 per cent of all postgraduate research 
Postgraduate education: overlooked and forgotten?
185
students appear to be completely self-funded – particularly amongst those studying 
in the arts and humanities. Part-time students are more likely to be self-funded, with 
61.7 per cent receiving no financial backing (HEC, 2012: 50).
The work of the HEC
The HEC was formed in 2011 by a group of parliamentarians who thought there was 
a need for a platform for a more nuanced, informed, and reflective debate on higher 
education policy. The Commission brought together 20 leaders from the education 
sector, the business community, and the three major political parties. It takes a Select 
Committee-style approach to its work – holding inquiries, taking evidence, and 
producing written reports with recommendations for policymakers. 
Owing to some of the aforementioned concerns, the HEC decided, for its 
first inquiry, to address the issue of postgraduate education. It took evidence from 
a large number of organizations and individuals – holding five evidence sessions in 
Westminster, a roundtable with the Wellcome Trust on postgraduate education in 
the life sciences, and a half day of workshops at the annual conference of the UK 
Council for Graduate Education. It also made visits to four campuses (at Oxford, 
Cranfield, and Greenwich Universities and the National Film and Television School), 
which consisted of meetings with heads of institution, academics, and students. In 
these sessions, members spoke directly to 11 vice chancellors and nearly 40 students 
and early career researchers. In addition, the Commission received 54 written 
submissions. 
The Commission looked at postgraduate education in three timeframes. 
It sought to understand more about the nature of the sector now and the state of 
postgraduate education in British universities today; it looked at the likely state of 
the sector in 2015, when the cohort beginning their undergraduate programmes 
in September 2012 under the new fee regime will come to consider entering 
postgraduate study; and finally, to the nature of the sector beyond 2015 – considering 
what the UK’s long-term vision for the postgraduate sector should be. 
Possible approaches to funding
Perhaps one of the most urgent and difficult issues the Commission had to confront 
was that of funding, particularly for fees and/or living expenses for home students 
on postgraduate taught courses. As indicated earlier, there is a prospect of students 
facing increased postgraduate fees and other expenses and repaying them in the 
context of rising undergraduate debt – and at a time when, as we have noted, existing 
Professional and Career Development Loans seem to be drying up. While the HEFCE 
teaching grant funding remains available for some courses, the arrangement is only 
temporary at present and does relatively little to offset the costs to the student as 
fees rise. Unless the funding issue is addressed, Don Nutbeam, vice-chancellor of 
Southampton University, may well be right to claim that ‘the alternative is a system 
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in which UK universities continue to operate in a global market place … from which 
our own students become increasingly excluded’ (Nutbeam, 2011). 
There are different views about the best way to finance postgraduate education 
in the future and some of the main ones were summarized in the Commission’s 
following report:
Possible Ways to Finance Postgraduate Education
A single loan scheme for undergraduate and postgraduate education
The Australian government provides student loans to cover the costs of 
postgraduate fees under the Higher Education Loans Programme (HELP). 
Repayments, made through the tax system, are progressive – with those earning 
more repaying back a greater proportion of their income each month. The 
total costs of the scheme are controlled through a lifetime cap of AUS $116,507 
(£75,273) for medical students and AUS $93,204 (£60,217) for other students. 
The scheme is available for most, though not all, postgraduate courses. The 
HELP system covers only fees, which are lower in Australia than the UK. 
The Australian model was presented to the Commission by Southampton 
University Vice Chancellor Don Nutbeam. Rather than replicating the 
Australian model exactly through creating a second separate loan scheme for 
postgraduates, Nutbeam proposes creating a single loan scheme which home 
students can draw on to cover both undergraduate and postgraduate learning. 
He contends such a system could be established without major changes to 
the current arrangements for student financial support for undergraduate 
education.
An income-contingent loan of £10k for masters degrees
In a report for CentreForum published in late 2011, Tim Leunig proposed that 
government should offer income-contingent loans of £10,000 to prospective 
postgraduate taught students in order to cover maintenance costs. 
Loan repayments would be made through the tax system, with graduates 
repaying 9 per cent of any income between £15,000 and £21,000. Repayments 
would not be taken from earnings over £21,000, as that is the point at which 
undergraduate student loan repayments will begin under the new student 
finance regime. Those earning over £21,000 would thus pay off £540 of their 
postgraduate loan each year. 
An interest rate would be applied, ranging from inflation to inflation plus 3 
per cent on a progressive scale with outstanding debt forgiven after 30 years. 
Leunig proposes that loans should be available for any postgraduate taught 
degree, with eligibility restricted to those with first class or upper second class 
honours degrees.
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Risk-sharing by students and universities
In oral evidence to the Commission Professor Nicholas Barr argued for 
extension of the undergraduate student loan system to postgraduates. Noting 
that ‘student loans are designed to make a small loss, protecting those with low lifetime 
earnings from repaying the entire sum,’ he argued that the key question for public 
policy was who carried this loss. Instead of the loss risk being placed on 
taxpayers – which would inevitably mean controls on student numbers – it 
could instead be shifted to the cohort of students and the universities through 
risk premiums. 
A long-term private bond
One idea put to the Commission envisaged universities collectively leveraging 
investment from capital markets to provide a long-term loan facility for UK 
students. Universities could be an attractive prospect for financial markets given 
the predictability of their revenue streams and the longevity of their business 
models.
Corporate bonds could be issued via a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
composed of a number of universities – potentially also including their alumni, 
private investors, industry, business, and other stakeholders – with government 
acting as guarantor. Each bond issuance would provide a facility for students 
at participating institutions to draw down loans for postgraduate study. The 
targeting of loans would be established as part of the lending criteria of the SPV, 
and this in turn would be a repayment risk insured against by each institution.
This could provide a scalable, postgraduate funding solution which offers 
less risk exposure for individual institutions and removes the need for risk-
selecting students. As a contingent liability, the bond is accounted for outside 
of the Public Sector Net Credit Requirement and offers students a cheaper 
repayment alternative to existing commercial loan schemes.
Alumni borrowing – the Prodigy Finance model
Prodigy Finance connects alumni with students attending the top universities 
in the world – ‘creating a community of investors and borrowers’. Alumni 
purchase bonds which cover an entire class of students at a particular university. 
Investors can choose to only invest in their own alma mater or to spread the 
funds among multiple universities. Prodigy structure the bonds to ensure a 
balanced and diverse portfolio of students in each issuance. The return to 
investors depends on the repayment performance of students – though to date 
there have been no defaults. There are however questions about the scalability 
of this model beyond MBAs and other high-return degrees. 
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Tax incentives for employers 
A number of contributors to the review advocated the establishment of tax 
credits for employers contributing to the cost of postgraduate education for 
their employees. Birkbeck College, University of London, stated that ‘Financial 
incentives to employers to pay for their staff to undertake part-time postgraduate studies 
should be considered seriously, as many employers are keen to do so but have limited 
resources.’
A research review of international tax incentives (CEDEFOP, 2009) identifies 
a need to avoid deadweight costs, especially among large enterprises, who may 
invest regardless of incentives. In designing a potential incentive system there 
may be a case for restricting eligibility to small and medium sized businesses. 
The CEDEFOP report also acknowledges that it is difficult to make informed 
policy decisions about tax incentives, noting the ‘scarcity of quantitative and 
qualitative information’ and that ‘comprehensive public evaluations of them are 
practically non-existent’. 
Source: Adapted from HEC, 2012: 67–9
A key question concerns how targeted or otherwise any such funding scheme should 
be. The Commission identified three principles for prioritization.
The first and perhaps most important principle is maximizing the value added 
of the loan scheme. The scheme’s design should seek to minimize deadweight cost 
and should not crowd out existing streams of funding. 
Secondly, the scheme might wish to target loans in areas where we are currently 
underinvesting and which are strategically important to our future competitiveness. 
The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, for example, recommended 
that the government ‘extend the student loan scheme currently available to 
undergraduates to cover STEM Master’s degrees’ (House of Lords, 2012). However, 
there are a number of other subject areas, such as modern foreign languages and 
quantitative social science, which are as vital to competitiveness and as important 
to maintain. There may well be arguments in relation to other vulnerable subjects, 
whether or not strategically important. 
Thirdly, the scheme may look to prioritize funding allocations on the basis 
of improving access to the professions. This could involve targeting loans at courses 
which are de facto requirements for entry into employment. An alternative approach 
would be to target funding at individuals, removing the barriers to participation faced 
by particular credit-constrained subgroups of society. In a written submission to the 
HEC inquiry, Universities UK suggested that the government might ‘perhaps identify 
those students that were eligible for maintenance grants at undergraduate level or 
through the use of other indicators… identify students that may not otherwise pursue 
postgraduate study’ (UUK, 2012). 
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After the HEC had reported, the National Union of Students made a further 
proposal of a way in which loans might be introduced for postgraduate students with 
minimal additional costs to the Exchequer (McVitty and Wright, 2012). This involved 
three specific schemes: one for fees and maintenance loans for those from hitherto 
poorly represented groups seeking access to the professions, another employer-
backed scheme for those studying for any postgraduate professional development 
qualification alongside employment, and finally a fees-only loan of around £6,000 for 
well qualified Master’s students in any field. The loans would be available through the 
Student Loans Company but on different terms to undergraduate loans and there 
would be a limited number of them in the first instance. 
The Commission’s recommendations 
Although the HEC report reinforced the criticism of the White Paper for neglecting 
postgraduate education and made a strong case for state-backed student loans to 
be introduced for segments of postgraduate provision where the financial markets 
have failed to provide competitive sources of finance, it did not itself propose a new 
funding scheme. However, it did establish a need for one and recommended that the 
government should immediately establish a taskforce to examine the feasibility of a 
postgraduate student loan scheme and develop policy options by December 2013. 
Alongside its advocacy of increasing the enrolment of home students on 
postgraduate courses, the Commission also noted that the very availability of such 
courses was threatened by a potential decline in international students as a result of 
changes in UK immigration rules. It is thus not clear that the buoyant international 
recruitment noted earlier will continue indefinitely. Indeed, subsequent figures 
suggest that 2012–13 has already seen a contraction in the total number of 
international students coming to the UK from some key markets. The enrolment of 
Indian students has already fallen by 24 per cent (HESA, 2013) and there is some 
recent survey evidence that even Chinese students are now becoming less likely to 
consider the UK as the preferred destination for their studies (ExEd, 2013). 
The Commission also made a number of other important recommendations, 
including better collection of data on the postgraduate landscape and improved 
understanding of employers’ needs for postgraduate skills, changes to the relevant 
immigration regulations, greater national and corporate investment in research and 
development, and the setting up of a joint working group to consider the issue of 
quality and international competitiveness in research degrees.
Conclusion
In the same month as the HEC reported on postgraduate education, Alan Milburn’s 
latest report on how universities can advance social mobility (Milburn, 2012b) also 
recommended a new loan system for postgraduate students. His report argued that 
the ‘risk that the ability to pay upfront, rather than an individual’s potential, will 
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increasingly become a determining factor in who can access postgraduate education 
… poses an unacceptable threat to the long-term health of the UK higher education 
sector’ (2010b: 6). 
Taken together, these two reports mounted significant pressure on the 
government to address this neglected issue as a matter of urgency. Support has 
also been received from Bright Blue, an influential group within the Conservative 
Party, with Director Ryan Shorthouse imploring the government to turn its eyes to 
postgraduate study and extend government loans to postgraduates (Shorthouse, 
2013). Further pressure came from 11 English vice-chancellors who wrote to the 
government about the funding crisis facing postgraduate education (Boffey, 2013a). 
Meanwhile, Minister David Willetts announced that he was holding a roundtable with 
interested parties ‘to discuss the emerging evidence of a problem and to consider 
potential solutions in the current difficult economic climate’ (Boffey, 2013b: 21). 
If no decision is made on an appropriate funding scheme for home students 
in the near future, some urgent interim measures will need to be put in place before 
students begin to emerge with increased undergraduate debt. Among those floated 
have been maintenance of teaching funding for postgraduate courses at least until 
any new funding scheme is in place. It may also prove necessary to extend such core 
funding to subjects currently excluded from it. Philanthropic support might also 
be sought for a specific endowment fund to support ‘need-blind’ entry for home 
students in some subjects. Other possibilities might include repayment ‘holidays’ for 
those returning to study part-time while repaying their undergraduate debts. For key 
professions like health, social work, education, and defence, the state could act as 
a surrogate employer and provide incentives for students to enrol on postgraduate 
courses, as already happens in the case of pre-service teacher training courses, 
for example. 
Beyond that, there is, of course, a need for a serious debate about the meaning 
and importance of graduate skills and the nature and quality of postgraduate 
education, as well as about the balance to be struck between undergraduate and 
postgraduate provision. However, such a debate should take place in a context where 
access to postgraduate education is a realistic possibility for those who can benefit 
from it. A ‘one-stop shop’ for information on courses and funding for postgraduates 
would also help here. 
All this is urgent. It would indeed be ironic if the new undergraduate 
arrangements introduced by the Coalition Government were to prove more 
equitable than their critics fear, only to find that inequities are reintroduced via that 
part of the system that has so far been relatively neglected in the funding debate. As 
Graham Spittle, chief technology officer at IBM and chair of the HEC inquiry into 
postgraduate education that has informed this chapter, has concluded:
Postgraduate education: overlooked and forgotten?
191
The UK government should recognise that their responsibility for higher 
education does not stop with undergraduates. We need to take a holistic 
whole-system view of education – and that must include postgraduates.
(Spittle, 2012: 42)
If we do not, then not only postgraduate education itself, but the standing of British 
universities and their research, as well as the future health of the economy and 
society, could well be at stake.
NOTE: In July 2013, just as this book was going to press, the HEFCE published 
two reports on the state of postgraduate education (HEFCE, 2013a; 2013b). At the 
same time, £75 million of public investment in improving postgraduate finance was 
announced. The HEFCE will earmark £25 million from the Catalyst Fund for pilot 
projects that stimulate progression into taught postgraduate education and a further 
£50 million, from the National Scholarship Programme budget, will be made available 
from 2015/16 onwards. Sector organisations and commentators continue to press for 
a more systematic approach to tackling the postgraduate funding challenge, with the 
Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission describing as ‘very disappointing’ the 
government’s apparent decision not to commission an independent report looking 
at the issue of postgraduate access (SMCPC, 2013). 
Note
1 The Coalition Government did however publish a separate research and innovation strategy 
six months later in December 2011. See www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/32450/11-1387-innovation-and-research-strategy-for-growth.pdf
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Chapter 11 
Leading the British University 
today: your fate in whose hands?
David Watson
Introduction
At the time of writing UK higher education is going through one of its more ‘manic’ 
periods. Recent policy decisions, allied to the government’s austerity programme 
(which has yet fully to reach publicly funded higher education), as well moral panics 
about graduate employability, have created a storm which, if not ‘perfect’, has made 
the sector and its leadership twitchy to an extent that has not been experienced since 
the late 1970s.
The policy framework
To demonstrate the regularity of government intervention in the system as a whole, 
below I set out the main landmarks of reform in the UK since the early 1960s. To 
put the point crudely, for every third entry of a cohort into the system since then, 
the system has been thrown up into the air by a government claiming it is fixing 
the sins of the previous administration – including, sometimes, its own party. In 
international terms this degree of legislative hyperactivity is extraordinary (Watson 
and Bowden, 2005).
UK government higher education initiatives 1963–2012
1. The Robbins Report (1963): creation of ‘new’ universities, plus the ‘ability to 
benefit’ criterion
2. The Woolwich speech and the creation of the Polytechnics (1965)
3. The James Report (1972): reorganization of teacher education and ‘diversification’
4. Withdrawal of the overseas student subsidy (1980), public expenditure cuts 
(1981), and the White Paper proposing a smaller and rationalized system (1985)
5. Creation of the National Advisory Body for Public Sector Higher Education 
(NAB), centralizing the former local authority responsibility for higher education 
outside the universities (1985)
6. White Paper endorsing the expansion and incorporation of the Polytechnics, 
Central Institutions, and large Colleges (1987), achieved in the Education 
Reform Act (1988)
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7. White Paper on the ending of the binary line (1991), achieved in the Further 
and Higher Education Act (1992), along with Funding Councils for the devolved 
administrations; creation of the ‘new new’ universities
8. The Dearing Report (1997): opens the way for undergraduate fees, legislated for in 
the Teaching and Higher Education Act (1998)
9. White Paper (2003) leads to ‘variable’ fees, the establishment of the ‘new 
new’ universities (without research-degree awarding powers), and to potential 
foundation-degree awarding powers for further education institutions in the 
Higher Education Act (2004)
10. White Paper, Higher Ambitions: The future of universities in a knowledge economy (2009)
11. The Browne Review (2010) leads to proposals for higher undergraduate fees, 
and a revised graduate contribution scheme
12. White Paper, Higher Education: Students at the heart of the system (2011): replacing 
Funding Council grants to institutions with a higher level of fees (up to £9,000) 
to be advanced by the Student Loans Company and recovered through fees 
(Watson, 2011).
This might not matter so much if there were a well-understood direction of travel, or 
a consistently articulated final goal. Instead, we have seen violent ‘mood swings’ on 
issues like the size of and provision for the sector, both within and across governments 
of differing stripes. Meanwhile, in addition to political tinkering, the biggest part of 
this story has to be missed targets. Prime Minister Tony Blair boldly announced a 
target of 50 per cent of 18–30-year olds in higher education at the Labour Party 
Conference in 1999: we are stuck in the low forties and are likely to go backwards 
(Gill, 2008). The Learning Age wanted a fully-functioning credit transfer system by 
2000 (DfEE, 1998: para 6.18). The Future of Higher Education saw all higher education 
teachers as having an accredited qualification by 2006 (DfES, 2003: 50). To the 
frustration of successive ministers, the central government policy writ runs small, 
except in relation to fees and funding.
At the time of writing (October 2012) the Coalition Government, whose parties 
entered the 2010 election with diametrically opposed policies on higher education, is 
struggling with the implementation of the policies in Students at the Heart of the System 
(BIS, 2011). 
Broadly, this White Paper represents the eleventh new ‘framework’ for UK 
higher education since the Robbins Report of 1963. It exhibits the characteristic 
mixture throughout this half-century of reform of brittle certainty, uncertainty, and 
evidence-free gambling on the outcomes.
Some things in the Paper provided confirmation of prior announcements, 
including a broken-backed response to Browne on fees. Fees are capped at £9,000 
(Browne had suggested removing the cap entirely) and a proposed redistributive levy 
has been dropped. Further interventions attempt to make a curious kind of market, 
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where at one end students with high qualifications – initially AAB at A-level, now ABB 
– can almost demand entry to a range of so-called elite institutions (whether or not 
these have the capacity to respond), and at the other, institutions will be encouraged 
to undercut each other on price. At the same time the Office for Fair Access (OFFA) 
will have its teeth sharpened. 
A second category of proposals – mostly those where the Coalition initially 
disagreed – were put out for ‘consultations’, now largely concluded. These included: 
post-qualification admissions (PQA): flatly rejected – probably now for a considerable 
time; upfront payment of fees (where the Liberal Democrats lost out to the 
Conservatives in allowing this apparent undermining of the progressive intentions 
of the fee repayment scheme); criteria for degree-awarding powers (largely aimed 
at making entry easier for private providers; reduction or removal of VAT for shared 
services (finally approved); and another attempt at devising a regulatory system that 
is both lighter-touch and more interventionist (BIS, 2012). 
In contrast are the evidence-light leaps of faith, where clearly no further 
research would be welcome. These include: the robustness of data about the student 
experience, the lighter-touch ‘regulation’ of standards and awards (surely counter-
intuitive after the post-expansion moral panics about what constitutes a degree anyway), 
and the cavalry over the hill of the ‘for-profit sector’ (with no acknowledgement of 
the US evidence about how the same companies can fleece and distort a generous 
system of public support for deserving students [see Stratford, 2012]). 
Most serious of all is the likely effect on public finances. Upfront payment 
will simply increase costs (and at the same time, perversely, dampen demand). Over 
time, and not least because of EU-wide obligations, the returns look wildly optimistic 
(HEPI, 2012a). Perhaps the most significant piece of whistling in the dark is the 
blithe confidence that 70 per cent of the funds advanced on students’ behalf will 
come back through the loan system.
As a result the system currently faces at least five interrelated and unresolved 
pressures:
1. The fee arrangements have suppressed demand, but not to the extent that some 
feared (HEPI, 2012c). The exceptions are part-time and mature enrolments, 
which have dropped like a stone (HEFCE, 2013: 3–4)
2. The government’s other market interventions (in particular, those that allow 
institutions to recruit as many of the most highly – but traditionally – qualified 
students) may be cutting against their ‘social mobility’ goals of diversifying the 
intake into ‘top’ universities
3. There are fears that the next spending review will open up (again) the question 
of protection for research funding. Nervousness here is compounded by the 
prospect of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) exercise at the end of 2013
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4. The prospects of a more ‘liberated’ (i.e. less regulated) private sector blow hot 
and cold. This arena is also complicated by the goal of a more ‘risk-related’ 
regulatory regime, with an uncertain demarcation between the Funding Council 
(HEFCE in England) acting as a regulator and the Quality Assurance Agency 
(QAA) consulting on its new ‘quality code’ (for the UK as a whole)
5. Devolution in general poses another set of uncertainties, also wound up by the 
prospect of the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014 (HEPI, 2012b).
In aggregate, this set of strains is exacerbated by the Coalition’s reluctance to table a 
Higher Education Bill, and hence provide a further lightning-rod for internal division 
and external opposition. Without primary legislation, number controls cannot be 
reformed, the regulations necessary for ‘liberating’ the private sector remain out 
of reach, and in an ironic way the position of the Funding Councils (especially the 
HEFCE) as ‘buffer’ bodies has strengthened, not diminished.
Institutional choices and trajectories
All over the world governments seek disciplined mission specificity for their higher 
institutions: they would like identifiable groups of universities and colleges, doing 
different things, and on expectations of different levels of funding. All over the world 
institutions won’t behave, largely because their ‘academic’ employees won’t behave 
– they are basically chasing similar (subject and professional) measures of esteem. 
Such a drive often gets connected with the notion of a ‘binary system’: when a 
set of ‘traditional’ or ‘academic’ institutions is contrasted with another designed to 
deliver a more local (and locally accountable), vocational, accessible, and responsive 
service. There is a related international pathology. States with binary systems often feel 
that the rigidities of the framework are holding them back (the UK is an example). 
Some without them feel this is the only way forward (Austria is considering reforms of 
this type). Sometimes those who have made the move get disenchanted and want to 
move back (like Australia, who may be followed by South Africa). Herein lies another 
rule: in policy terms the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence (or 
somebody else does it better).
In these circumstances it is unsurprising that despite the strength of calls 
to differentiate their missions, the majority of institutional leaders have chosen to 
preserve the full range of their activities and to keep their options open. Analysis of 
undergraduate prospectuses reveals, for example, the very limited range of claims of 
distinctive or exceptional performance. These (almost) always include: a research 
environment (on a scale from ‘intensive’ to ‘informed’); attention to teaching and 
learning (much more likely to be about infrastructure – like ‘world-class learning 
resources’ – than to pedagogy itself); graduate destinations (including the ubiquitous 
‘employability’ claim); an ‘international’ community; and the social and recreational 
environment (the latter has receded a little lately in favour of the first four – not 
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many lead any more, as they once did, on nightclubs). Nor do the main voluntary 
interest groups (or ‘gangs’) make much sense in terms of objective performance. 
There are currently five (as follows – numbers are as on websites on 11 November 
2012), although the situation is increasingly fluid, and it is very hard to make sense, 
for example, of the Russell Group on any objective measures:
● The Russell Group of self-proclaimed “research intensive” institutions (24)
● The ’94 Group of smaller ‘research intensives’ (12)
● ‘Million+’, claiming to educate over a million students and made up chiefly of 
former Polytechnics and Scottish Central Institutions (21)
● Guild HE – the representative group of pre-1992 Colleges of Higher 
Education (25)
● The University Alliance, a group formerly called ‘non-aligned!’ – perhaps better 
termed the Groucho Marx Group (25).
In particular, it is clear that institutional status (and ‘gang’ membership) have very 
little to do with sound and responsible management, which is found (or not) in 
all types of institutions. In an attempt to show how specious many of these claimed 
boundaries are, Brian Ramsden and I created in 2007 the ‘Association of Seaside 
Universities’. We were able to get convincing contributions to our manifesto from all 
14 eligible universities (Watson, 2009: 105–13). 
Another familiar illusion is that of ‘academic drift’ by the so-called new 
universities, most recently claimed by Stefan Collini, who calls it ‘the flow of 
emulation’ (Collini, 2012: 5, 54). Since 1992 there has been a popular view that the 
post-92 institutions began meekly to imitate their ‘old university’ counterparts. In 
fact, as Rachel Bowden and I demonstrated in an analysis of the first ten years of 
the ‘new new universities’, if anything the reverse was true (Watson and Bowden, 
2002). The former PSHE institutions by and large stuck to their own traditional 
business (of professional and vocational higher education, and through part-time 
and mixed-mode as well as full-time study). What did begin to happen was that 
traditional universities, seeing this sort of development as in tune with the times, 
began instead to move across this unfamiliar field themselves (not least by founding 
Business Schools). 
Among the main drivers towards this convergence or isomorphism, five stand 
out in particular.
1. There are the policy uncertainties set out above. The vice-chancellor of the 
University of Central Lancashire was speaking for the community when he stated 
that the biggest risk faced by his institution is Her Majesty’s Government
2. The student market poses another set of problems. What students want and need 
can confound the most sophisticated policy frameworks, where spokespersons 
react to what they regard as irrational choices by prescribing more and 
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decreasingly plausible ‘information’. Look at the ways in which student demand 
led the systems of the ‘developed’ world towards meeting the needs of the 
cultural, creative, and service economies. Their ICT requirements (where they 
are normally ahead of their teachers) compound this. The UK system provides 
ample evidence of how (despite political voices to the contrary) a market does 
exist. Indeed student choices – of subjects, of institutions, and of mode of study 
– could be said very substantially to have moulded the system as we have it today. 
That is why so many supply-side STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics) initiatives have failed (the same is not true in the developing world 
[Nuffield Foundation, 2008]). That is why there is a slow but inexorable move 
towards studying closer to the family home. And that is why institutions (like the 
UK Open University), which hold out the prospect of earning while learning, are 
increasingly popular
3. Inherited and accumulated resources (of all kinds) can limit freedom of manoeuvre.
A good device for taking a cold-eyed, objective view of the relative position 
of any institution starting out on the process of mapping its future is to use the 
‘prosperity index’. This elementary league table, invented by Rachel Bowden and 
myself at the end of last century, aggregates all of the income received by UK 
higher education institutions from all sources in the year and divides the amount 
by the full-time equivalent number of students they taught in that year (Watson 
and Bowden, 1999). It is a crude proxy for what those students might expect 
in terms of the quality of the infrastructure, staffing, and services. In the terms 
of today’s discourse, these are the resources available to support the ‘student 
experience’: teachers and administrators, libraries and laboratories, buildings 
and gardens (the Aristotelian peripetaea), partnerships and networks, and the 
‘cloud’ effect of research and intellectual capital. It has the useful side effect of 
strongly predicting the rank orders established by much more dubious multi-
factorial league tables in newspapers and magazines. The original ‘prosperity 
table’ predicted the Times league table with a correlation of 0.92. In that sense 
it was, of course, a circular measure: the institutions had ‘performed’ in various 
ways to gain these resources. It does, however, operate as a significant reality check 
for a number of institutions for whom modesty rather than self-aggrandizement 
is indicated.
Table 11.1 shows the top ten of the 162 institutions in 2010–11. In order 
to correct for volume and breadth of activity I have assumed a cut-off at 10,000 
FTE students, so the list begins at number 4 (the top three on the full list are 
small, highly successful specialist institutions: the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, Cranfield University, and the London Business School).
Claire Callender and Peter Scott
200
Table 11.1 Prosperity Index (total income over FTE students) 
2010–11 for the top ten large (10k+ FTE) institutions
1. Cambridge (4) £65,836
2. Imperial College (8) £48,819
3. Oxford (9) £46,817
4. UCL (11) £37,608
5. Edinburgh (16) £27,769
6. LSE (17) £26,235
7. Kings’s College London (19) £25,874
8. Bristol (22) £23,850
9. Liverpool (23) £23,474
10. Warwick (27) £22,173
Notes: Actual position in brackets
Source: HESA
It is immediately significant that all of these, apart from LSE, have Medical Schools, 
confirming the fact that medicine makes a huge difference to relative income. 
As for separating the ‘apex’ from the ‘clingers-on’ the fault line after number 
4 is palpable, validating the concept of a ‘golden triangle’ between Oxford, 
Cambridge, and London (several others of the smaller London Colleges are in 
roughly the same zone, but not included because of their size; for example the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine is at number 3 on the overall 
list, at £115,603). If College income were included, Oxford and Cambridge would 
be even further out on their own. 
Table 11.2 shows the other end of the spectrum.
Table 11.2 Prosperity Index (total income over FTE students) 
2010–11 for the bottom ten large (10k+ FTE) institutions
1. Open University (162) £6,098
2. Edge Hill (161) £7,054
3. West of Scotland (157) £7,913
4. Leeds Metropolitan (156) £7,933
5. Huddersfield (152) £8,103
6. Glasgow Caledonian (151) £8,107
7. Bournemouth (150) £8,184
Leading the British University today: your fate in whose hands?
201
8. Bedfordshire (149) £8,222
9. Plymouth (147) £8,321
10. De Montfort (144) £8,442
Notes: Actual position in brackets
Source: HESA
One human reaction, comparing the bottom to the top, is to ask what possible 
advantage could be gained by fining these institutions for the further support of 
those at the top (consider, for example, the enormous contribution made to the 
sector by the OU – with roughly one tenth of the resources per FTE student of 
Cambridge)
4. Then there is the question of performance. It is striking how many institutional 
strategies are driven by a desire to be at or near the top of rankings and league 
tables, the statistical merits of which make the professional cringe and whose 
implicit goals are naïve in the extreme. How many ‘apex’ institutions are there 
are there in a given country, and how many could there be (see [5] below)? The 
tempting vice-chancellor-like answer is ‘my institution, and every one above me’ 
5. Such issues all build up to the question of reputation. Each institution will maintain 
a separate ‘reputational reservoir’, and the larger it is the more easily the university 
will be able to ride out pressures and problems (especially those which attract the 
media (Watson and Maddison, 2005: 142–52).
Empirically, nearly every national system of higher education has one, two, or not 
more than a very few ‘apex’ institutions (the term was coined by Robert Cowen 
(Cowen, 2007)). These are internationally and nationally recognized and prized. 
In the UK Oxford and Cambridge would fall into this category. Juliet Chester and 
Bahram Bekhradnia have explored the detail of their exceptional qualities (HEPI, 
2009) and as an important new book by David Palfreyman and Ted Tapper identifies, 
these institutions have, and generally act upon, a sense of responsibility for the 
higher education sector as a whole (Palfreyman and Tapper, 2008). The retiring Vice-
Chancellor of Cambridge, Alison Richard, put the point well: ‘Cambridge occupies 
a distinctive and distinguished place among universities, but our future health and 
that of UK higher education as a whole are interdependent’ (Richard, 2009).
Views like this tune in well with the historical commitment in the UK to a ‘controlled 
reputational range’ of institutions (Watson, 2006). With strong mutual commitments 
to academic enlargement, to quality assurance (through, for example, external 
examining), and to collective promotion (through Universities UK), there has been 
a sense that UK higher education is a collaborative exercise, in which each end of a 
reputational pecking order knows about the other and has something bound up in its 
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success. The undermining of this precious quality may be the most damaging effect 
of UK higher education policy over the past decade (roughly since 2003).
Meanwhile, the brittle assertion of ‘world-classness’ itself may be a mirage: 
what counts in the tables (like research citations and self-evaluation by members of 
academic fields) is the opposite of most of the features governments say they want 
from ‘their’ institutions (like high teaching quality, contributions to social justice, 
and entrepreneurialism). 
The ‘zone of freedom of action’
In response, sound institutional intelligence can assist with at least the following ten 
features of effective strategic leadership and management:
1. The first is balancing ambition and realism – ensuring that strategic goals are not 
only stretching but attainable. (Objectives that are simply out of reach prompt 
cynical reactions from groups inside and outside the institution)
2. The second is getting matters in proportion – for example, ‘right-sizing’ that 
section of a research strategy focused on the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) and its successor, the Research Excellence Framework [REF].
The most secure measure of ‘research intensity’ shows the same gap between the 
apex and the aspirants. Table 11.3 ranks the same ten institutions as Table 11.1 by 
their position on the league table of research funding as a proportion of teaching 
and research funding from the Funding Councils.
Table 11.3: ‘R’ funding as a proportion of ‘T+R’ 2011–12: selected 
institutions
1. Oxford (4) 68%
2. Cambridge (5) 68%
3. LSE (6) 66%
4. Imperial College (7) 63%
5. UCL (8) 62%
6. Edinburgh (12) 51%
7. King’s College London (16) 45%
8. Bristol (21) 43%
9. Warwick (22) 43%
10. Liverpool (40) 34%
Notes: Position in overall rank in brackets
Source: HESA
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Once again there is a natural gap (after rank 5). Also again, on the overall table the 
big hitters are interspersed with all sorts of smaller players, giving the lie to the fact 
that size rules in research performance (this time the Institute of Cancer Research 
is 1st, the London Business School 2nd , and the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine 3rd). In this rank, the lowest Rustler ( Exeter) is at number 51 
(with 27 per cent) and the lowest 94-Group institution (East Anglia) is above it at 
number 50 with 28 per cent. The highest ’94-Grouper is SOAS, at the dizzy heights of 
number 13 (50 per cent). The Alliance joins in at number 63 (Bradford, 18 per cent) 
and Million+ at number 83 (the Guildhall School of Music and Drama, 9 per cent)
3. Thirdly, there is the permanent challenge of contextualizing league tables – most 
of which are profoundly misleading (especially the newspapers’ ‘multi-factorial’ 
variants; ‘single-issue’ and standardized tables, like the National Student Survey, 
can be more useful). It is striking how many institutional strategies are driven 
by a desire to be at or near the top of rankings and league tables, the statistical 
merits of which make the professional cringe and whose implicit goals are naïve 
in the extreme
4.  This does not preclude bench-marking for challenge as well as for comfort – as in 
testing performance against institutions from different as well as the same parts of 
the sector
5.  Meanwhile, inside the institution it is important to probe course and departmental 
granularity – in other words, getting below the tyranny of whole-institution 
averages (like the Funding Council ‘bench-marks’) to see how they are built-up, 
and hence being able to tackle issues locally and in detail
6. Then there is the challenge of reassuring stakeholders – as well as building cases 
for partnership and other support
7. Leaders also have to learn to deal effectively with the counter-intuitive – when 
the evidence provided by institutional research does not fit the managers’ 
preconceptions
8.  The golden rule is about getting the money right – a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of institutional success
9. Connected with this is the increasing salience of information systems, and their 
integration (JISC, 2009)
10. All of this leads up to the task of establishing and maintaining the institution’s 
unique ‘zone of freedom of action’, where temporary, creative cross-subsidy is 
probably the institutional manager’s most powerful device (Watson, 2009: 140).
Managing the future
If there is a moral in this story, it is that institutional leaders can only manage the 
future if they are serious and successful about managing both the past and the 
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present condition of their universities and colleges. Leadership has to be about 
extrapolation from a well-understood institutional history, as well as about correcting 
the course, and, where appropriate, about fresh starts. Except in the case of heavily 
pump-primed private higher education, approaches based on ‘Cambodia Year Zero’ 
are non-starters. Knowing the real condition of your institution – where it came 
from, how it is performing, how well it could perform, and at what – is an absolute 
prerequisite for facing the future with both ambition and realism (Sayers and Kubler, 
2010: 45–7). 
A more important issue is the reality check this offers those institutions 
wishing to associate themselves with a largely fictional wider elite in the slip-stream 
of the apex, largely, it seems because they have banded together in private clubs for 
the purpose. As the analysis above suggests, such clubs seem to have little really to 
do with relative significance across the wider sector; other ‘clusters’ could be much 
more powerful and helpful to policymakers. They also make a significant category 
mistake: for almost all funding decisions in the UK system the university is not the 
unit of analysis: it is the performance of subsidiary elements (researchers, courses, 
subjects, teams, and departments – which can of course be aggregated, sometimes 
misleadingly). At a cruder lever, one leadership illusion that works all the way down 
the reputational pecking order is that ‘all our geese are swans’ (or everybody here is 
‘world-class’, or at least ‘excellent’). 
It is very easy for institutional leaders to take credit for whatever goes well and 
to blame others for what goes wrong. We are now entering another one of those 
periods (the late 1970s and early 1980s were the last) when we need to be a smarter 
system. We are certainly facing another powerful – if not necessarily perfect – storm: 
of national policy confusion (exacerbated by devolution), of funding uncertainty, 
and of diminished public confidence. Survival and prosperity will once again only 
securely be achieved – as it has been in the past – by understanding and adapting in a 
framework of enduring principles. If there is a single lesson from the forty-year history 
leading up to the current confusion about the future for UK higher education, it is 
that survival (and occasional prosperity) has largely come from within. Our fate is in 
our own hands.
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Introduction
Any analysis of the White Paper Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System 
faces a number of difficulties. Although it was published at a particular moment, June 
2011, it was only one stage in a policy process that had begun with the publication 
of the Browne Report nine months before and is continuing to unfold. Although Lord 
Browne spoke, rather incautiously perhaps, of a ‘paradigm shift’ when he introduced 
his Report, the current reforms of English higher education can be traced back well 
into the period of New Labour rule between 1997 and 2010 (or even earlier), as 
Michael Shattock demonstrates in his chapter on the historical antecedents to the 
current reform. These reforms have also been substantially elaborated since the 
White Paper’s publication. Some of its strands have been significantly revised, others 
have not been pursued, and new elements have been introduced. As the Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus pointed out long ago, it is impossible to step into the same 
river twice. It is the same with any analysis of a complex policy process such as that 
represented by the 2011 White Paper. All that can be offered by way of conclusion, 
therefore, is a set of preliminary reflections and provisional assessments, all subject 
to change.
There is a temptation to describe the White Paper, the document itself and also 
its pre-history and subsequent evolution, as a ‘shambles’ – or an ‘omni-shambles’, in 
current political argot. But that would perhaps be unfair and certainly unwise. All 
policy processes reflect the dynamic between short-term political choices and long-
term structural changes. The former are inherently ephemeral and volatile, adding to 
the impression of improvization and inconsistency. The latter may appear inexorable 
and inevitable, giving an equally strong impression that ‘there is no alternative’ (in 
effect, there are no political choices to be made with regard to overall direction, only 
of timing – and, possibly, implementation). But both impressions are misleading. 
Politicians genuinely aspire to make strategic choices, even if they are often fiercely 
constrained by tactical considerations (especially so in the case of the White Paper 
because it was produced by a coalition government). Real choices also continue 
to be available, although they may require a degree of political will and courage 
that is often lacking (and which may be difficult to exercise within an increasingly 
mediatized political environment). In other words, there is nothing inevitable about 
the policies outlined in the White Paper, even if there is nothing surprising either, 
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because the dominance of neo-liberal market ideology, although shaken by the 
unfolding financial and economic crises, has not (yet) been shattered.
In this conclusion two issues will be explored. The first is how best to interpret 
the reforms of English higher education of which the White Paper is the centrepiece 
– in terms of continuity or rupture? The second is the reforms’ collateral effects, or 
unforeseen and unintended consequences, on a range of issues including student 
demand, access and equity, part-time study, postgraduate education, and new 
providers.
Interpreting the reforms
There can be little doubt that the majority of higher education leaders view these 
reforms as a ‘cruel necessity’, as indeed they did the substantial increase in tuition 
fees by the Labour Secretary of State for Education, Charles Clarke, in 2004 (UUK, 
2011). In their view a gap has opened up between the funding required by institutions 
– in particular, ‘world-class’ research intensive universities – and the resources the 
state is willing, or able, to provide. They recognize, with varying degrees of regret, 
that the essence of a welfare state has been fundamentally challenged by the new 
neo-liberal global order, and that the constrained public funding that is available 
is likely to be focused increasingly on health, pensions, and welfare. They accept 
that further downward pressure on public expenditure in general, and expenditure 
on higher education in particular, has been applied by the Coalition Government’s 
determination to reduce the deficit by ‘shrinking the state’. As a result they see no 
alternative to some form of ‘cost sharing’ between taxpayers and students (and 
graduates), of whom the former will contribute less and the latter more to the overall 
cost of higher education. A minority, of course, has actively welcomed the radical – 
and, they hope, irreversible – shift from grants made to institutions to tuition fees 
paid by students. Naively perhaps, they regard the shift as likely to enhance their 
freedom of action. A small number eagerly anticipate the development of a full-
blown market in higher education.
In the short term the reforms will deliver the additional funding that is their 
primary justification in the eyes of the majority:
● First, ministers have themselves publicly stated that total funding (direct grants 
made to institutions by the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) and the loans made available by the Student Loans Company to 
students to pay increased tuition fees) will increase – while failing at the same 
time to explain how this increase can be reconciled with the government’s 
overarching aim to reduce the deficit. Vince Cable, the secretary of state for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, told the Universities UK annual conference in 
September 2011 that total expenditure on higher education by his Department 
would increase from £9 billion in 2011–12 to £10 billion in 2014–15 (Cable, 
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2011) – and that figure did not include the rising bill for student loans. This 
increase is partly transitional (and so temporary) – as one funding regime is 
phased out and a new regime phased in – and partly structural (and therefore 
potentially permanent), although it is difficult on current evidence to determine 
their respective weights
● Secondly, although there has been a lively debate about the likely level of 
the so-called RAB (resource accounting and budgeting) charge – the degree 
of continuing public subsidy required to compensate for the fact that many 
graduates will never pay back the full amount of their loans – there is no doubt 
that the amount will be substantial (Bekhradnia and Thompson, 2012a). 
Ministers insist that the charge will be 33 per cent (3 per cent higher than 
the RAB charge figure originally given in the White Paper, while their critics, 
using the government’s own model, calculate that it could be much higher 
– perhaps more than 50 per cent. However, even if the government’s lower 
figure is accepted, there will be little, if any, reduction in the total of publicly 
provided funding available to higher education (as opposed to nominal public 
expenditure).
However, this optimistic funding scenario must be qualified for two important reasons:
i) The transition from the old to the new funding regime has created higher levels 
of uncertainty, and produced greater turbulence. Although overall funding has 
increased, these gains have not been spread equally across the system. Some 
institutions have enjoyed substantial increases, while others have experienced 
losses. Such an uneven pattern has been only partly attributable to shifts in the 
preferences of students now empowered by increased performance data from 
institutions in the form of key information sets (KIS), although that would fit 
the White Paper’s market-oriented logic. In fact, there is little evidence of any 
significant shifts in student preferences – so far. The main reason appears to 
be the variable capacity of institutions, and of departments and courses within 
them, to manage the new funding environment – and, in particular, the complex 
tri-partite system of student number controls. Whatever the cause, the effect 
is to produce substantially increased turbulence. Optimists hope this will be a 
relatively short-lived phenomenon, the inevitable pains of transition. Pessimists 
fear it may become a more endemic phenomenon, arguing that greater 
turbulence is a logical (and desired) outcome of the development of a more 
marketized system of higher education. In the past public policy was designed to 
reduce turbulence – for structural reasons, because both graduate life cycles and 
academic development and research timescales are long (like procurement cycles 
for defence or major infrastructure projects); but also for normative reasons, 
because as key civil society institutions universities needed to be insulated to 
some degree from the immediate pressures of politics and the market place. The 
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HEFCE, and its predecessors, created a range of policy instruments to smooth 
transition and reduce turbulence. The prophylactic of such protection is now 
being progressively reduced – with unknown consequences
ii) The planned increase in publicly provided resources for higher education 
may be, literally, too good to be true. In his 2013 Budget the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, announced an across-the-board 2 per cent squeeze 
on the budgets of all Whitehall departments. Although the details of this latest 
round of reduction were not scheduled to be available until after the publication 
of this book, expenditure on higher education is such a large fraction of the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills’ (BIS) budget that it is almost 
impossible for it to remain unscathed. In the longer term the next Spending 
Review is likely to pose a further threat to funding levels that are regarded as 
generous (and are, in the sense that they represent real increases at a time when 
most other publicly funded services are suffering often catastrophic declines). 
As an opening shot in the spending review war, Danny Alexander, chief secretary 
to the Treasury, wrote to ministers in March 2013 warning them to prepare 
for cuts of 10 per cent in their departmental budgets. The difficulty of cutting 
expenditure on higher education, of course, should not be underestimated. 
The continuing indirect public subsidy represented by the RAB charge could 
only be reduced by toughening the repayment regime for student loans, while 
direct public expenditure is increasingly focused on research – Quality Research 
(QR), as determined by the outcomes of the forthcoming Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) – and higher-cost STEM courses (those in science, technology, 
engineering, and medicine) and SIVS (strategic and vulnerable subjects). But the 
strong sense that planned levels of public support on higher education are highly 
vulnerable, combined with increased levels of turbulence in the system, detract 
from any feelings of optimism that the reforms of English higher education, and 
the new fees-based funding regime, has helped deliver the resources needed to 
fill the funding gap.
As a result it is difficult to interpret these reforms. On the one hand they represent 
continuity because they have protected, however temporarily and precariously, the 
funding base of English higher education, and they represent the latest instalment 
in a policy process, as Peter Scott described in more detail in chapter 3, dating back 
to the re-introduction of direct student fees by New Labour following the Dearing 
Report (if not the replacement of maintenance grants by loans in the 1990s). On the 
other hand they represent rupture, because they have created much higher degrees 
of turbulence that institutional leaders are struggling to manage but also because 
they do not appear to have established a sustainable funding regime such as the 
Browne Report aspired to produce. Not only do they appear to be unsustainable in 
terms of what is known about the Coalition Government’s intentions with regard to 
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reducing overall public expenditure and ‘shrinking the state’, they also appear to be 
unsustainable because inconsistencies (and even contradictions) within the reform 
process are undermining their effectiveness. Some of these inconsistencies reflect 
failures of implementation, others may represent more fundamental flaws in design.
Unintended consequences – and collateral damage?
All reforms are incomplete – in the double sense that they cannot cover every issue 
and that, even in the case of those issues they do, they rarely offer entirely satisfactory 
solutions – logically or logistically. The reform of English higher education is no 
exception. However, some reforms are more incomplete than others. The question, 
therefore, is whether the reform formally triggered by the Browne Report and codified 
in the White Paper (and subsequent policy iterations) is an example of an especially 
incomplete reform. To be able to offer even a provisional assessment two different 
aspects need to be considered. The first is an internal test: whether the different 
elements within a reform package are reasonably consistent and also whether the 
package is sufficiently comprehensive. The second is an external test: of the reform 
package’s resilience and, in particular, its capacity to absorb the impact of subsequent 
political (and economic) ‘events’ and other factors that could not have been 
reasonably anticipated (or, at any rate, reliably factored into it). Such external factors 
have been most vividly described by the former US Secretary for Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld in his infamous reference to ‘knowns, known-unknowns and unknown-
unknowns’.
Both tests can be applied to the reform of English higher education under five 
headings. Four – student demand, access and equity, part-time study and postgraduate 
education – are different aspects of the reform’s impact on levels of participation 
and patterns of study (in short, student-related aspects of the reform). The fifth – 
new and alternative providers – relates to its impact on the shape of the system and 
on institutions. Finally, the powerful, if indirect, impact of the Browne Report/ White 
Paper reform on institutional priorities, organizational cultures, and the orientation 
(and ethos) of English higher education also needs to be considered.
Student demand
As an earlier chapter pointed out, the recommendations made in the Browne Report 
were a recipe for expansion. The lifting of the fees cap, plus the tapered ‘taxation’ of 
fee income beyond £6,000, was designed to avoid the need to restrict (or even reduce) 
student numbers at a time when public expenditure would need to be cut. The other 
alternative, reducing the unit-of-resource (funding per student), was dismissed by 
the Browne Committee. In practice the number of applications fell sharply following 
the government’s decision to set a £9,000 cap (in other words, a tripling of fees). 
According to the University and College Admissions Service’s (UCAS) End of Cycle 
Report 2012, 13 per cent fewer full-time students in England were admitted in 2012–3 
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than in the previous year. Full-time applications for 2013–14 were initially sharply 
down even on the reduced levels for 2012–13 but recovered to end up slightly ahead 
at the time of UCAS’ January deadline. The number of students admitted will not be 
known until the autumn of 2013.
There has been a lively debate about the extent to which higher fees have been 
mainly or entirely responsible for the decline in applications, and different views 
have been expressed about whether this decline is simply a temporary ‘blip’ (such 
as occurred when fees were raised from £1,000 to £3,000 in 2006) or evidence of a 
more sustained decline in demand overall. Other factors are now likely to make it 
more difficult to determine the isolated impact of higher fees: notably, the decline 
in the number of 18- to 21-year-olds in most English regions and the deterrent effect 
of a tighter visa regime on international student recruitment. Although student 
applications were barely affected by a similar demographic slump in the late 1970s, 
conditions then were very different; UK higher education then recruited about a fifth 
rather than almost half of the relevant age group. As a result demographic decline 
could bite more deeply. Nor is the socio-cultural ‘protectionism’ that has grown 
in reaction to the liberalization of the global economy likely to be a short-lived, or 
particularly English, phenomenon. In the future the recruitment of international 
students, therefore, will most likely have to be undertaken in a colder climate – 
whatever the fate of the current visa regime and immigration targets. However, one 
thing is clear: the reform package is no longer designed to fund significant growth, 
as the Browne Report had originally intended and which was implicitly endorsed in 
the White Paper. Whether it will result either in consolidating or reducing student 
numbers is still unclear.
Access and equity
A major criticism of the central plank in the reform of English higher education – 
the raising of the fees cap to £9,000 – has been that potential students from more 
disadvantaged backgrounds would be disproportionately discouraged, as Anna 
Vignoles discussed in her chapter on widening participation (chapter 7). So far the 
evidence from UCAS statistics does not support this criticism. This conclusion has been 
broadly endorsed in a report from the Higher Education Policy Institute (Bekhradnia 
and Thompson, 2012b). In fact, the number of applications from such students 
fell by (slightly) less than average in 2012–13. However, that number did decline 
nonetheless and the relative chances of students from disadvantaged and advantaged 
social backgrounds continue to remain unchanged. Further progress towards more 
equitable access, a major policy preoccupation of New Labour governments under 
the general label of ‘widening participation’, appears to have stalled.
Also the Coalition Government’s original hope that fees would be truly variable 
has proved to be in vain, an issue discussed in greater detail by Gill Wyness in chapter 
6. Instead the great majority of institutions has decided to charge up (or very close) 
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to the £9,000. The decision following the White Paper to encourage institutions to 
charge lower fees by allowing those with average fee levels of £7,500 or less to bid for 
additional places (the so-called ‘core and margin’) produced disappointing results. 
Only a limited number of institutions bid for the additional places and they do so 
mainly by reducing their average fee levels by substituting fee waivers (future debt 
reducing) for (cash-in-hand) bursaries. In the event, many of the allocated places 
remained unfilled. Such a policy failure appears to have stemmed from the price 
insensitivity generated by the way the new fees regime has been implemented – and, 
in particular, the rather generous (and leaky) repayment regime. 
However, the major factor determining the impact of these reforms on access 
and equity is the response of institutions to the new funding environment. Any 
reduction in overall student numbers would tend to squeeze out more ‘marginal’ 
students (of all types). There is also already evidence of institutions ‘trading up’ by 
increasing entry scores, in the hope that this will improve their market (or, at any rate, 
their league table) position, which would have a similar effect. Finally, the substitution 
of the narrower ‘fair access’ agenda for the much broader ‘widening participation’ 
agenda, already well under way before the 2010 election, is likely to have a profound 
effect on institutional priorities and behaviours, despite – or perhaps because of – the 
proliferation of high-profile scholarships and bursaries. The emphasis has switched 
from wider interventions, designed to produce more equitable – and equal – outcomes 
to the promotion of social mobility, in the restricted interests of the ‘deserving poor’ 
(i.e. the tiny minority of well-qualified applicants from poor homes). 
Part-time study
Both the Browne Report and the White Paper attempted to embrace part-time students 
in the reform of English higher education. Indeed the members of the Committee 
and ministers may deserve some credit for not confining their attention to full-time 
students. For the first time (some) part-time students have become eligible for loans 
to pay their tuition fees, the assumption no longer being that all part-time students 
are either employed or else well able to fund their own higher education. However, 
this positive measure has been more than cancelled out by another – unintended 
perhaps but nevertheless inevitable – effect of the funding reform: the decision made 
by many institutions to increase part-time fees pro rata with full-time fees. Part-time 
students have thus been provided with a powerful disincentive, which has produced 
a precipitate fall in the number of applications for part-time study. To the extent 
that institutions have not increased part-time fees to match the rise in full-time fees, 
the effect has been to make part-time students less ‘valuable’ – and, therefore, to 
reduce the incentive to recruit them. So the overall impact of the reform for part-
time students has been negative.
The problem, as Claire Callender points out in chapter 8, is twofold. First, 
the distinction between full-time and part-time study is an administrative construct, 
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designed for purposes of data collection and (in particular) to determine fee status 
and therefore eligibility for various forms of financial support. It lacks any particular 
academic logic. Moreover, part-time study is defined in different ways for different 
purposes, which compounds the confusion. Secondly, part-time study is defined in 
relation to full-time study that is still regarded as the normal, or standard, pattern. So 
part-time students are calibrated in terms of the number of contact hours, expressed 
as a fraction of the – notional – standard contact hours for full-time students. 
‘Notional’ because studies have revealed wide variations in both contact and study 
hours for full-time students – not only between disciplines, which can be plausibly 
explained, but also within disciplines, which are more difficult to justify (Bekhradnia, 
2012). In any case the development of mass higher education has tended to make the 
distinction between full-time and part-time study increasingly ‘fuzzy’ – most ‘full-time’ 
students now have substantial term-time jobs (a trend that will be further encouraged 
by higher fees), while up to a fifth of ‘part-time’ students are not employed; they 
are unemployed, on ‘career breaks’, dependent on support by their partners, or 
otherwise outside standard employment and may be earning substantially less than 
their ‘full-time’ peers. Of course, full-time and part-time students still remain discrete 
groups in terms of other characteristics.
This ‘fuzziness’ is likely to increase with the rise of work- and community-based 
study and of MOOCs (massive open online courses). Private providers are also likely 
to encourage non-standard patterns of study, to control costs as well as to enhance 
their attractiveness in the market. Indeed it may not be an exaggeration to conclude 
that in a very few years not only will the distinction between ‘full-time’ and ‘part-
time’ study become more problematic, so too might the very definition of who is a 
‘student’. Yet the reform of English higher education depends on these distinctions 
and definitions. Indeed within the managed market that it aims to stimulate, entry 
conditions, and eligibility criteria, are likely to become even more important. It is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that the equal treatment of full- and part-time 
students cannot be produced by resort to conventional funding mechanisms within 
the higher education domain. Instead it would require the imaginative use of the 
wider tax and benefit systems. 
New providers
The White Paper anticipated that a significant number of new providers would enter 
the higher education market, an issue explored by Paul Temple in chapter 9. Indeed 
without significant change in the institutional architecture of the system, it is difficult 
to see how higher levels of competition can be generated. From the start there has 
been a risk that the cartel-like instincts of existing institutions would be difficult to 
overcome, that they would ‘price’ up to the new £9,000 cap, and that the publication 
of KIS and the impact of league tables would only gradually modify deep-rooted 
Claire Callender and Peter Scott
214
institutional behaviours. As Temple writes in chapter 9, two different processes for 
opening up English higher education to new types of new provider were anticipated:
i) The first was that further education colleges would increase their stake in higher 
education. At present most higher education provision in further education 
colleges is essentially complementary to the provision in universities and other 
higher education institutions; most is at Higher Certificate/Diploma and 
Foundation Degree level and many courses are franchised from or validated by 
universities. There is little evidence so far that many colleges would prefer to 
develop more stand-alone provision, in competition with courses in mainstream 
higher education, as research commissioned by BIS itself has demonstrated (Parry 
et al., 2012). Nor is there much evidence that colleges are anticipating substantial 
growth in higher education student numbers, which has been largely borne out by 
their failure to recruit the additional students awarded under the HEFCE’s ‘core 
and margin’ initiative. However, a shift from complementary and competitive 
provision and a step-change in the volume of higher education provision in further 
education colleges would both be required to free up the market
ii) The second process was that new providers, both not-for-profit charities and 
for-profit corporations, would compete with existing ‘public’ institutions. So far 
progress has been slow. Two providers – the College (now the University) of Law 
and Regents College now Regents University London – have been granted full 
university status. Four others have been given degree-awarding powers, including 
BPP University College (now owned by the Apollo Group, a United States for-profit 
corporation that also operates the University of Phoenix). A number of reasons 
appear to explain why alternative providers are reluctant to enter the English higher 
education market. One is continuing uncertainty about the regulatory regime, in 
particular the arrangements for monitoring academic quality and standards but 
also other performance measures (for example, completion and graduation rates 
and other efficiency measures), and also about how eligible students are for loans. 
Private providers appear to be unconvinced that this regime will continue to be 
based on a ‘public’ model of higher education. They also believe that establishing 
joint ventures and other forms of collaboration with existing institutions offers a 
better business model than cut-throat competition. This alternative model is being 
pursued by some of the most active private providers such as INTO, Study Group, 
and Kaplan. As a result, there appears to be a limited prospect that the English 
system’s institutional architecture is going to be substantially modified, although 
a secondary effect of loosening the rules for achieving university status has been 





The Browne Committee, like most previous enquiries into higher education, was 
largely focused on undergraduate students. Although this focus on undergraduate 
students had not been mandated by its remit, this remit was to make recommendations 
on ‘student fees and funding’. Rightly or wrongly this produced an assumption that 
these students were undergraduates and that funding was also subordinate to fees, 
i.e. its funding recommendations should be designed to accommodate any new 
fees regime rather than to design a funding system from first principles. In fact the 
Committee stretched its remit and, as has already been said, Lord Browne himself 
claimed that its recommendations set out a new ‘paradigm’ for English higher 
education. But the focus on undergraduate students remained. The White Paper 
did not significantly expand the scope of the reform. Its sections on research and 
postgraduate education were brief – no new policies were unveiled, apart from the 
standard rhetoric about excellence and concentration (assumed to be essentially 
synchronous). It is perhaps worth noting that Research Councils, which have a 
significant stake not only in research but also in postgraduate education, are UK-wide 
bodies. As such they cannot easily be corralled into the narrower reform of English 
higher education, an accidental but perhaps important effect of devolution.
The neglect of postgraduate education is a serious flaw in the reform package, 
as Geoff Whitty and Joel Mullan argue in chapter 10. One reason is that, as with full-
time and part-time students, the distinction between undergraduate and postgraduate 
education is becoming fuzzier. In many professional disciplines it has always been a 
contrived demarcation. So-called ‘undergraduate’ Master’s courses have proliferated. 
Many postgraduate courses are ‘postgraduate’ in time but not ‘postgraduate’ in level, 
often serving as conversion courses or elements in wider programmes of continuing 
professional development. A second reason, again as with part-time students, is 
that the increase in undergraduate fees has produced pressure to increase fees for 
postgraduate courses – and for very similar reasons. But no attempt has been made, 
as there has been with part-time students (however feebly and unsuccessfully), to 
articulate the two processes. In effect, the reform package is silent on postgraduate 
education. A third reason is that this silence feeds the uncertainty about the impact 
higher undergraduate fees (and correspondingly higher graduate debt) will have 
on the propensity of students to continue on to postgraduate courses. There is 
particular concern that, among students in comparatively low-pay occupations, 
higher undergraduate fees may have a significant deterrent effect. A similar concern 
regards postgraduate courses that do not appear to boost future earnings. In short, 
the reform of English higher education has served, no doubt unintendedly, to turn 
postgraduate education into terra incognita as well as the future frontier for widening 
participation.
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Conclusion
Reforms do not need to succeed to succeed. In many, perhaps most, detailed respects 
the reform of English higher education triggered by the Browne Report and codified 
by the White Paper (and subsequent policy interventions) has failed to produce the 
changes desired by ministers – so far. 
● The reform package has delivered additional resources to institutions – but 
in a random and unpredictable manner. In any case this increase appears 
to have been an unintended consequence of the financial arrangements for 
the transition from the old to the new fees and funding regime, the caution 
of institutions (and general restrictions on pay increases), and the generous 
student loan repayment regime introduced to ‘sweeten the pill’ of higher fees. 
As a result, levels of overall funding are regarded as precarious and temporary, 
likely to be reversed by additional cuts to core budgets in the forthcoming 
Spending Review.
● Fees are not variable in any meaningful sense. Instead institutions have ‘priced’ 
to the cap, partly because they fear charging lower fees will be seen as a lack 
of confidence in their own standards (and standing) and partly because the 
generous repayment regime has produced low-price sensitivity. It is hardly a 
simplification to say that the majority of institutions have either charged the 
maximum £9,000, or, if they had poor recruitment records or simply wished 
to demonstrate their commitment to widening participation and social justice, 
have charged slightly less. But the differential is of little consequence within the 
total burden of graduate debt.
● As a result, a market has failed to develop: there is little evidence that student 
preferences have significantly changed – between more and less popular 
subjects, and between institutions arranged in their familiar ‘pecking order’ 
– despite the publication of KIS and the often elaborate – and confusing – 
packages of bursaries, scholarships, and fee waivers on offer. Efforts to open up 
the market, at least for well-qualified applicants, have probably served to reduce 
student diversity.
● A reform package designed to allow for expansion in student numbers – in the 
eyes of the Browne Committee at any rate – has produced the opposite effect. 
In the first year of the new fees regime, applications, and admissions, plunged. 
While applications by full-time students have since recovered, they remain 
below the levels reached under the old tuition fees and funding regime. If the 
impacts of demographic decline and the chilling effects of the new visa regime 
and anti-immigration sentiment on international student recruitment are taken 
into account, it seems unlikely that the current reduction in student numbers 
will be a short-term ‘blip’.
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● The institutional landscape has remained essentially unchanged and there 
are few signs that it is likely to alter in the short and even medium term. 
Further education colleges, with a few exceptions, have shown little appetite 
for expanding their stake in higher education, even if market conditions 
allowed. Alternative providers have been slow to enter the market, preferring 
collaboration with existing providers to cut-throat competition. As a result, 
there is little downward pressure on fee levels.
● The collateral effects of the reform of (full-time undergraduate) tuition fees and 
funding have been to produce significant shortfalls in applications by part-time 
students and to generate high levels of uncertainty about the future size and 
shape of postgraduate education. Finally, much unfinished business remains, 
particularly with regard to the regulation of institutional status and academic 
standards.
Hardly an impressive achievement. And yet … It is possible that, although a failure 
in terms of detailed policies, the reform of English higher education may achieve its 
overall objective: to change the culture of the system. The cumulative effect of these 
measures is likely to have an important impact on both institutional priorities and 
organizational cultures. Resources could well be diverted from ‘front line’ teaching 
and research into marketing and ‘customer care’. In future academic leadership may 
be valued less highly than the ‘business planning’ skills needed to manage the new fees 
and funding environment. The changing context within which institutional leaders 
must operate is the subject of David Watson’s contribution to this book (chapter 11). 
Collegially determined (and largely self-policing norms), rooted in trust, could be 
replaced by performance measures and management targets, one aspect of what Ron 
Barnett describes as the (damaging) shift from ‘mystery’ to ‘explicitness’ in chapter 5. 
Two points deserve to be emphasized in this respect. The first is that the drift towards 
such behaviours is already well established. Policy insiders and institutional managers 
are perhaps less aware of it – partly because they derive advantages from it and partly 
because they have become routinized by its effects through daily exposure – than 
critics such as the Campaign for the Public University (2013) and the Council for 
the Defence of British Universities (2013). The second point is that such corporate 
behaviours can flourish in the absence of true markets, just as collegial and mutualist 
behaviours can flourish in commercial environments. The reform of English higher 
education may not be successful in producing the market university, but it is certainly 
likely to provide a powerful stimulus to the development of the managerial university.
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